PREJUDICE IN DISCOURSE

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Teun A. van Dijk

Prejudice in Discourse
An Analysis of Ethnic Prejudice
in Cognition and Conversation

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For Philomena

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PREFACE

This book reports results from the interdisciplinary project 'Prejudice in Conversations about Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands', carried out at the University of Amsterdam. This project has two major aims. First, a cognitive model is being designed to represent ethnic attitudes in general and prejudice in particular. Second, an analysis is being made of how people talk about ethnic minority groups and how such talk expresses their underlying prejudices. Empirical data have been gathered in some 120 nondirected interviews in various neighborhoods of Amsterdam. In the present study we will focus on the discourse characteristics of prejudiced talk. Only limited attention will be paid to the social-psychological theory about ethnic stereotypes and prejudice. In a later study we hope to report more in detail about this cognitive dimension of the project.

The appearance of this book in the series *Pragmatics and Beyond* needs some comment. Although we will also pay attention to pragmatic features of talk in the narrow sense, that is, to illocutionary functions of utterances as speech acts, much of our analysis lies 'beyond' this conception of pragmatics. First, also other levels of discourse analysis will be attended to. And second, we are primarily interested in the relationships between discourse, on the one hand, and the cognitive and social contexts of language use, on the other hand. Prejudice and prejudiced talk require an interdisciplinary account in terms of cognitive models of social attitudes and intergroup conflicts as well as in terms of a sociology of communicative interaction and its context. This means that our study belongs to a broader, empirical approach to pragmatics, as it was advocated by Charles Morris several decades ago. Theoretically, however, this research should be located at the boundaries of discourse analysis, cognitive psychology, social psychology, and microsociology.

An important motivation for both our project and the present book is the realization that ethnic prejudice and racism are a rapidly spreading problem in our society, especially also in Western European countries. The immigration of large groups of black people from the former colonies and of 'guest

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. *Aims of this study*

In multiethnic societies the different ethnic groups constitute a prominent topic of thought and talk for each other. Especially when new groups become salient, e.g. by recent immigration, conflicts, or socioeconomic circumstances, members of the autochtonous majority group will regularly engage in conversation about such newcomers. Such talk is crucial for the informal distribution of beliefs and for the expression and social sharing of attitudes about minority groups. Typically, it is also an important occasion for the formulation and persuasive diffusion of ethnic prejudice in society. This study deals with some of the properties of such prejudiced talk among majority group members. Our examples will be taken from interviews held in Amsterdam about 'foreigners' in the Netherlands, in particular immigrant workers from Morocco and Turkey, and black citizens from the former Dutch colony of Surinam. Yet, our discussion has a wider scope, and hopes to reveal more general features of racist discourse. In that respect, it may contribute to our insight into talk and communication about minority groups, and hence into the forms of discrimination and racism in many other 'Western' countries.

Our systematic description of prejudiced discourse is not just an exercise in applied discourse analysis. Rather, we will focus on those features of discourse that may be relevant for the expression of ethnic attitudes and for the diffusion of such attitudes in the community. That is, prejudiced talk is on the one hand taken and analyzed as a prominent form of social interaction and of verbal discrimination by majority group members. On the other hand, it is examined as an observable indication of assumed cognitive representations of ethnic attitudes and of the strategies for the mental and social uses of such 'delicate' beliefs. In other words, discourse is both our object and a method of investigation.

Due to space limitations, however, we will only pay limited attention to the cognitive and social dimensions of prejudiced discourse, and focus on the various structures of talk about minorities. Thus, we will investigate

workers' from the Mediterranean countries has challenged the widespread myth of racial tolerance in our countries. Within a wider socioeconomic, cultural, and historical analysis of racism, it has therefore become imperative to thoroughly study the processes in which racist beliefs and attitudes are formed and diffused. Besides the mass media, school textbooks, or official (political, legal) discourse, it is especially informal everyday conversation among majority members that has contributed to the spreading and acceptance of prejudiced attitudes and to possible consequences of such beliefs in discriminatory interaction with minority members. In this sense, this study is also intended as a demonstration of the feasibility and necessity of an applied, critical approach to discourse analysis. To guarantee its readability for students or researchers from several disciplines as well as for a wider public of people interested in prejudice, we have tried to keep the theoretical framework and the terminology as simple as possible. Detailed theoretical studies will appear as independent articles elsewhere.

We are indebted to several groups of students who assisted us in collecting the interview data for this study, and to the members of the prejudice project at the University of Amsterdam for many discussions and comments on earlier versions of parts of this report. We are indebted to Livia Polanyi for her corrections in the English translations of the original Dutch interview fragments. The Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO) is gratefully acknowledged for its funding of this project.

Special thanks are due to Philomena Essed for her general support and advice, as well as for numerous discussions about the subtleties of racism as it is experienced by black minority members. With love and gratitude, therefore, this book is dedicated to her.

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semantic and pragmatic strategies, style and rhetoric, narrative structures of stories, argumentation, and other conversational characteristics. In each case, however, our perspective will be on the specific functions of such structures in the expression or display of 'underlying' ethnic attitudes, or in the accomplishment of the (interview) interaction.

Finally, this study should be seen against the background of other research on ethnic stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, and racism. Our cognitive and social psychological perspective on these important social problems should not obscure the fundamental relevance of sociocultural, historical, political, or economical factors. And a discourse-analytic approach again is just one, though rather new, method and object of research within the area of communication, cognition, and interaction. Yet, by unraveling some of the details of this everyday, microlevel of prejudice and talk, we hope to build the bridge between cognitions, on the one hand, and the broader social dimensions of racism, on the other hand.

1.2. *Theoretical framework*

Both prejudice and talk are social phenomena that require analysis within an interdisciplinary framework. A full-fledged theory of prejudiced discourse, therefore, would be a highly complex undertaking. In this modest monograph only fragments of such a theory can be spelled out.

A first line of theory formation has been inspired by our own previous work on discourse (e.g. van Dijk 1972, 1977, 1980, 1981). Although much of this earlier work does not systematically deal with spoken dialogues in the social context, it suggests many notions that are also relevant for the analysis of talk. Conditions on local semantic coherence, the concept of semantic macrostructure, the analysis of speech act sequences, and so on, hold both for text and talk. Similarly, our systematic analysis of narrative structures and their relationships with discourse will appear to be relevant in the account of stories about minorities.

Secondly, we have drawn suggestions from our earlier work with Walter Kintsch about the psychology of discourse processing (Kintsch and van Dijk 1978; van Dijk and Kintsch 1983). This cognitive approach provides the important link between thought and talk, and hence suggests how prejudiced attitudes and their expression in discourse may be related. At the same time, this study of ethnic attitudes serves as a possible, social-psychological extension of the earlier cognitive model of production and understanding.

Since we are dealing with dialogical data, namely interviews, some of our analyses will draw, thirdly, upon results in conversational analysis, involving strategic moves in talk, conversational storytelling, turn-taking, sequencing, and so on (for references, see the following chapters). We will see that an important feature of talk about minorities is its strategic nature. People want to make a good impression (and not appear racist), but at the same time they may want to express their negative opinions, feelings, or experiences regarding ethnic minority groups. These conversational goals may conflict, and therefore require strategic resolution, both cognitively and interactionally. At this point, our strategic model of discourse processing is also relevant (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983).

Fourth, ethnic attitudes in general, and stereotypes and prejudice in particular, also require more focused theorizing. Our perspective in this case resembles that of recent research often summarized under the label of 'social cognition' (Forgas 1981). That is, we view prejudice as a form or as a result of what may be called 'social information processing', not at the purely individual or personal level, but rather as a central property of social members of groups, on the one hand, and of groups and intergroup relations, on the other hand (Tajfel 1981, 1982). In this sense, our work is also meant as an extension of current research in cognitive social psychology about (ethnic and other) stereotypes, group schemata, and biased information processing about minority groups (cf. e.g. Hamilton (ed.) 1981.) Whereas much of this work has an experimental basis, we hope to be able to assess the structures and processes of prejudice through systematic analysis of natural data. Another difference with our approach is that in our opinion much of this work is not cognitive enough, on the one hand, and not social enough, on the other hand; a well-known predicament of social psychology. For instance, frequent use is made of several cognitive notions, such as 'schema', 'script', 'categorization', 'prototypes', 'availability', etc., but it is seldom spelled out in detail what exactly such cognitive representations of social phenomena (other persons, groups, actions, situations) look like, and what processes are involved in their actual use in concrete social situations. At this latter point, a thorough microsociological analysis of interactions and situations is necessary, especially for interethnic encounters. Ethnic prejudice cannot be fully understood without an explicit account of its functions for observation, action and interaction in such situations as well as within society at large. The link between the microlevel and the macrolevel of racism should be established in this kind of broadly conceived social-psychological approach.

Finally, prejudiced talk also serves a number of additional communicative and social functions, such as interpersonal persuasion, the diffusion of social beliefs and opinions in the community, ingroup solidarity, or normalization of attitudes and social precepts for the behavior towards minority groups. Unfortunately, there is little research about such functions of informal communication 'through' everyday talk for the spreading of ethnic attitudes. Yet, there is some relevant work on these social and cognitive dimensions of communication, from Katz and Lazarsfeld's (1955) classical book on personal influence until some recent studies on social cognition and communication collected by Roloff and Berger (1982).

Although this theoretical background is already fairly complex, it should be emphasized that most of the directions of research mentioned above are not homogeneous approaches. In the field of social cognition alone, there are several orientations, such as the more cognitively inspired American work, as exemplified e.g. in Hamilton (ed.) (1981), and the European approach as we find it e.g. in Tajfel (1982). Also, it is not difficult to distinguish other approaches to ethnic prejudice, e.g. political, ideological, historical, sociocultural, and so on. In the respective chapters and sections, we will provide further details and references about theory and research in the various fields mentioned above.

1.3. *Methods of research*

It has been remarked above that discourse, for us, is both the object and method of research. That is, we not only analyze talk for its own sake, e.g. as part of a theory of some type of discourse, but also to get at the 'underlying' ethnic attitudes of speakers. In that sense, discourse features serve as data for theoretical inferences about the structures and processes of prejudice in memory. It is our contention that this kind of natural data provides insights into the contents and structures of prejudice, and especially into the functions and other uses of prejudice in the lives of the people that harbor them, which cannot possibly be revealed through experimental laboratory work. Of course, such data also exhibit the kind of 'messiness' that controlled laboratory experiments do not have. Talk is just very much more complex than responses on scales, choosing between a few options, or even writing 'free responses' in a laboratory task, and this complexity is also transferred, as a matter of course, to the analysis of the data. However, the loss of control with respect to specified outcomes of tested hypotheses is more than compensated by the richness and the validity of the data from

natural discourse. Many subtleties of ethnic opinions, for instance, would not be expressed in an experiment. On the other hand, what may be an experimenter bias in the laboratory may become an interviewer bias in talk. We will see, however, that this bias is only minimal if respondents can talk freely. And on the other hand, the interaction with the interviewer reflects precisely what we want to know, *viz.* how people talk to *others* about ethnic minorities (Schwartz and Jacobs 1979).

At this point, there is another problem, though. Even nondirected interviews are of course not the same as spontaneous everyday conversations (Erickson and Shultz 1982). Even in spontaneous interview talk, people may tend to follow the strategies of socially desirable answers to questions asked, especially when minorities are involved (Gaertner 1976). Nonetheless, we will assume at the same time that also interviews are a form of social interaction and communication, and that many of their properties are sufficiently close to spontaneous talk to warrant at least partial conclusions about the nature of everyday conversations about minorities (at least with people we don't know). The reason we had to content ourselves with interviews is that it is practically impossible to elicit 'real' conversations about a specific subject. This would also raise the ethical problem of working with a hidden tape recorder. Though it is in principle possible to tape a large number of spontaneous conversations in various social settings in the hope that the participants would bring up the subject of 'foreigners', such an approach would not yield enough data.

Therefore, we have collected a large number of interviews most of which were held about a purported topic such as 'Life in Amsterdam' and in which the topic of minorities was often brought up spontaneously by the interviewees, or also casually introduced by the interviewers.

The relevant portions of the interviews have been transcribed more or less literally, but only in a few cases in the same kind of detail as is required for precise conversational analysis. Thus, our data are the transcriptions of interview fragments, and it goes without saying that also in that case we are still rather far from what 'actually went on' in the interview. Especially intonation, gestures, or other nonverbal features of talk cannot be studied in that way. Another problem that is relevant for this book is the necessity of translating the original spoken Dutch into English. For many aspects of colloquial Dutch, such as the use of particles, this is virtually impossible, so that the English examples given in our analyses will be only approximations of the original talk.

1.4. *Respondents*

The people we interviewed all belong to the white Dutch majority, and live in different neighborhoods of Amsterdam. The interviews were held in three different periods from 1980 through 1983. The first group was conducted in different neighborhoods, that is, both in neighborhoods in which also a substantial number of minority groups live ('contact' neighborhoods) and in neighborhoods in which virtually no minorities are present ('noncontact' neighborhoods). The second group of interviews were all held in one neighborhood in which poor Dutch people live side-by-side with people from several minority groups. The third set of interviews was held in a rich, noncontact part of Amsterdam. The underlying rationale for this distribution was the assumption that ethnic prejudice and especially everyday experiences regarding ethnic minorities would be different in the contact and the noncontact neighborhoods.

Finally, we did not try to follow the usual rules for the sampling of respondents, also because many of the contacts had to be established spontaneously in public places such as parks, cafés, or shops. Yet, we interviewed more or less the same number of men as women and tried to speak with people of different ages. The socioeconomic background of the people was more or less homogeneous in the respective neighborhoods they lived in.

Although this study focuses on ethnic prejudice, many of the people we talked with simply cannot be seen as outright racists. In fact, many are very liberal and tolerant and actually oppose prejudice and racism. In this sense, it should be stressed that we are not *only* interested in prejudice, but rather in more general attitudes about minority groups, whether negative or more neutral. That is, even if people display tolerance, we want to know *how* they do so, since this also is a feature of the ethnic situation.

1.5. *Minority groups*

Since our examples are drawn from interviews about ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands, we should briefly specify some of the characteristics of the ethnic situation in that country. Needless to say, a first historical, cultural, and socioeconomic background for ethnic attitudes and prejudice is the colonial background of the Netherlands. Both in the East Indies and the West Indies, Holland, for centuries, had some colonies, and several of the groups of people that immigrated in the last decades are originally from those former colonies. A first group of citizens from what is now Indonesia

immigrated after this country became independent in 1948. An important group of these immigrants constitute the Moluccans, and they have become one of the major targets for prejudice and discrimination in the Netherlands. Despite the earlier claims of e.g. Bagley (1973) that — at least until the seventies — the reaction of the Dutch population to this immigration of nearly 200,000 people was more or less tolerant, as compared to England, we witness increasingly negative attitudes also against this group.

Then, in the sixties, the economic prosperity of the Netherlands led to the employment of large groups of immigrant workers (called 'guest workers' in Dutch, as in German), first mainly from Italy and Spain, and in the past decade predominantly from Turkey and Morocco. Whereas the Italians and Spaniards eventually returned to their home countries, or became more or less integrated and accepted, the major forms of intolerance in the last years have been directed against people from Turkey and Morocco. As we will see in more detail in our interview data, many of the negative attitudes concern the sociocultural differences and the socioeconomic competition perceived by members of the majority. Islamitic practices, cooking, the role of women, and other cultural characteristics of Turks and Moroccans are in that case interpreted in the same negative way as the assumed competition for scarce housing, work, and social services. In the seventies, racist parties have emerged that advocate the return of all (or at least the 'illegal') guest workers to their home countries, and now have one seat in parliament.

A third major group of immigrants came from the former colony of Surinam (adjacent to Guyana), which became independent in 1975. In a short time, more than 100,000 people from that country settled in the Netherlands, mainly in the larger cities in the western part of Holland. Whereas for this group the cultural differences were maybe less marked (most of them speak Dutch, at least as a second language) than for the immigrant workers from Turkey and Morocco, the Dutch population was confronted for the first time with a considerable group of black citizens (African-Surinamese, often labeled 'creoles', as well as Indian-Surinamese, usually identified as 'Hindustans', besides smaller groups of Chinese and Javanese Surinamese).

Both the Surinamese and the immigrant workers generally suffer from bad housing, high unemployment, low-paid jobs, and many forms of discrimination (Bovenkerk 1978). Since the government realized that most 'foreigners' — as they are commonly called — were to stay in the Netherlands (WRR 1979), policies have been developed to give them special support, e.g. in education, housing, and social services; but on the whole, these policies

were often ambiguous. Despite the verbally professed goals of differentation and cultural autonomy for the various groups, there is at least tacit acknowledgment of the need of integration. And despite strict immigration policies, many people in the white majority resent the special attention paid to (or assumed to be paid to) the 700,000 (5%) new citizens by the national and local authorities.

This concise overview provides some background information about the ethnic situation in the Netherlands. Not only has a sharp decline in the economic position of the Netherlands in the eighties brought about a nearly twenty-percent unemployment rate, but also an increase in openly formulated prejudice, xenophobia, and racism. Whereas 'racism' has long been a taboo notion to denote the ethnic situation in the Netherlands, the last few years have brought the recognition that the alleged Dutch tolerance, indeed, was only a myth. As we will see in more detail in later chapters, recent survey data have revealed that according to the well-known social distance measures, more than half of the Dutch population has negative attitudes towards (the presence of) foreigners, with only slight variations according to region, town, gender, age, political affiliation, or occupation (Lagendijk 1980). Only about a quarter of the population appears to be relatively tolerant according to this kind of interview data. One of the reasons to analyze in depth the kind of interviews we have held is to gain more, detailed, and especially qualitative insight into these ethnic attitudes. (See section 4.10 for further data from survey research about ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands.)

1.6. *Prejudice in other types of discourse*

Although this book is mainly concerned with the study of prejudice in conversation, its more general title warrants at least a few remarks about the expression of ethnic attitudes in other types of discourse. Racism in our society not only shows itself in everyday talk, but is verbally represented also in media discourse, in textbooks, political propaganda, laws and regulations, meetings, job interviews, literature and comics, and so on. Only some of these genres have systematically been examined in order to assess ethnic stereotypes, ethnocentrism, prejudice, or verbal discrimination. Our project on prejudice in cognition and conversation, therefore, is part of a larger framework of studies that aims at the critical analysis of prejudice in other discourse types, e.g. news reporting in the press (van Dijk 1983a) and secondary school textbooks (van Dijk and Spaninks 1981).

Racism in the *media* has been the topic of most studies in this domain. News, both in the press and on TV, advertising, movies or various other TV-programs have been analyzed systematically for their portrayal of minorities (Hartmann and Husband 1974; UNESCO 1974, 1977; Husband 1975; Downing 1980; Troyna 1981; van Dijk 1983a). The general findings of this research consistently point to similar features of the role of minorities in the media, despite differences between countries, the national or the regional press, type of newspapers or of TV-programs. In general, then, minorities also are minorities in the media. They are less employed as journalists (in the Netherlands: almost none) (Greenberg and Mazingo 1976; Husband 1983). Newsreports, feature articles, and TV-programs about them are relatively scarce. In movies they still play secondary and stereotypical roles. News about them is predominantly negative: crime, conflict, social problems, drugs, and the negative consequences of immigration as perceived by the majority. Or else they have a passive role; it is news about the actions of the authorities for (or against) them, or of members or groups from the white majority. Their opinion, even in matters that regard them directly, is seldom asked. Instead, white minority specialists are invited to comment on policy issues or conflicts. General social problems, such as drugs or muggings (Hall *et al.* 1978), are redefined as associated with minorities. Even when news is not outright racist, it subtly conveys negative representations about (the presence of) minorities. Our interview data show that newspapers are often taken as the evidence base for negative opinions. Other research shows that people often mention the media as the source of their knowledge and beliefs about minority groups, although their own experience and contacts as well as conversations with others also figure high in this respect (Hartmann and Husband 1974; Bagley and Verma 1979). The problem of media influence is complex, also for this topic, but it should be stressed that this influence may be substantial for those topics that (a) are found relevant and salient, and (b) about which people do not have direct information from other sources. Tendencies of media reporting often reappear, therefore, in everyday talk. And conversely, racist talk may again be reported — often without critical comment — in the press. In this way, racist politicians (like Powell in England) and extremist parties and their members may be heard by millions. But the same holds for the 'racial discourse' (Reeves 1983) of the established parties and their representatives: racist attitudes and ideologies are not only formed and spread by right-wing extremists.

Similar remarks hold for *textbooks*. If minority groups are represented at all in history, geography, or social science textbooks, this will very often be an incomplete, biased, ethnocentric, if not a prejudiced presence. Just as racism in everyday life does not feature prominently in our media news, colonialism, slavery, and the many negative aspects of the history of our (western) countries will hardly be emphasized in textbooks. Western culture, technology, or political organization are systematically shown in a positive light, in contrast to the 'primitive' nature of the peoples on other continents. Before and after the colonial presence, those same countries are hardly portrayed. This picture also applies to the immigrated groups from those former colonies in the present context. Their culture, organizations, political, actions, and their forms of everyday life are systematically underrepresented both in the press and in textbooks (Ferro 1981; Redmond 1980; van den Berg and Reinsch 1983).

We have given this brief summary of some of the findings in research on prejudice and racism in other discourse types because many of the more specific beliefs about minorities in conversations derive from what we have read and heard about them from other sources. Comics, children's literature, and textbooks play an important role within the wider context of processes of socialization (Katz 1976). They help to transmit the general cultural beliefs that have been accumulated during our colonial histories. And the media provide the more specific picture about the current ethnic situation, defining the topics of concern and the overall negative evaluation of minorities in our society (Husband 1982).

1.7. *Talk about minorities: An example*

At the end of this *Introduction*, it may be a useful illustration of the previous sections and a relevant preparation of the chapters to follow if we give a concrete example of the kind of talk we intend to analyze in this book. Such an example not only gives the flavor of the content and form of such talk, but may also serve as some initial evidence for the theoretical analysis of prejudice in the next chapter. Systematic analysis will then follow in the subsequent chapters.

The following fragment is taken from an interview with a retired director of a small firm who lives in one of the more elegant new suburbs of Amsterdam, a typical noncontact area (we use 'Iter' as an abbreviation of 'Interviewer' and 'Itee' for 'Interviewee'):

(1) (I, 2).
Iter: But such, of course Surinamese and guest workers do not live in this neighborhood.
Itee: In this neighborhood, there live uhh a lot of aliens, a lot of foreigners, a whole lot. But uhh not the
Iter: [But uhh
Itee: guest worker who does the dirty work, who does the heavy work, and they uhh[h
Iter: [If they would, if a district would be built here, or uhh, let's say apartment houses, cheap apartment houses, just like, just like in de Bijlmer [new suburb of Amsterdam with many foreigners], what would your opinion be? How would you react?
Itee: I would uhh (pause), I would find that WRONG. Not because those people would not have the right to live here. But because uhh, uhh (pause) Because it uhh uhh, I think, if you would build cheap apartment houses here, then that would diminish the value of the, the houses; the houses that have been built here, uh would definitely decrease, and that is economically irresponsible, that is impossible, and it is not necessary either, and I wouldn't know why, why you, why you uhhh, uh, uh, would build for example industry in certain areas, areas that have been built for people who have come to live in this neighborhood, and they have bought houses, have built houses, because it was planned as a garden city. In a garden city, you cannot establish industry. Impossible.
Iter: But sometimes you hear that the city says: we ought to have a distribution policy and, there are so many foreigners, they should be distributed over the whole town, and, well, so[I just want to say
Itee: [I don't know. Then you shouldn't, shouldn't do that, uhh, not, not in the middle of a neighborhood like this, that's impossible. I believe, I believe that uhh then you would more or less run down the city uhhh (pause).

Though many other remarks would be relevant to this fragment, one of the prominent features of the talk of the interviewee is his strategy to acceptably answer the hypothetical question of the interviewer about the possible establishment of minorities in his neighborhood. In his previous remarks, he had already shown many forms of caution and what may be called moves of

'concession': *foreigners, they are also people.* In this fragment, he starts his answer (line 14) with an emphatic negative (*WRONG*), but immediately 'repairs' this opinion by denying the possibly negative inference by the interviewer (about the tolerance of the speaker). He then proceeds very hesitantly to the actual reason for his negative opinion: the price of the houses would diminish. Instead of relating this assumption with his own interests, he rather claims a more general economic rationale. This argument, however, may still be considered as rather weak, and he is clearly looking for better reasons. He then resorts to a comparison: one would not build industry either in this garden city. After a repeated hypothetical question of the interviewer (mentioning city plans for possible redistribution of 'foreigners'), he finally specifies another important reason: the neighborhood would deteriorate.

Whereas people in contact areas will typically tell concrete stories about (negatively interpreted) personal experiences, this man in a rich noncontact neighborhood resorts to generalizations, economic responsibility, a comparison, and strategic moves both to express his negative opinion and at the same time to protect his self-definition as a nonracist citizen. In the following chapters we will analyze the underlying opinions and these strategies in detail.

2. ETHNIC PREJUDICE

2.1. *Classical approaches*

In this chapter a succinct analysis will be made of ethnic prejudice. After a very brief summary of classical and more recent approaches to ethnic attitudes, stereotypes, or prejudice, we present our own theoretical framework. Prejudice is both a cognitive and a social phenomenon. It is not merely a characteristic of individual beliefs or emotions about social groups, but a shared form of social representation in group members, acquired during processes of socialization and transformed and enacted in social communication and interaction. Such ethnic attitudes have social functions, e.g. to protect the interests of the ingroup. Their cognitive structures and the strategies of their use reflect these social functions. We will therefore label our approach 'sociocognitive'. Our evaluation of other work about prejudice is based on that perspective (van Dijk 1983b).

The history of prejudice research is closely linked with the development of social psychology in the past fifty or sixty years. This means, on the one hand, that most approaches have been psychological, stressing the individual mental mechanisms and neglecting the social dimension of ethnic attitudes. Yet, on the other hand, the cognitive bias has only recently led to a more explicit application of notions and methods of cognitive psychology. The predominant interest for the 'prejudiced individual' has obscured the role of a 'prejudiced society' in the acquisition, the functions, and the context of such individual attitudes. Typically, then, most work on prejudice is formulated in terms of stereotypes, that is, as wrong beliefs, faulty reasoning, or biased perception regarding other groups or nations. The concept of 'racism', taken as the wider social and institutional framework for a study of prejudice, very seldom appears in both classical and currect research.

A first landmark in the early development of the study of social stereotypes from a cognitive point of view is Lippmann's (1922) study of public opinion. He argues that we do not directly react to the events in the world, but rather to 'pictures in the head' we have about such events. Such pictures exhibit the necessary simplification, are at the same time a subjective

interpretation and reconstruction of reality, and are shared by other members of the same culture. His definition of 'public opinion' fairly closely resembles what we would now call 'social cognition'. He shows that our culturally defined stereotypes of other people bias our perception of their actions. Given one single trait, we will tend to fill in the details about others according to the stereotypical picture in our head. Decisively he rejects any biological basis or vague notions such as 'group minds'. To explain the ubiquity of stereotypes, we should first look in "the nursery, the school, the church" (1922: 93). Yet, stereotypes for him are not just economical ways of information processing. They also have social functions, *viz.* as "defenses of our position in society". Many of Lippmann's observations thus provide the main tenets of our actual views on social stereotypes.

Yet, more than a decade later, the restrictions of an experimental paradigm seem to have replaced the 'anecdotical' approach of the journalist. Katz and Braly (1933) report about their vastly influential approach to stereotypes in terms of traits assigned to the members of groups or nations on the basis of a list of characteristic adjectives. A stereotype, then, is measured as the scoring on such a list, and consists in the presence, the ordering, and the frequency of each trait assigned to the group by experimental subjects. For several decades such a way of assessing stereotypes has dominated the literature. Despite some fluctuations due to specific circumstances (such as the evaluation of Germans or Japanese in the war), the remarkable finding was that stereotypes for certain groups (e.g. blacks) are rather stable.

A more comprehensive, interdisciplinary foundation of the study of prejudice had to await Allport's (1954) classical book, which, rather significantly, appeared in the same year as the well-known ruling of the US Supreme Court that segregation is unconstitutional. Allport defines prejudice as "an aversive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have objectionable qualities ascribed to the group" (8). Here, as in most other definitions, prejudice is a negative attitude against group members, but it remains implicit that these are, as a matter of course, members of other groups, outgroups. More importantly, it is not stated that we are not dealing with attitudes of individuals, but with attitudes of group members *as* members of an ingroup. For ethnic prejudice, which is usually negative, Allport specifies in addition that the attitude is based on an inflexible (over)generalization Not only faulty reasoning about other groups is involved, but some kind of mental 'rigidity', which means that people do not change their attitude if

they acquire new knowledge about the other group. Prejudice has various functions for the individual, but Allport especially draws attention to the force of conformity with prevailing 'folkways' rather than to some form of irrationality. Prejudgment, he argues, is a normal consequence of group categorization, especially when ingroup-outgroup relations are concerned. According to the principle of least effort, prejudice as a form of categorization involves overgeneralization and simplification. We tend to select and accentuate negative characteristics of outgroup members. Allport then discusses, in detail, research findings about the various conditions that lead to the development of prejudice, such as historical, social, and personality factors. Social change, the size of minority groups, economic competition, conformity with the ingroup, socialization, etc., are typical social conditions. On the other hand, we find personal characteristics such as frustration, aggression, anxiety, or authoritarianism that are conducive to a prejudiced personality.

This personality approach was especially advocated by Adorno *et al.* (1950) in their famous book about the authoritarian personality. Working against a psychoanalytical background, these authors stress the importance of early experiences of the child, the attitudes and strict child-rearing practices of parents for the development of a prejudiced personality. People who are prejudiced typically score high also on the well-known F-(Fascism) scale, and may be characterized for their ingroup conformism, respect for power and dominance, aversion to deviance, and their intolerance against minority groups, among other things. Despite the widespread influence of *The authoritarian personality*, the book also soon came under critical attack for both methodological and theoretical reasons. Especially the personalistic approach to prejudice has in the past decade lost much of its influence and has been replaced, on the one hand, by a more cognitive analysis of group attitudes and, on the other hand, by an emphasis on the social nature and context of prejudice. Thus, Pettigrew (1958) was able to show in his comparative study in South Africa and the USA that, more or less independent of variations in personality, ethnic prejudice is determined by the sociocultural norms of the (dominant) group.

From this brief summary of some of the early studies of ethnic stereotypes and prejudice, a complex picture already emerges that contains most of the issues that are also relevant in prejudice research in the last decade: (a) prejudice is a specific property of social information processing about other groups, involving mechanisms such as overgeneralization, simplification, selection or other properties of 'faulty' reasoning; (b) these

processes are embedded within various sociocultural constraints, such as conformism, ingroup loyalty, institutions, socialization of the child, norms and laws; and (c) there are individual differences in the susceptibility to prejudiced attitudes that are determined by authoritarian education, childhood experiences, personal frustration, and anxiety. Most of the work during the fifties and sixties has (mostly experimentally) tested specific consequences of one of these major tenets in prejudice research (see e.g. Westie 1964; Harding *et al.* 1969; Brigham 1971; Jones 1972; Ehrlich 1973; Katz 1976; Bagley *et al.* 1979; and Bagley and Verma 1979, for surveys and reviews).

2.2. *Current research*

Research in the past decade, we suggested, has usually selected one of the major paradigms or crucial notions of earlier work on stereotypes or prejudice. Despite occasional references to the societal functions or contexts of prejudice, most work has remained psychological and practically severed from other research on race relations, e.g. about economic, historical, or cultural dimensions of intergroup conflict, exploitation and racism. Interdisciplinary integration is exceptional, and most work is a straightforward continuation of the traditions of research in social psychology.

Yet, there are of course also changes, new accents, and suggestions for different lines of research within this broad paradigm. For the sake of our discussion, we will select two major directions of theorizing and experimentation, although there are of course other approaches and, especially, various intermediate positions. The first approach may be located mainly in Europe and has been developing under the influence of, or in close collaboration with, the late Henri Tajfel, at Bristol. This work, especially in more recent years, has stressed the social dimension of intergroup relations and prejudice. The other approach, prevalent in the USA, is more recent and emphasizes the cognitive dimensions of stereotyping, social information processing, and group perception. Associated with this direction are the names of e.g. Hamilton, Rothbart, Taylor, Snyder, Wilder, Rose, and others. Although the first group also uses cognitive notions, such as 'categorization', 'differentiation', 'accentuation', or 'group representation', they will typically reproach the latter group that prejudice should not merely be dealt with in terms of individual cognitive processes. Rather, they claim that the roots of prejudice should be sought in intergroup relations and conflicts, in the social functions of prejudice, fundamental differentiation between ingroups and outgroups, and the influence of such group distinctions upon the social information

processes of their members.

In fact, Tajfel's early work in this area is not very social, indeed, but deals, for instance, with biases in perception, such as the subjective estimation of lengths of lines by experimental subjects. Yet, relevant for later research on intergroup relations is that this early work already showed that people tend to adapt their estimations to those of others in the group (see Tajfel 1981, for a collection of his papers in which this development can be witnessed). Even more decisive were his experiments, together with many others, about what were called 'minimal groups'. The general outcome of these experiments is that people that are assigned to a group — even on completely arbitrary grounds — in the laboratory will consistently favor their own group and act more negatively toward the other group, for instance in allocating money or points. The conclusion of these experiments, it seems, is that ingroup favoritism is a general feature of group differentiation, even in socially 'minimal' situations (see also Tajfel 1978, 1982, for various chapters on these experiments). We may assume in that case that when group differentiation is real, and people are identifiably related to a group by properties of appearance, social status, or cultural characteristics, and when conflict or competition are at stake, this kind of ingroup favoritism and outgroup rejection will be much stronger. The work of the 'European' group of researchers has precisely been geared towards experimentally testing the many implications of this feature of group differentiation. The theoretical notions that frequently occur in this work are e.g. 'social identity', 'social comparison', 'relative social status', and above all 'categorization'. Thus, one aspect of intergroup comparisons is for example the systematic accentuation of, on the one hand, intragroup similarity, and, on the other hand, intergroup differences, a process already examined by Allport (1954). Despite gradual differences between groups, people will, in this way, cognitively represent the outgroup as being defined by homogeneous characteristics that are markedly different in important respects from those of the ingroup.

These and other findings are of course fundamental for the process of prejudice formation. Due to the socially shared representation of outgroups in general, and ethnic minority groups in particular, members of the ingroup will tend to perceive the appearance and the actions of minority members to be inherently 'different', mostly in the negative sense. In an early article on prejudice (reprinted in Tajfel 1981), Tajfel examines some of the cognitive implications of such intergroup conflicts and the consequences of social change. He argues that if there are changes in the social status quo — as is

the case for the immigration of Surinamese or Mediterranians in the Netherlands, people of the ingroup need to accomodate their representations of such groups and of social reality in general. They search for cognitive coherence and will tend to explain the causes of such change by attributing it to the inherent characteristics of the outgroup, rather than to transient properties of such groups, or to situational factors. This 'attributional' explanation, as we will see shortly, is one of the current approaches to ethnic stereotypes and intergroup conflicts in social psychology. The difference with wrong judgments about physical stimuli or persons, however, is that such attributions are socially shared and confirmed. They are part of an ingroup consensus. Moreover, such categorization and attribution is not neutral (as is the case for some national stereotypes), but associated with group values. Negative stereotypes, therefore, have social functions which, besides the explanation of social events, involve the justification of actions against outgroups and the positive differentiation of the ingroup in situations in which such differentiation becomes insecure (Tajfel 1981: 156). The process of specific (negative) stereotype formation should start at this social level: the particular contents of prejudice are determined by these cultural constraints, social changes, and group interests. Tajfel correctly observes, however, that the processes by which such "hostile or derogatory social 'images' of outsiders" become widely diffused has hardly been studied yet (155). It is one of the aims of this book to contribute to our understanding of these processes.

On several points, there are important similarities between this European-based research on intergroup relations and the more cognitive approach in the USA. Common to both directions is the interest for processes of social perception, both of persons and of groups, and the possible 'biases' that may characterize such perception, especially when other groups are involved. Inspired by the information processing paradigm in cognitive psychology, most American researchers in that case will focus on the mental processes involved in those forms of what is now commonly called 'social cognition' (Hastie *et al.* 1980; Higgins, Herman, and Zanna 1981). Attitudes come to be formulated in terms of 'group schemata', that is, as organized packages of social beliefs in memory (cf. e.g. Hastie 1981). This notion of a 'schema' goes back to the influential work of Bartlett (1932) about remembering, and has been reformulated especially in Artificial Intelligence research about the representation of knowledge (Norman and Rumelhart 1975; Schank and Abelson 1977).

Against this background, a number of researchers have also paid atten-

tion to the cognitive processes of social stereotypes (Hamilton 1981 is a useful collection of some of the major directions in this work). Thus, Hamilton's own work in this area has for instance been dealing with the systematic biases, so-called 'illusory correlations', that people establish in their accumulation of information about other groups as part of their representation of their stereotype of such groups in memory (Hamilton, 1976, 1979, 1981; Hamilton and Gifford 1976; Hamilton and Rose 1980). Social stereotypes, he argues, involve judgment errors in correlations between groups and the characteristics assigned to them. For instance, if a smaller group is perceived to perform infrequently occurring actions, they will generally tend to be overestimated in frequency. This would explain also, as we typically witness in our own interview data, that minority groups are often associated with criminal acts. The negative, value-laden nature of such correlations needs further explanation. Why, for instance, would minority groups not be associated with infrequent positive actions? Whereas these findings highlight the process whereby stereotypes are formed on the basis of subsequent experiences in the life of group members in their interactions with outgroup members, other experiments show how stereotypes, once established, also systematically bias our interpretation and evaluation of the actions of outgroup members. Thus, people will generally tend to process information about actions and events of outgroup members that are consistent with their current stereotypes: actions that confirm a stereotype are systematically estimated to have occurred more frequently than actions that are neutral in this respect. Such a finding again shows the well-known self-confirming and persistent nature of social stereotypes, and provides a somewhat more explicit account of the 'rigidity' assigned to personality in earlier work on prejudice. Similar results can be found in Rothbart's work on memory for 'confirming events' (Rothbart, Evans, and Fulero 1979; Howard and Rothbart 1980). People have better memory for positive ingroup behavior, and for negative outgroup behavior if the latter corroborates stereotypical beliefs.

Similar results appear in the work of Taylor and her associates (e.g. Taylor *et al.* 1978; Taylor 1981). She shows that categorization processes play an important role in the interpretation of the behavior of people by observers. Stereotypes about blacks, men or women, tend to influence these interpretations. However, such stereotyped perceptions depend on contextual features. A woman alone in a group of men or one black within a white group will be more salient because of their distinctiveness. In that case, observers will recall more information about the behavior of these 'solo'

persons. If these results can be generalized to everyday situations outside the laboratory, this implies that our perception of relatively small groups of ethnic minorities or of individual minority members in social situations is systematically biased both by stereotypical schemata and by their social distinctiveness. So, if a negative action by a minority member is observed, it may be better recalled (and retold in a story, say) if it confirms a stereotype, but also because it is more salient because the actor is more salient. In fact, Snyder (1981) argues that social stereotypes also play a role in our reconstruction of the past: they selectively help to retrieve stereotype-conform past interactions with outgroup members. He emphasizes that stereotypes are social because they organize our perceptions of, and our interaction within, the social world. In other words, prejudices will be used to derive expectations about the behavior of minority members, and new information will tend to be interpreted such that these expectations, as some kind of 'hypotheses', are confirmed (see also Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid 1977; Snyder and Uranowitz 1978; Snyder and Cantor 1979).

In a number of experiments, Wilder arrives at similar conclusions about the nature of information processing relative to social groups (Wilder 1981). In line with the finding of Tajfel and others described above, he found that people (in the laboratory) tend to enhance ingroup similarities and differences with other groups. The other group is seen as more homogeneous on many characteristics, and people will tend to favor ingroup members. But people also differentiate among several outgroups: discrimination against certain outgroups is reduced if more 'extreme' (more different) outgroups become salient. This finding seems to have its correlate also in the perception of minority groups in the Netherlands. Due to the salience of Turks, Moroccans, and Surinamese, earlier groups of immigrants, such as Spaniards and Italians, have become less focused upon as targets for special attention, discrimination, and racism (also because they are ethnically and culturally less 'different' from the Dutch majority group) (see also Brewer 1979).

In the last decade, there have been numerous attempts to fill in this cognitive picture of social stereotypes. Much research addresses the problem of biased information processing relative to outgroups due to stereotypical attitudes. The theoretical framework is borrowed from cognitive psychology and Artificial Intelligence. Stereotypes are represented as group schemata, retrieval of information about minority groups is formulated in terms of certain strategies, *viz.* 'availability heuristics' (Tversky and Kahneman 1973), and the fundamental basis of stereotype formation is related to the processes

of prototype formation and use (Rosch and Lloyd 1978; Cantor and Mischel 1977).

In this framework, for instance, Duncan (1976) was able to show that the *same* acts, when committed by a black boy or a white boy, were seen by white subjects to be more agressive if the black boy was involved. She explains these results by assuming that the notion used to interpret the 'shove' will involve 'aggression' more readily for black boys, because according to the stereotype this concept is more available. Linville and Jones (1980) explain this kind of polarization in somewhat different terms. They assume that outgroup schemata are less complex than ingroup schemata (information about our own group), and that therefore the interpretation and evaluation of outgroup behavior is based on more extreme categories: people tend to see subtle differences better for the people they know well. Again, these and other findings do not account yet for the fact that stereotypes about ethnic minority groups are predominantly negative. Not only biased, incomplete, or other forms of 'defective' information processing about groups are involved, but very specific, negative stereotypical contents, and overall negative information retrieval, use, and generalization. Only part of this important negative bias can be explained in purely cognitive terms (e.g. negative information is more salient, etc.), so that these various theories must be integrated into a broader social dimension of research.

Finally, in the last few years one of the prevailing paradigms of social psychology, viz. *attribution theory*, has also contributed various papers about the nature of ethnic prejudice. Attribution theory, going back to the work of Heider (1958), is a set of hypotheses about the naive social action theory of people. It argues that people also try to understand events and actions by assigning 'causes' to them. These causes may be localized 'within' the actor (e.g. personality properties, such as intelligence or laziness) or 'outside' the actor, *viz.* in the context. In the perception of actions of outgroup members, it appears that (white) observers will tend to attribute negative actions to the 'inherent' properties of the outgroup (e.g. criminality, laziness, etc.) and positive actions to the context (luck, special circumstances, help of others). This 'ultimate attribution error' (Pettigrew 1979) provides an additional explanation for the negatively biased organization of ethnic stereotypes in terms of 'inherent properties' of the outgroup. This hypothesis is of course more complex. For instance, we saw above that minorities may be more salient, and so, during interaction, attention would be directed more to the actors themselves than to their context. Also, attribution will depend on the

beliefs and social schemata of the attributor. Hewstone and Jaspars (1982) showed, for instance, that black boys (especially after a brief discussion of the topic) will attribute unemployment more often than white boys to discrimination of white bosses (rather than to e.g. laziness of the members of the own group). In other words, not only the interpretation of the actions of minorities depends on our stereotypes about them, but also the whole causal or rational 'background' for the understanding of actions and events in the social world (see also Stephan 1977). It is obvious that social conflict in interethnic relations may be partly based on differences in attribution of the ethnic groups involved. Negative action against minority members will be 'self-attributed' by the majority member to the 'circumstances', e.g. the previous behavior of the minority member, whereas the minority member involved may attribute the action to the inherent racism of the actor. Although many of the principles we have described above may have a more general nature, it should be stressed that most were assessed by white researchers and for white subjects, focusing on the stereotypes of white majority groups. How minority group members interpret actions and interactions, and how they see and experience the social prejudices and discrimination of the majority has been investigated very little (Essed 1984). Here we find another important shortcoming of social psychological work on stereotypes and prejudice.

2.3. *Toward an integrated framework for the study of ethnic prejudice*

In the remaining pages of this chapter, we will try to sketch a provisional framework for the study of prejudice, taking into account the theoretical and empirical findings we have briefly summarized in the previous sections. We have suggested that our own approach could be labeled 'sociocognitive'. That is, we will indeed analyze ethnic prejudice, 'as such', as a cognitive phenomenon, but embedded within a broader social context. Although there are, at several points, similarities with the work reviewed above, our emphasis is also different in several respects:

(a) In our view, it is insufficient to simply use a number of appropriate cognitive notions, such as 'schema', 'prototype', or 'availability'. Rather, what we need is a precise specification of the social representations, the strategies, or other cognitive processes involved. Without such a specification, processes of e.g. categorization, differentiation, negative bias, or attribution remain too vague to arrive at specific predictions or explanations of prejudiced actions.

(b) Despite the need to specify the 'contents' of ethnic stereotypes in detail — as they are held by specific ingroups about outgroups — we will assume that especially the *use* of prejudiced attitudes is important in a theory of prejudice. Our approach to the account of such uses will be a 'strategic' one.

(c) Prejudices are cognitive schemata and strategies for their use within social contexts, which determine their contents, their organization, their relevance, their functions, their acquisition, etc. That is, prejudice cannot properly be understood outside an account of its role in ethnic intergroup relations, and in the perspective of the dominance or the interests of the majority with respect to minority groups.

It goes without saying that a few pages in a single chapter cannot spell out the full details and implications of these principles. A general outline, focusing upon some features that have had little attention in previous research, is all we can provide. Also, our approach is different from a methodological point of view. We assume that many of the subtleties of ethnic prejudices cannot be adequately accessed in a purely experimental framework in the laboratory. More naturalistic data, such as interviews or accounts of participants, are necessary. In the following chapters, therefore, we will try to link some of the assumptions of this chapter with various observations about prejudiced talk.

2.3.1. *The cognitive framework*

Within a cognitive perspective we take ethnic prejudice, first, as a specific type of *attitude*. In particular, such an attitude will be defined in terms of an organized set of beliefs and opinions about minority groups, that is, as a 'group schema'. Such a group schema is the cognitive basis of all our information processing about members of such groups, e.g. in the perception, interpretation, or attribution of events and actions, the understanding of discourse, or our own interaction with ethnic minority members in social situations. There are three major questions that should be asked about such group schemata: (a) what do they look like, (b) how are they used and in what situations are they used, and (c) how are they acquired and/or changed?

Let us start with the last question. Obviously, ethnic attitudes are primarily acquired through processes of socialization and social interaction both with ingroup and outgroup members (Allport 1954; Katz 1976). These social contexts will be discussed below. From a cognitive point of view, however,

the process of acquisition is rooted in the specific treatment of information about minority groups in general, and specific minority groups and their members in particular. We hear and read about (new) minority groups in our society, and may eventually also see them and interact with them. On all these occasions, properties of such groups will be inferred from the information available, but also properties of the ethnic relationships in general, or the sociocultural context. In other words, we do not represent social stereotypes about minority groups simply in terms of a list of 'traits' (intelligent, powerful, or creative, say). Rather, the inferences about minority groups are more complex and require representation in propositional terms, as we will see in more detail later. Yet, the interpretation processes are not 'neutral'. Even when new salient ethnic groups are becoming relevant for attitude formation, people already have pre-established schemata about (other) minority groups, i.e. acquired on previous occasions and during socialization. If these schemata are 'negative', that is, have negatively valued propositions dominating the attitude structure, then this negative orientation may also transfer to the acquisition process for new attitude schemata, a process which we may call 'schema transfer'. The economy of this transfer is obvious: we need not start from scratch each time we are confronted with different outgroups. We have a kind of superschema (or metaschema) for the formation of new group schemata in general, and for minority group schemata in particular. We here capture an important feature of the 'prejudgment' nature of prejudices: even without *any* information about a group, people may already start building an attitude about them. This also explains why ethnic attitude schemata are so negative 'overall', so difficult to change, even when new (conflicting) information is available, and why they are often so similar, despite the differences of the outgroups concerned. In other words, people start processing information about a new ethnic group with a protoschema already in mind.

Group schemata, however, are general and abstract. They are formed through processes of abstraction, decontextualization, and generalization. Just like knowledge frames or scripts, they are located in semantic (long term) memory. Apart from the proto-schema already present, its contents and structures must therefore be inferred from more specific information. A next question which arises, therefore, is how such specific information about e.g. events or actions in which ethnic minority members are involved can be connected with these more general group schemata. We here address a complex problem about the details of information processing of events and

situations, including discourse about such events or situations. Neglecting for a moment the details of the short term memory operations involved in the perception and interpretation of action or event sequences, or in the analysis of situations, we assume that people strategically construct a representation of such events or actions in memory. Such representations are located in episodic memory. They are the memory 'recording' of the (subjective) experiences of people. If we hear a story about a Turk slaughtering sheep in his bathroom (a typical example in our data), the listener will construct a *textual representation* of that story in episodic memory. This representation allows the listener to reproduce, if necessary, what was told and also how it was told. In our interviews, this assumption is crucial to account for the fact that the interviewer can adequately interact with the story-teller: permanent reference needs to be made — or inferences must be drawn — relative to this cognitive representation of what has been said before.

At the same time, though, a listener will not only construct a representation of the text, but also of what the text is about, of the actions and events themselves, or the denoted situation of the story. We call this the *model* of the story, and this (situation) model is also represented in episodic memory. Models are typically richer than the discourses about them. They also feature previous experiences about the same or similar situations and will also embody instantiated information from general group schemata. For our example this means, for instance, that people may have heard other stories about slaughtering sheep, may have witnessed such an event themselves, or simply that they 'fill in' this knowledge from their general stereotypical beliefs about Turkish or Moroccan groups. The model, then, is the full picture people have about a situation. This means that discourse or actions, even when these yield incomplete information about some situation, will typically be heard or seen in the light of the information in the model. Thus, when people later have to recall the text or the events, they will not simply reactivate the actual representations of them (even subjective ones), but rather their more general model of the situation, and from that they will *infer* what has probably taken place. And conversely, new information may be used to update or confirm the information in the model (van Dijk 1984, 1985).

For the explanation of the processes of interpretation involved in the perception and understanding of actions of minority members, it follows that such actions are made subjectively 'intelligible' with respect to such models. If, for instance, no information is available from the perceived events about the agency of the action, a minority member may be taken as the agent by

default, e.g. when there is general schema-information about the attribution of criminal events to minority members.

Models of concrete situations may be generalized if they appear to be relevant on several occasions. And from these accumulated experiences, people will eventually infer elements for the group schema. In other words, group schemata are abstract, decontextualized situation models. Yet, as we will see in more detail below, ethnic group schemata may be based on scantier evidence. The familiar phenomenon of 'overgeneralization' characterizing prejudice in our framework involves the use of particular situation models as general group schemata. In more mundane terms: a single experience is taken as a social truth. A protoschema about a group can thus be transformed into a schema by decontextualization of a particular, episodic model. And conversely, this general schema may, in turn, be used to activate episodic models and to form new ones by the monitoring of interpretation processes in novel situations. We here find another cognitive reason for the well-known stable nature of ethnic prejudices: they form a 'self-sufficient', circular, if not self-fulfilling system of biased interpretation, model formation, schema formation, and using schemata and models again in the interpretation of new events. Some of these relations are clarified in Figure 1.

2.3.2. *Strategies of ethnic information processing*

Within the cognitive setup we have sketched above, we now should locate the various *processes* involved in the perception, the interpretation, the storage, the use, or the retrieval of ethnic information about minority groups and their actions. Some of these processes have already been mentioned above: the formation of models and schemata and their use in the interpretation of actions. The way we analyze cognitive processes is in terms of *strategies* (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983). Important features of a strategic approach, as distinct from e.g. a rule-based analysis of information processing, are the goal-directed, flexible, effective, multilevel, parallel nature of strategies. They can handle incomplete information, both from text and context as well as from memory. They yield practical hypotheses about the structures or the meanings of incoming data. The complexity of social situations and events is such that participants or observers cannot possible handle all information in all its detail. Effective strategies, then, guide this process, e.g. by selecting the information that is most relevant in a context and for the individual. Strategies may cooperate with each other. Thus, in the observation and interpretation of action, we will have strategies for the decoding



Figure 1: Outline of a schema of ethnic information processing

and interpretation of nonverbal activities, of discourse, of structural properties of actions, of situational features, and so on. These strategies are of course coordinated, *viz.* by an overall Control System, which also monitors the flow of information from Long Term Memory knowledge, beliefs, or attitudes to decoding and interpretation in Short Term Memory and the storage of representations or the activation of situation models in episodic memory. Also, strategies will establish coherence in sequences of interaction, assign overall macrostructures (a 'point') to such complex sequences or the events they are part of, regulate processes of causal attribution, and so on.

For our discussion about the processing of ethnic information, we should in particular pay attention to the strategies that seem to define prejudiced 'thinking'. That is, we do not simply conceive of prejudice as a list of traits, as we have suggested earlier, nor even in terms of a list or schema of propositions, as we find in the group schema discussed above. Rather, prejudice should also be accounted for in terms of 'dynamic' processes. This also guarantees that people are able to handle new situations in which ethnic minorities or actions with members of outgroups are involved. Stereotypes are often represented as 'fixed' belief structures. We have suggested some of the features of the cognitive account of this 'rigidity'. Yet, although events and situations may have many recurrent characteristics, and although people may typically participate in such situations with 'ready-made' prejudices, they still have to do much cognitive work in order to handle the situation in accordance with their cognitive makeup. For one thing, they may often be obliged to manage conflicting evidence. Hence, a more strategic approach is necessary. And the essential flexibility of such strategies does *not* mean that prejudiced people have 'flexible' personalities' as far as opinions or interactions with minorities are concerned. Rather, this flexibility has to do with the requirements of situational variability and the adaptation of people to the processes of social change. If the processes were not flexible, given such variable input data, people would have to change their internal representations all the time. And in the case of ethnic prejudices this is precisely *not* the case, so that the interpretation and representation strategies should manage to establish a link between data and naive social 'theory'. Let us examine some of these strategies.

(a) *Selective perception and interpretation*

The processes of selective attention and perception are well-known in various fields of psychology (McArthur 1981). For our discussion, this process

pertains to the perception, analysis, and interpretation of whole situations and their component (inter)actions in which ethnic minority members are involved (cf. van Dijk 1985). Obviously, people will seldom participate in such situations without a large number of schema- and model-based beliefs and expectations. Shopping, making a busride, going to some government office, or just walking in the street are such situations. People have general schematic scripts about such social situations and their characteristic events and participants, as well as more concrete personal experiences, i.e. models, about such situations, and all this information will be projected in the perception and interpretation of new situations and events. Processing, thus, is not simply bottom-up but also top-down. In contact neighborhoods, for instance, people will expect that in the street or in the supermarket they may encounter ethnic minority members, and they may also have previous experiences about the kind of action such members may engage in. Given these personal beliefs, new situations will be analyzed according to general, schematic categories. These include Time, Location, Participants, kind of social event, rules and norms, and so on (see Forgas 1979; Argyle, Furnham, and Graham 1981; van Dijk 1984, for an analysis of such social situations and their cognitive representations). In 'ethnic situations', all other things being equal, people perceive participants that may have obvious externally different properties (appearance, clothing). More than for ingroup members, these data may be selected for specific attention and interpretation. Indeed, on such grounds, a first provisional group categorization will be made. This means that the available cognitive resources are 'biased' towards the interpretation of group category features of social participants, rather than towards the analysis of the situation (setting, other participants, circumstances) or the actual actions of the participant minority members. Here we do not have *the* reason, but rather *one* of the reasons why in attribution processes majority people will tend to explain minority members' actions in terms of 'internal' properties (as defined by the category in the group schema), rather than in terms of circumstances (Pettigrew 1979; Hewstone and Jaspars 1982; Jaspars, Fincham, and Hewstone 1983). Similarly, once the minority members are selected for special attention, especially in situations where their presence is indeed still exceptional (see Taylor 1981, for this 'solo status'), also their activities will receive relatively more attention. This means that in situations of everyday social conflict, actions of white majority members *against* minority members will be less in focus, so that any reaction to negative actions in negative terms will be more salient for minority members. Here we also find

one (cognitive) component of the process of discrimination: negative actions of minorities get more attention than negative actions of ingroup members. In fact, this would hold for all actions, and especially salient actions, and the *negative* direction of such a strategic analysis of the situation will be determined by the contents of the group schema: negative actions may be expected and hence 'looked for', and *if* they occur (or are thought to occur), they will in turn confirm the group schema (cf. Hamilton 1979; Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid 1977). We see that several constraints on cognitive strategies as well as the social basis of prejudice will concurrently contribute to a 'special treatment' of minority group members in the understanding of actions in situations. In other words, situation analysis is no longer 'routine'.

(b) *Action interpretation*

Selective attention for minority actors in situations implies, as we have suggested, selective attention for their actions and, in particular, hypothesis-testing strategies for stereotype-conform actions (Rothbart 1981; Snyder 1981). Yet, the process is more complex than that. People simply do not have an infinite list of stereotypical actions of minorities in their schematic group attitude. In fact, most of the actions observed will not have a stereotypical nature (walking in the street, buying in the supermarket, sitting on a bus, etc.) but a more general mundane character. Action interpretation as monitored by prejudiced schemata or models thus requires (a) strategies for making mundane actions salient, (b) focusing attention on culturally different activities, (c) assigning special values to salient or different actions. For example, an old lady among our respondents had witnessed the action of bargaining over prices on the market, an action which, in her interpretation and evaluation, violates Dutch rules of shopping behavior (which is not correct because bargaining on the market is perfectly acceptable in some cases). For immigrant workers, though, the action was seen as 'typical', and valued negatively. Indeed, in our data we find many cases in which respondents report specific or typical actions of minority members, mostly negatively valued ones, that also occur among white Dutch people. That is, here we do not have a case of deficient frequency estimates or of stereotype testing, but rather a process of negative categorization. *Every* action can in principle be interpreted negatively, even positive ones: being helpful may be taken as to 'mix in other people's affairs'.

It goes without saying that this process is particularly strong for all actions that are culturally specific (or interpreted as such), such as religious practices,

cooking culture, clothing, family interactions, or speaking and communication. These are both highly salient and part of the stereotype, and therefore focused upon even more strongly. The *accentuation* of such cultural or other ethnic differences has received much attention in the literature, and need not be discussed in further detail here (Allport 1954; Tajfel 1981).

(c) *Model building*

Having interpreted the actions of minority actors, as briefly indicated above, people represent such actions and their situations in memory and thus build models of such situations, at the same time retrieving similar models and updating old models (cf. van Dijk 1985). The processes of selective attention, perception, salient and negative interpretation, will of course result — in memory — in the models of such actions and situations. It follows that models of 'ethnic situations' may be biased in several respects. First, they may be relatively incomplete: there may be more detailed (e.g. negative) knowledge about actions of minority actors than about majority actors or about setting and circumstances. Second, the explanation and evaluation assigned to these actions will tend to be given — also for that reason — in terms of person-as-group-member characteristics rather than in terms of the circumstances or the other (majority) actors. Third, there will be a structural consequence: actions of minority members, due to their salience, will have a higher-level representation in the model than other actions or events. This will also make them more easily retrievable. Here we find one of the strategic and structural underpinnings of the notion of 'availability' that we have met before (Tversky and Kahnemann 1973) also in its interpretation of stereotypical actions.

One crucial strategy in model building for ethnic situations may be called *negative extension*. Negative extension is a very flexible strategy, often part of the attribution process. Thus, a negative evaluation of a person or group will extend to the evaluation of their actions. Similarly, in a model, a negative action may extend to the actor, or conversely; and the same holds for negative consequences and their 'causing' actions, or for lower-level microactions and higher-level macroactions of the situation. That is, a general tendency to understand social episodes in evaluative terms (Forgas 1979) is exemplified here in a negative direction for 'ethnic situations'. In our data we find many examples of such negatively valued situations, such as bus- and tramrides, shopping, and walking in the streets of a contact neighborhood. Similarly, negatively valued circumstances such as the deterioration in old popular

neighborhoods may by transfer be attributed to the presence or the actions of minority groups.

Negatively valued models tend to mutually serve as each others' retrieval cues. Discussion of the negative characteristics of the neighborhood will therefore often trigger a minority topic (and conversely) — along a possible cause-result dimension. But the same holds for the spontaneous mention of drugs, unsafety, and crime in town, and so on. These are partly rooted in stereotypes about minority groups (e.g. use and selling of drugs), but we here notice that also specific strategies of episodic information retrieval may be at stake for the understanding and evaluation of situations.

(d) *Group-schema use and (trans)formation*

Ethnic group schemata play a role in all stages of ethnic information processing. Attention, selection, the programming of the context-specific Control System, the selection of models, and the categorization of participants and their actions all require information from a more general schema. The contents of the schema, as well as its overall structure, will therefore determine many of the expectations or predictions as well as hypothesis testing in observation. We have already assumed that group schemata about minority groups tend to be formed more readily from episodic models. The same may hold for their use. Instead of relying on one's own personal experiences, people may discount such models and prefer the use of social 'ready-mades' from semantic memory. This also means that the models themselves will tend to have a structure that is similar to the stereotypical 'ethnic' scripts that are part of the group attitude. Indeed, our data show that stories about personal experiences, which should be based on models, have a very stereotypical content and organization, as if they are expressions of group-schema scripts. This may mean that people 'invent' stories based on imagined evidence, or also that variable situations are coded and represented completely in accordance with the stereotypical organization of such situations (slaughtering sheep, conflicts about noises from neighbors, shopping disagreements, the occupation of neighboring houses by minority families, and so on).

The construction or transformation of group schemata themselves will exhibit strategies similar to those mentioned above for model building. For instance, negative extension may play an important role in the projection from one part of the schema to other parts in order to keep the schema coherent. The important consequence of these strategies is that the negative

evaluation of some trivial feature of appearance (such as the clothes of Turkish women) or of some action may extend to the evaluation of the schema as a whole. That is, in the hierarchical structure of the schema, a negative evaluation may characterize also the top levels of the belief and opinion structure. From such top levels, that negative evaluation may again influence, top-down, the evaluation of lower level information.

We have, more or less informally, described some of the strategies in the processing of ethnically relevant information about actions and situations. Our aim was to locate and specify some of the well-known 'biases' that occur in such interpretation processes. We have seen that such biases may take place in each stage of understanding and evaluation. They are not merely explained in terms of (negative) group stereotypes, but also in terms of special 'ways' or 'styles' of handling minority group information. And besides group schemata, also action representations and models play an important role. In fact, schemata are the result of the specific models people build of 'ethnic situations'. Clearly, these need not only be based on one's own observation. On the contrary, we have stated in the beginning of this book that much information about minorities derives from hearsay, gossip, conversational stories, and the media. But also in that case, people 'imagine situations', and form group schemata. In our analysis of the conversational data, we will try to make the hypothesis formulated above more explicit in terms of the 'expression' people give to their underlying strategies of manipulating their prejudices.

2.3.3. *The organization of group schemata*

Group schemata, in our view, are a specific form of attitude structures. Attitudes are not simply any 'evaluation' people may have about things, persons, or events, but complex, organized memory systems (contrary to other views in social psychology, e.g. Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). They consist of a hierarchical cluster of social beliefs, that is, beliefs about social objects such as other persons, groups, social structures, or social phenomena. These beliefs may be 'factual' (epistemic) beliefs shared by a group, or evaluative beliefs, or opinions. Since attitudes have a general, abstract nature, the beliefs they organize are also general. Specific opinions about a specific person or event are located in models (including general models, such as my general opinion about my neighbor). Beliefs can be represented in terms of propositions, so attitudes are represented as propositional structures. Their organization is not arbitrary but effective for their relevant uses and functions. This

may mean, among other things, that attitudes: (a) are organized hierarchically, (b) are featuring a set of 'fixed' categories in which similar information can be stored, (c) display semantic coherence, (d) display connectedness (e.g. causal, rational) between subsequent actions or events, (e) may embody full frames or scripts of stereotypical episodes, and (f) have open, terminal nodes in which the actual values of concrete situations may be fitted. Also, other structural features may be expected, e.g. a specific organization by personal or social relevance (van Dijk 1983b).

The general and abstract nature of attitudes is intimately related with their *social* basis. We assume, therefore, that attitudes — unlike models — are socially shared by groups. The reason is that the social relevance of attitudes needs social acquisition (through socialization and interaction), normalization, confirmation, and 'practicality'. In other words, people will tend to form attitudes only if they are useful for their social life, that is, for the interpretation of social events or for participation in interaction.

These assumptions about the nature of attitudes *a fortiori* hold for attitudes about social groups, and hence also for minority attitudes in general and prejudice in particular. We will simply take prejudice as a negatively dominated ethnic attitude. We have assumed earlier that it seems plausible that people have some kind of protoschema for the formation of ethnic or other group attitudes. Such a protoschema consists of an organized cluster of relevant social categories of such groups. Appearance, social status, or typical actions may be part of such a schema. Obviously, these categories are not arbitrary. On the contrary, what we store in our attitudes about relevant (out)groups must be relevant and functional in our dealings with such groups. Hence, they ultimately have a socially shared basis. Our major assumption, then, is that ethnic prejudice, besides its obvious cognitive dimensions, requires a specification in these social terms: their contents, categories, and schematic organization (hierarchy, relevance, coherence) are determined by societal functions, cultural norms and values, and the historical background of the group. To the contents of ethnic attitudes we will turn during our analysis of the interviews, but now we must finally conclude our theoretical framework with these social constraints on prejudice.

2.3.4. *The social context*

We have repeatedly stressed in the preceding sections that ethnic prejudice is not just an individual attitude about minority groups. And although prejudice 'as such' is defined in cognitive terms, a full account also requires

explication of the role of the social context in the acquisition, the organization, and the uses of ethnic attitudes. Prejudice, thus, is a phenomenon of social cognition.

This role of the social context can be approached in several ways. The traditional approach would study prejudice in terms of the categories or groups of people in society that typically display more (or less) prejudice. Correlations would be computed for demographic variables (gender, age, education, profession, etc.), on the one hand, and the outcomes in survey research about specific prejudice items, mostly scored in scales, such as social distance scales, on the other hand (cf., for instance, Bagley *et al.* 1979; Bagley and Verma 1979). And similar results can be obtained for other social factors, such as amount of contact with minority groups, neighborhood, media consumption, and so on. Such investigations may be useful to get a rough general picture of the distribution of ethnic prejudice through society and suggests possible further research about the correlations involved. Although there is much variation in the quantitative data obtained in different countries, there are also some stable findings. For instance, younger people and people with higher education typically score lower on prejudice scales. Such results, however, should be handled with care. The techniques involved are rather superficial for the kind of issue they want to measure. People will tend to give socially desirable answers, and this tendency may be correlated with amount of education. We have reason to believe that ethnic prejudice is inherent in the social cognitions of majority groups of a racist society, and that factors such as class, profession, education, or income do not say much, as such, about the presence of prejudice. Only, due to different social contexts and, hence, concrete experiences, the *kinds* of prejudices may be different. Indeed, Wellman (1977) found with qualitative methods (interviewing) that interest was the major factor involved, independent of profession, status, or education. This result is consistent with research by and among minority groups themselves about the experience of prejudice and discrimination by majority members (Essed 1984). We provisionally conclude that the current macrosociological, quantitative approach raises more questions than it answers. The same holds for the explanatory framework for such data. Even if statistics would show that, say, lower-middle class people are more prejudiced (according to the instrument chosen for measurement), and that this may be related to processes of social comparison and upward mobility, we still do not know *how* exactly such social phenomena are related to the amount, the strength, the contents, the structures, the uses, or the value

direction of prejudice, nor to the contexts for the enactment of prejudice in discrimination. In fact, the explanation is misguided in the first place because it is highly doubtful whether higher-middle class people would not have ethnic prejudice as well (for a discussion of these issues see, e.g., Wellman 1977; Gaertner 1976; Chesler 1976).

Our approach, therefore, must be more qualitative. We must first know how social contexts in general are related to ethnic prejudice, independent of possible variations due to specific social circumstances. Also, we should answer the question of what kinds of prejudice arise in social situations, and how group schemata are formed in multiethnic societies. If we have a precise model of the relationships between social contexts and cognitive organization and strategies, we may derive specific hypotheses that can also be tested quantitatively (by surveys), experimentally, or through thorough qualitative research (conversation analysis, media analysis, interviewing, personal accounts or diaries, and so on). It is the last line of further investigation that we will follow in the rest of this book.

There are several ways to relate group schemata with social context. A first general assumption is that people have a naive, commonsense representation of society, that is, of social structure, groups, and social situations. This assumption has been put forward both in microsociology (e.g. ethnomethodology) as well as in social psychology (see e.g. Garfinkel 1967; Cicourel 1973; Wegner and Vallacher 1981; Jaspars, Fincham, and Hewstone 1983). This means that there is no *direct* relationship between social context and cognitive contents or organization. Rather, it is the way social members see and interpret their social reality which impinges on their resulting 'pictures' of social reality, including social groups or ethnic relations. And conversely, once such social cognitions have been constructed, this will also determine *how* social reality is interpreted or interactions planned and executed. Second, group schemata, we maintain, are derived from situation models. The relation between the social context and group schemata, therefore, runs via the representation of social situations in episodic models. Our perception of, or interaction with, minority group members (or hearing stories about this) leads to what may be called 'ethnic situation models', and these form the basis for the formation of ethnic schemata, as described above.

Third, neither ethnic situation models nor the general group schemata have an arbitrary content and organization. On the contrary, we assume that social members organize and use their cognitions in ways that (at least initially) have social functions. What we store about minorities must be socially

relevant information. Socially relevant information, thus, pertains to effective perception and identification of minority groups, and effective actions against or interactions with outgroups. Here we meet again the notion of social and economic *interest* (Wellman 1977) we have mentioned above as a major condition for ethnic prejudice. Yet, this notion is too general and too vague, and needs further explication.

Against this background, we assume that group schemata are built around a categorical framework that is rooted in these social functions as they are relevant for ingroups. These categories are, for example, the following:

(a) national origin and/or appearance;
(b) socioeconomic position;
(c) sociocultural norms, values, religion, beliefs, language;
(d) (typical) actions or interactions;
(e) assigned personal properties (intelligence, etc.).

Although this list of categories may not be complete, it captures the central organizational elements for information about (ethnic) outgroups. And although their ordering may change in various social situations and for different groups, it is assumed that it reflects also some degree of relevance. If higher-level categories are less relevant, lower ones take over. The hierarchy predicts that prejudice will most likely be directed to foreigners (established in the country of the ingroup) and/or to people of different physical appearance (skin color in the first place). This assumption is in accordance with the tendency, in the Netherlands, to direct prejudice primarily against 'foreigners', and especially foreigners of a different ethnic background. The second major condition pertains to the socioeconomic position of the group, including size, jobs, status, and so on. This explains why prejudice in Holland is directed against a large group of Turkish immigrant workers rather than against a much smaller group of Yugoslavians, or the still smaller group of Arabic businesspeople. It is at this level that people will organize their prejudices of the kind 'they take our jobs', 'they take our houses', 'they are using our social services', and so on. Obviously, this category becomes more relevant in times of economic recession. Notice that we do not claim that an economic recession 'causes' prejudice. Rather, we assume that it results in the fact that one specific category of prejudiced group schemata becomes more relevant. That is, such a category may be used to store more information. And this information may be used in special cases of attribution (e.g.

scapegoating) of socioeconomic problems to minority groups. In situations of everyday life, finally, we will find the prejudices organized in the third category, involving sociocultural differences, such as norms and rules, religion, and language. Indeed, in contact areas, our data suggest that these — after the socioeconomic resentment at a more national level — are the major points of negative feelings about minorities. The last categories involve the stereotypical actions and inherent properties of minority groups (e.g. criminal actions and criminal personality, incompetence, or 'do not work' and laziness, respectively). These are most relevant for the many instances of everyday situations of perception and interaction with minority group members. And these may also be precisely the kinds of prejudices that are subtly enacted in everyday actions of majority members against minorities (Essed 1984).

Notice also that the theoretical assumptions made above about the social basis for the categorical organization of group schemata in principle holds for the formation of prejudices against any outgroup. So, also prejudices against women, against young people, 'punks', squatters, football fans, and so on, basically seem to be organized in that way. For women, for instance, the prejudices would be articulated especially in categories (d) and (e), although, of course, appearance is relevant for *prima facie* identification, and socioeconomic factors play a role in the prejudices about the professional occupations (and restrictions) for women. In category (c), we would typically find belief-based prejudices against (other) religious groups or political dissidents.

The categories hypothetically formulated above for the internal organization of group schemata were suggested to have important social functions for ingroups. This means that, both internally and externally, ingroups and their members should be able to maintain themselves, to keep a superordinate position, to enhance their control over other groups, to further internal coherence, and so on. Indeed, in the perception and the representation of outgroups it is of primary importance that such outgroups can be identified, that they do not constitute a fundamental threat to our economic resources or privileges, that they do not endanger the norms, rules, and basic beliefs of the ingroup, do not behave fundamentally different or threaten our basic values (freedom, safety, independence, privacy, etc.), or that they can be trusted. Possible differences, deviations, or threats must be monitored constantly by ingroup members in order to maintain the aims of the ingroup. In our data, indeed, we find that practically all concerns, complaints, negative remarks, uneasiness, or other prejudiced beliefs organize around such topics.

In other words, the group schemata, the situation models (and hence the stories), and the strategies of their use are not arbitrary but rather directly related to the relevant social dimensions (interests, aims) of the dominant ingroup.

Thus, the first category (origin) translates into concerns of *territory*. Repeated accusations are made of intruding, invading, or lack of respect for *our* domains: country, town, neighborhood, street, houses, parking lots, or cafés. Differences of appearance also lead to breaches in routine perception, recognition, and differentiation between people: 'they all look alike' provides fundamental uneasiness. The perceived threat to our basic norms, values, and beliefs also translates into uncertainty about the fundamental mechanisms for the interaction of group members: differences would affect the basis properties of evaluation, planning, decision making, and so on. The resistance against different norms and values, then, is considerable, and together with the implied category of typical (inter)action, they yield the general claim that minorities should *adapt* themselves (to our norms, rules, etc.). This is maybe the most frequently expressed prejudice or sign of intolerance in the Netherlands. Of course, wishes about change at these lower levels (adaptation) may well be strategic maneuvers to conceal more fundamental prejudices (economic, appearance). This gives us a glimpse of how the organization of ethnic attitudes also *shows* itself socially in preferred topics of discourse. The first few categories, at the macrolevel, will dominate media discourse, the last few will dominate informal everyday conversation, stories, and jokes.

Finally, group schemata, organized as outlined above, also provide the basis for *ethnic situation models*. That is, they organize how we see and understand such situations in accordance with the primary interests of the ingroup. This assumption is also empirically testable. For instance, we may expect that stories about such encounters will highlight the specific situational categories that are related with the categories in the group schema, e.g. deviant appearance, deviant behavior, threat, and so on. This is indeed what we will find in our data. More importantly, such models are the basis for *action* and *interaction*. Here we find the important link between prejudice and discrimination, which has occupied researchers for years (Allport 1954; Harding *et al.* 1969; Brigham 1971; Jones 1972; Ehrlich 1973).

We have not included, as usual, an action-tendency component in ethnic attitudes (see e.g. Allport 1954), since we assume that such 'dispositions' require independent theoretical formulation. Attitudes provide information

(beliefs, opinions) that may enter a complex process of action preparation (motivations, purposes, intentions) and execution or control. Much other information, both cognitive and contextual, may interact with attitudinal data, so that a direct link between prejudice and actions can seldom be established (as was already shown, experimentally, in a field study (LaPierre 1934) half a century ago (see also Wicker 1969)). Then, we should also distinguish between prejudice and its verbal expression.

Still, it is obvious that group schemata contribute to the social interaction models people devise during the planning of their actions. In the framework of the social interests spelled out above, this means that one of the major functions of prejudice is the rationalization and justification of discriminatory acts against minority groups (see Allport 1954; Tajfel 1981; Snyder 1981). The organization of social interests of ingroups and their reflection in prejudiced ethnic group schemata thus results in the following pattern of prevalent aims (not always conscious) in action plans that are part of ethnic situation models. For ease of discussion we call these the 7 D's of Discrimination; Dominance, Differentiation, Distance, Diffusion, Diversion, Depersonalization or Destruction, and Daily Discrimination. These general plan categories will organize, in principle, all actions against, about, or with minority members, *viz.* maintaining power and control, treating them differently (a social act function related to the cognitive function of seeing them differently), keeping them at a distance (out of our country, town, neighborhood, street, house, family, etc.), diffusing beliefs and prejudices about them (mainly in prejudiced talk), attributing social or economic problems of the ingroup to them, treating them as inferior, hurting or destroying them, and, finally, enacting all these more general actions also in small everyday activities (minor inequities). Of course, *these* plans and actions do *not* figure in our data, but they do indeed feature in research about the experiences of minority members (Essed 1984).

In the preceding pages we have tried to link the cognitive framework with the social context of prejudice, discrimination, and racism. We have briefly and informally shown that the structures of ethnic prejudice schemata can be explained in terms of fundamental social dimensions of group interests and aims. We have also suggested how prejudice, and the ways it is expressed in discourse, is organized around such categories, depending on socioculturally and historically varying relevance. Finally, we have indicated how ethnic attitudes are again related to the social context through models of situations — and hence in the perception of minority actions — and in the planning

and execution of actions of majority members against minorities. In the latter case, one important feature is the planning, justification, or rationalization of various forms of discrimination (dominance, distance, etc.). Though sketchy, our account shows how the cognitive structures of prejudice are related to the social ones of social perception, interaction, situation, and societal organization. Also, it shows how prejudices may be related, both through cognitive and social strategies, to the ways people express them in everyday conversation or other types of discourse. In the remainder of this book, we will investigate these strategies, as well as the contents and style of prejudiced talk. We will then be able to make valid inferences about the actual contents and organization of ethnic prejudice, as well as about their social functions (see also Levin and Levin 1982).

3. THE CONTEXTS OF PREJUDICED DISCOURSE

3.1. *Text and context*

Just as any other type of text, prejudiced discourse is an integral part of various contexts. Before we proceed to a systematic analysis of talk about minorities in the following chapters, we should therefore specify its relations with these contexts. In the previous chapter we have summarized some of the features of the sociocognitive basis of prejudice. This chapter should show how talk about minority groups is related to this 'basis'.

Obviously, not only simple relations of reference are involved. The fact that prejudiced discourse explicitly or implicitly is *about* minority groups is hardly an adequate characterization of the social embedding of talk. Important is the fact that prejudiced discourse is a form of language use and interaction of social members in social situations of ingroup communication. And similarly, it is crucial to analyze this social process of communication in terms of the possible conditions, effects, or functions prejudiced discourse may have for the ingroup or the community, for instance in the diffusion of relevant social attitudes. In order to fully understand the structural features of prejudiced discourse, we must therefore mention some of its major social functions. The actual accomplishment of the discourse in the course of the interview interaction (in itself a social phenomenon) can then be placed within a wider sociocultural environment. We may assume that the discourse, taken as conversational interaction, will signal in many ways this embeddedness in this sociocultural context, for instance the intergroup relations and conflicts involved. In this sense, talk expresses or represents its own context.

Part of that social context are social members, who at the same time are participants in the discursive interaction. We therefore assume that the discourse will also express or indicate what goes on 'in' these participants. Beliefs, opinions, attitudes, and group schemata, in particular, as well as the strategies for their use in social communication in informal settings need to be displayed, so that they can become relevant in the social context. An important component in a theory of prejudice and of prejudiced talk, therefore, is an account of *how* people exactly go about expressing or formulating

their 'mental' manipulation of prejudice. From our formulation of this problem, it may be clear that we do not mean in this case some purely individual or personal expression of underlying cognition. On the contrary, we want to know how speakers do this *as* social (ingroup) members, that is, how these cognitive processes of expression or formulation are socially constrained.

It goes without saying that this theoretical enterprise is fairly complex. We have few explicit conceptual or experimental instruments to guide us. We know next to nothing about the processes of discourse production. Nor do we know precisely how these processes again relate to the social interaction in talk or interviews and, through such encounters, with the wider social context of intragroup relations or (ethnic) intergroup conflict.

3.2. *Production strategies for prejudiced talk*

We have suggested that, as yet, we have few theoretical instruments or experimental data to specify the processes of discourse production. This is even more true for the expression of specific cognitive contents or strategies. We must therefore fall back on our own model of strategic discourse processing (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983), although that model primarily specifies the comprehension side of this process (see also Cushman and McPhee 1980).

Some major components of this model have already been discussed in our cognitive account of prejudice in the previous chapter. We have assumed that the processes of decoding, analysis, and interpretation take place in Short Term Memory (STM). Here, textual data are strategically analyzed in structural terms and interpreted as propositional schemata. Such propositions are coherently related, both locally (linearly) and globally (hierarchically). Macropropositions are recursively derived from the locally connected propositions and define global, overall themes or topics, the so-called macropropositions. These macropropositions may be assigned specific functions, depending on the type of text or talk, e.g. narrative, argumentative, or conversational functions (e.g. 'Complication', 'Conclusion', or 'Closing', respectively). This process of interpretation is strategic, as we have suggested before: it accepts incomplete information from various levels of the input text data as well as from context and from 'internal' cognitive knowledge or beliefs (concepts, scripts, attitudes). The result of this flexible process is a (textual) representation (TR) in Episodic Memory (EM). In addition, we assume that this TR is related to a situational model (SM). This model represents the accumulated personal experiences people have with similar situations. It is the 'referential' basis of the text or the talk: what it is about.

Text or talk are merely fragmentary and incomplete. They presuppose large amounts of knowledge in models, information that speakers and hearers bring to bear in the actual comprehension of the text. And conversely, the textual representation in episodic memory, a 'new experience', is used to update the current model(s). Finally, models may be generalized and abstracted, and may yield decontextualized knowledge and belief clusters in semantic memory, e.g. frames, scripts, or group attitudes. Due to their use and relevance in many social contexts of communication and interaction, such schemata in semantic memory may be qualified as *social* schemata. To push this distinction between episodic and semantic memory (both functions of Long Term Memory, LTM) even further, we might speak of 'personal' and 'social' memory, respectively. Episodic memory records our personal experiences, knowledge, beliefs, etc., and semantic memory rather the information that is socially shared with others of the same group or culture. However, social schemata are used also in decoding, interpreting, and forming textual representations, or in the activation and construction of models, so that these will also have an important 'social' dimension. Indeed, understanding is hardly a purely private or individual enterprise, and successful communication therefore presupposes also partly shared TR's and SM's in memory. Yet, models will also involve individually variable and unique information, given their unique biographical construction process.

This sketchy framework, in which many details have been ignored for the moment, may be used to specify some of the characteristics of the production of prejudiced talk. The semantic 'content' of discourse, thus, may be assumed to originate again in episodic models. People have some 'picture' of the situation, e.g. the ethnic situation in their neighborhood, or of some concrete event, together with personal evaluations (opinions) about these. And this model will be the input for the production process.

Of course, the complete model cannot be, nor need be, expressed, but only relevant fragments. Speakers know what part of the model is already known and can be presupposed according to rules of pragmatic appropriateness (e.g. for assertions). Hence, our own models must be compared to our models of the models of our speech partners (what we assume that the other already knows, or can readily infer from that knowledge). A context-relevant selection is made of the model information that the speaker wants to express, or what the speaker assumes that the hearer will want to know.

At this point, prejudiced talk has interesting features. We have seen in the previous chapter how prejudiced models of situations are formed. Such

models may be biased pictures of social reality and may involve prejudiced group schema instantiations. There are, however, social norms and values that regulate what we can appropriately express in a given context. Opinions about other people and other groups, especially negative ones, are a case in point. When expressed, these might be interpreted as a negative property of the speaker, e.g. in terms of intolerance. In general, speakers will try to avoid such negative attributions by their listeners. Given the strict social norms and values against ethnic prejudice, discrimination, and racism, who wants to be considered a racist? People have, or try to maintain, a positive self-image of tolerant, understanding, cooperative citizens, on the one hand, and of kind persons, on the other. Direct expression of very negative opinions about minorities may be interpreted as indicators of a person schema (Markus 1977) that conflicts with this positive self-image. Therefore, people will try to save face, and resort to strategies to maintain or enhance a positive impression (O'Keefe and Delia 1982; Goffman 1959, 1967). We may expect, then, that such self-presentation strategies, which are essentially social, impinge on the process of model expression we are dealing with here. In more mundane terms: if delicate beliefs or opinions are involved, people simply will not always 'say what they mean'. At least, they will do so only when the discursive context of assertions guarantees that no negative attributions are likely to be made by the listener. We may expect, therefore, that if speakers want to express some negative opinion about minority groups, they will tend to do some strategic 'covering up'. This, indeed, we will witness in our interview data.

For the cognitive process of production, the social constraints on interaction and communication as well as the strategies in the presentation of self have of course important consequences. Before part of a model about an ethnically relevant event can be expressed, speakers need to inspect the assumptions about the model of the listener (including his or her beliefs about minorities) as well as the other constraints of the communicative situation. Interaction with people we know or people who like us is less risky from the point of view of expressing delicate beliefs, e.g. because we know they agree with our group schema, or because we assume that they will understand and accept our personal models of the situation. In the interview situation, which is semiformal, we may have an intermediate case. Losing face for a stranger we probably will never meet again is less risky. Also, the goal of the communicative event is to express personal beliefs. The result of these rather complex constraints, which each speaker has to deal with effec-

tively throughout the conversation, has to be fed into the strategies of production. The overall Control System will have to monitor this ongoing process, *viz.* by representing the goals of the interaction or the interview and by an overall characterization of the context and the listener (Snyder 1979).

Once we have all that, plans can be made for the actual production process. Given the overall pragmatic nature of the interview situation, the overall (macro-) speech act involved, in this case, is straightforward, *viz.* an assertion. Next, the overall topic or theme, the macrostructure, is also fixed, namely the situation in the neighborhood, or the presence of 'foreigners', depending on the 'definition of the situation' (i.e. of the topic) by the interviewer. The discourse plan, therefore, is no problem as such (although, of course, the speaker may want to avoid it, change topics, or simply refuse it by ending the conversation). This semantic and pragmatic macrostructure, then, is fed intc the Control System, and will also monitor the local organization of talk. The cognitive work, then, focuses on the linear, local accomplishment of the interview encounter. Yet, also here there is help from the outside: the interviewer asks questions, and once subjectively understood, the information derived from those questions will be used as a powerful retrieval cue for fragments of our models. A question like *Do you ever meet foreigners in the supermarket*? can be used to search in the foreigner model or the supermarket model for relevant experiences. If present, an affirmative answer may be planned locally, possibly with details about our experiences represented in that model (e.g. about that situation in which we had a problem with a minority member). Yet, nondirected interviews precisely do not guide this process too closely. Interviewees are expected to spontaneously tell about their relevant experiences or opinions, within the boundaries of the established topic.

Given the constraints as described above and the macro-plan for the conversation, and given specific questions of interviewers that have led to activated model fragments, these fragments (proposition sequences) may be built into the local semantic 'text base'. This semantic representation is the starting point of the actual formulation processes in STM: lexicalization of concepts, syntactic ordering, sequencing of propositions and clauses, stylistic choices at various of these levels, and, finally, input into the phonological/phonetic and paraverbal systems of expression. Details of these processes are less relevant here (see e.g. Butterworth 1980). Important, though, is the fact that these expressions do not only realize the semantic representation, but also pragmatic, interactional, and cognitive dimensions of the situation

(accusation, persuasion, uncertainty, emotions, and many more). Also, details of the expression will signal various operations of the production process. Hesitations, for instance, may signal underlying search strategies, as is often the case for the stylistically relevant lexicalization of names for minority groups, or doubts about the appropriateness of some specific opinion. Similarly, complex semantic, rhetorical, and conversational strategies marked by such 'surface' features may in turn reveal underlying cognitive strategies in the manipulation of ethnic information from models and attitude schemata. Our analysis in the following chapters will be geared towards a 'functional' description of talk characteristics as such indicators of underlying cognitive processes. But at the same time, we will take into account the signaling of the (also cognitively represented) social constraints upon the interaction, such as the strategies of self-presentation and persuasion (Burgoon and Bettinghaus 1980).

Finally, it should be added that information about minority groups as expressed in talk not only comes from episodic models. People may well have no experiences at all, and in that case there is little to 'tell'. Yet, we assume that people also have models about what they read in the press, see on TV, or hear from everyday stories. We have in fact emphasized that real understanding involves the activation or the construction of situation models. That is, most adults in our multiethnic society do have (socially shared, often stereotypical) models. However, we will also see that information may be drawn directly from the group schema, that is, in those cases where general beliefs or opinions are asked or volunteered about minority groups. We will later examine in more detail these two 'sources' (models or schemata) for expressed prejudiced.

3.3. *Social strategies and functions of prejudiced talk*

It has become clear in the previous section that cognitive processes in the expression of prejudice in talk presuppose a complex system of social constraints, rules, norms, information, and situational variables. Among other things, talk, also in interviews, requires strategies of self-presentation and persuasion. Social members know the norms and rules regulating what we may say to whom about what in what situations. Speaking negatively, especially about others or about other groups, is done routinely, but with the background norms in mind that forbid gossip, slander, or verbal discrimination. Similarly, people realize that they are both (white) ingroup members, especially when talking about outgroup members, and parties in ongoing

talk. They are face-to-face with an unknown person taking the role of interviewer, and are about to define together the situation for some stretch of time. And depending on these social constraints and on the actions of the interviewer, the speaker must engage in a process of social self-disclosure.

The immediate task at hand, then, is the satisfactory compliance with, and the execution of, the request for expressing experiences or opinions, that is, participation in a conversation or interview. There may be several subgoals or social implications involved in such a task, e.g. cooperation in an institutionally defined encounter (the research interview), more personally directed 'help' of the student-interviewer-in-the-course-of-performing-his/her-work, but maybe also the more self-directed goal of getting things said to complain or to accuse others. In other words, several *functions* may become relevant that go beyond the immediate goals or reasons for the interview interaction. Especially if we want to speculate about the less formal talk in everyday situations, such further functions of conversations are of crucial importance. The consequences of 'having a nice talk' with somebody in that case are socially more relevant, e.g. for intragroup and intergroup relation, than the satisfaction of needs to talk or to communicate. Whereas in the following chapters we will pay more attention to the interactional strategies involved in such talk, we should discuss here some of these social functions of talk about minorities. Since an adequate theoretical framework is lacking for a more systematic account, we can only provide a tentative enumeration of some crucial functions.

(a) *Socializing personal experiences*

Personal experiences of encounters with members of outgroups not only have individual but also social relevance. For other ingroup members, such experiences may become 'typical' examples of a well-known ethnic group conflict. Thus, personal models of such situations become socially *shared* situation models. Such models may serve as 'evidence', also for others, of general group stereotypes. In stories they may be retold, 'as if' one had experienced such encounters personally. This is crucial for those experiences of everyday life that not only are narratable per se, but instances of events that are exceptional or uncommon, such as accidents, crime, serious conflicts, or miracles. Personal experiences become the experiences of groups or of a small community and provide the *social data base* on which further talk and opinions are based.

(b) *Self-presentation*

The expression of one's own experiences and opinions is also a mode of self-presentation in social encounters. People will not only denote their relationships with members of the outgroup, but at the same time mark their position in the ingroup, e.g. as a competent social member who shares the important values, norms, and goals of the ingroup and who will display knowledge about dominant norms of understanding and tolerance. Despite the negative opinions and the complaints about ethnic groups and group members, the speaker may in this way show at the same time that this negative evaluation is not derived from a personal negative bias. On the contrary, the speaker wants to be kind and reasonable at the same time. It is obvious that this social function is important especially in conversational interactions with relative strangers (e.g. in interviews) and in general with those ingroup members who are outsiders in the local community of the neighborhood.

(c) *Identity and social integration*

Closely related to this social function of self-presentation are conversations about ethnic minorities that, at the same time, function as a display of social identity and integration with regard to one's own ingroup. Thus, stories and arguments are told in order to express a common basis of evaluation with respect to outgroups. Speakers show that their basic goals, norms, and values are those of the ingroup as a whole, and that therefore they properly belong to the ingroup. Their experiences with ethnic minority group members are thus narrated as experiences of ingroup members and as expressions of a 'common fate' of the ingroup. They thereby signal their social membership as well as their 'normal' reactions to this shared predicament (Festinger 1950).

(d) *Persuasion*

Since not all ingroup members have the same experiences or the same opinions and attitudes, talk about negative experiences may also have a persuasive function. That is, negative opinions and attitudes are not simply formulated as one's own, personal beliefs, but as justified, credible, and acceptable convictions. Therefore, conversations about minorities have an important argumentative dimension, in which both stories and rhetorical devices are used to make the experiences and their evaluations more convicting. Indeed, stories are told as personally experienced (and hence 'true') evidence that may serve as valid premises in the argumentation structure that leads to a negative opinion-conclusion. Storytellers will often make an *appeal* to hearers, such as *What would you do...?* Thus, common talk may lead to 'mutual persuasion' as a form of decision making within groups about

relevant action or attitudes, and may lead to the polarization of attitudes (Hewstone and Jaspars 1982).

(e) *Informal mass communication*

Closely linked with the first function mentioned above (the expression of personal experiences as social experiences), conversations about minorities also have an important function as a means of informal mass communication. The mass media as such will hardly explicitly formulate racist beliefs and do not pay attention to the everyday experiences of 'common people' (although an overall negative bias is obvious in the Dutch media, cf. van Dijk 1983a; see also Hartmann and Husband 1974; Husband 1977, 1980, for Britain). Hence, the only way opinions, events, and experiences can become socially shared is through this medium of informal mass communication, whereby some story can be told and retold to family members, friends, or acquaintances, thereby quickly spreading in the community (cf. Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). Soon, such stories may indeed begin their own life and become some form of ingroup folklore. In this respect, they resemble rumor and gossip (Allport and Postman 1947; Shibutani 1966; Fine 1984). In situations of social uncertainty, when basic values and goals are felt to be threatened by a common outgroup, and when public information (e.g. by the mass media) does not provide sufficient data, storytelling about minorities becomes of vital importance for the ingroup (see also Knopf 1975).

(f) *A mode of conflict resolution*

The expression of personal negative experiences and opinions, when shared with others of the ingroup, may further serve as a mode of social conflict resolution when other solutions are not available. The resented outgroup is there, the 'government doesn't do anything about it', but ingroup members feel uncomfortable, threatened, and confronted with everyday perceptions and interactions they cannot handle. We will see that stories about ethnic minorities often lack a Resolution category: a negative event or action, ascribed to ethnic minority members, could not and cannot be countered by effective personal or social action. The story thus must center around a negative Complication category and an important Evaluation category, in which the storyteller expresses personal opinions about the events and the overall negative conclusion that should be drawn. The 'solution' of the social predicament, thus, is twofold, *viz.* various acts of discrimination towards outgroup members, on the one hand, and sharing one's experiences with others of the ingroup, on the other hand.

(g) *Amusement*

Next, we should not forget that everyday conversation and storytelling may also have aesthetic or 'hedonic' social functions: people will also tell about their experiences in order to amuse the communication partner. Stories about the 'funny' ways of behavior of ethnic minority members will often serve this purpose. Their actions are seen as violating not only basic norms and values but also commonsense expectations about routine behavior. Perceived deviations may thus become the interesting and reportable nucleus of an everyday story, implying that these people are funny, weird, crazy, stupid, etc. At the same time, such stories not only denote 'weird' events, but also signal the social and communicative 'interestingness' of the storyteller. The 'interestingness' attribution to persons as social members may be combined in this case with their positive evaluation as competent storytellers if they are able to tell not only about an interesting event, but also have an artful control of stylistic, rhetorical, and narrative devices. Here we touch upon the large class of other forms of racist discourse, such as jokes, rumors, 'funny' TV-programs, and the like (Husband 1983).

(h) *Cognitive display and social precepts*

Finally, our analysis in this chapter suggests that informal discourse about minorities also functions as a display of both personal and socially shared strategies. The expressive functions of discourse serve the necessary utterance of problems and predicaments, and the persuasive functions are aimed at inducing similar interpretations, models, and schemata in other ingroup members. In this way the 'contents' of our prejudices as well as our 'evidence' for them may be communicated. It appears crucial, however, that we should also share similar strategies for handling social information about minority groups. Our daily talk exhibits some of those strategies and our hearers may pick these up again. We may thus learn from others *how* to think about minorities. This is important, because the topic is not only socially relevant but also delicate. There are strict social norms for our treatment of groups and group members. If we have beliefs and opinions that would conflict with those norms, this conflict must be strategically resolved. This requires complex reasoning steps, involving justification procedures, the selection of relevant premises (about social 'facts'), and the defense of exceptions to the prevailing norms of tolerance. These strategies need to be learned, and discourse is the preferred location for their exercise, both in production and in understanding and integration. It displays how *we* handle

'the problem', and allows us to be praised and criticized for our 'solution'. Praise will confirm our moves, criticism will probably help to make them better, more subtle maybe.

Similar remarks hold for the social dimension of such precepts. Stories in talk not only show what the minority member did, but also what *we* did, how we handled a situation, and what kind of action appeared to be effective. We have seen above that this will not always be the case: complaint stories will often only lead to a Complication, featuring a problem, predicament, or a 'deviant' or 'strange' event, and not always a solution by the storyteller. But at least an evaluation will be formulated, so that the conclusion about the opinions regarding the event and the participating minorities becomes clear. Yet, other stories *do* show how ingroup members solve a problem. Then, the storyteller as an ingroup member is not only a victim but also a hero. The solution marks his or her superiority, and also suggests how the problem can be solved. This need not always be directly in terms of aggression or discrimination against minority groups. Also more subtle forms of social problem solving are displayed, often implying the recurrence to paternalistic strategies. In both cases, though, the minority group remains in the negative, subordinate role. *They* are the cause of the problem, and the discourse shows how *we* can or should handle such problems. Besides the diffusion of cognitive content and strategies, the discourse apparently also shows the contents and the strategies of the most effective interaction with minorities. The moral of everyday stories thus at the same times becomes a precept for strategic discrimination.

More functions could be formulated for everyday talk about minorities. Essential for the discussion in this chapter is the vital intermediary and mediating role of discourse in the socialization of personal experiences, and the individualization of social interaction types, strategies, models, schemata, and norms shared in the community. Discourse appears to be one of the most important media linking the individual and the social, the cognitive and the interactional dimensions of racism. It is the place where social cognitions become 'articulate'. The implicit preconditions of interactions may become explicit in stories, arguments, conclusions, and their subtle strategies. The discourse shows both how the speaker relates to the outgroup and how solidarity with the ingroup is understood. It shows both the speaker's cognitive/affective states and his or her social position. Upon the arrival of new groups or the emerging salience of an existing group, the discourse can vicariously represent both the attitude to be taken and the actions that are imperative.

In case of lack of contacts, experiences, or direct information regarding minorities, the discourse is the symbolic substitute for these social encounters and preformulates the moral conclusions we might infer from such encounters. Therefore, an analysis of racist discourse exemplifies in many respects the complex issues dealt with in this discussion about the systematic relationships between prejudiced cognition and its functions in racist interaction.

4. TOPICS OF DISCOURSE

4.1. *Dimensions of discourse analysis*

In this chapter we start with the structural analysis of talk about minorities. For the sake of theoretical and descriptive clarity, a distinction is made between *global* and *local* structures of discourse. Global structures are defined for the discourse as a whole or for large segments. Local structures are characterized at the level of sentential structures, relations between sentences, or turns and moves of dialogical interaction. Yet, some important dimensions of discourse comprise both levels. For instance, narrative and argumentative structures are to be described both at the global and at the local level. In this and the next two chapters, we will focus on the overall organization of discourse: topics (themes), stories, and argumentations. Then we proceed to local semantic strategies, style and rhetoric, and finally to the pragmatic and conversational structures proper. Such a distinction in separate chapters might obscure the relevance of a more 'integral' analysis, in which fragments of talk are analyzed precisely for their interdependence at different levels or dimensions. We will compensate for the lack of a separate cross-level approach by paying attention in each chapter to the relations with other aspects of analysis. It goes without saying that space limitations do not allow detailed theoretical explication in the respective chapers. References to important theoretical backgrounds for the analyses will however be provided for further orientation. Similarly, the analyses themselves can only be fragmentary. It is impossible to analyze some 120 interviews in detail, so we just take characteristic examples. A few quantitative data give an impression about the generality of the features studied in the qualitative analysis.

4.2. *Topics of discourse: A theoretical account*

The global, overall structures of talk to be dealt with in this chapter can be called *thematic* or *topical*. Such themes or topics of discourse can be defined in semantic terms: we see them as properties of the (overall) meaning of discourse. A sentence-based semantics, however, cannot account for such

notions, which we make explicit in terms of semantic macrostructures (van Dijk 1972, 1977, 1980). Macrostructures are hierarchical configurations of (macro)propositions, which represent the themes or topics of the respective episodes of the discourse at various levels of generality or abstraction. Thus, a topic may be expressed by several sentences in a discourse but also by larger segments of the discourse or by the discourse as a whole. In our case, for instance, the highest-level topic of discourse established by the interviewer implies, of course, the concept of a 'foreigner' or of 'ethnic minorities'. However, since topics are defined as full (macro)propositions, a single concept like 'foreigner' is not as such a topic but maybe part of a topic, *viz.* in the Participant category of the topical (macro)proposition.

A topic of discourse (the somewhat less technical notion that we will use here as the equivalent of the more abstract notion of 'semantic macroproposition') may be further characterized as the most 'important' or 'summarizing' idea that underlies the meanings of a sequence of sentences in a discourse. It defines the 'gist' or 'upshot' of such an episode, and at the same time assigns global *coherence* to such an episode. Or, still in other terms, it is what such a passage *is about* (globally speaking). A topic is derived from the meanings of the sentences of an episode, that is, from a sequence of propositions defining that episode, by a number of macrorules. These generalize, abstract, and reconstruct meanings at a higher level of abstraction. Detailed descriptions of the various activities of shopping, for instance, would in such a case be 'summarized' by a macroproposition 'I went shopping'. This reconstructive inference is possible only on the basis of our knowledge of the world, such as scripts (Schank and Abelson 1977). This means that in our view a full account of the (local and global) meanings of a discourse cannot be dissociated from a cognitive framework, such as the one sketched in the previous chapters (for details and further references, see van Dijk and Kintsch 1983). Such a cognitive framework would not operate with the abstract macrorules of a more formal semantics, but account for topics in terms of macrostrategies: How do language users actually go about inferring and constructing the 'overall' meanings, the topics, of a discourse? Which textual, contextual, or cognitive cues or information do they use? and What is the nature of the (possibly varying) cognitive representations of these topics in memory? (see also Kieras 1982).

These cognitive strategies are in turn related with the dialogical interaction of talk. That is, to 'speak about a topic' is also an interactional accomplishment which requires conversational strategies of the participants.

Topics are not just 'there', but may be suggested, introduced, negotiated by the parties of a conversation. They may be challenged and changed under specific conditions, or changes may be interactionally 'refused' by the other participant. Especially in interviews, it is the interviewer who introduces and monitors the (central) topic, occasionally bringing back the conversation to the topic as agreed or tacitly established. In spontaneous discourse, topical coherence at the global level may however be rather loose, giving way to local coherence conditions or to lower-level 'minor' topics that can be changed frequently. But even at this intermediary level, participants will have to make clear their 'point' during a sequence of sentences (or propositions, or turns) (Polanyi 1979). Our point in this paragraph, then, is that topics are not only to be defined in terms of semantic macrostructures, or in terms of knowledge-based cognitive strategies for the inference of 'gist', but also of an interactional accomplishment at various levels of talk (see Maynard 1980; Erickson 1982; Brown and Yule 1983; chap.3).

4.3. *Building topics: An example*

As an example of the conversational construction of topics of discourse, we briefly examine the thematic organization of fragments of the interview with the retired director we have also introduced at the end of chapter 1. The overall topic of that fragment was, for the interviewer, the conditional 'If minority groups would come to live in this neighborhood, what would you think?', and the topic for the interviewee was 'I wouldn't like that' (expressed initially as *I would find that WRONG*). This naive topic assignment already shows that we may have complementary topics for the participants in talk, and these need not be exactly the same. At a higher level of abstraction, though, we might generalize to a topic such as 'I do not like foreigners in this neighborhood', because the question of the interviewer about the opinion of the interviewee is a normal (interview) condition of the macro-opinion organizing this fragment. According to the rules of macrostructure inference, normal conditions, components, and consequences can be abstracted from at a higher level.

The topics leading to the topic of this fragment were: 'There are many foreigners in Amsterdam; we shouldn't have let them come here, because of the economic consequences.' Then, the topic changes to minorities in this neighborhood, under the overall theme mentioned above (dislike of possible immigration). At the end of that episode, the interviewee says:

(2) You can't do that in the middle of a neighborhood like that, that's impossible. I believe, I believe that uh then one would let uh the town more or less pauperize.

This final argument against the immigration of minorities needs to be backed up, because, as it stands, it contains a rather negative qualification of minorities, *viz.* as the cause for urban decay. Hence, the interviewee must expand on that proposition and, as a result, introduces a new, supporting topic, as follows:

(3) (I, 3)
Itee: If you go to De Bijlmer uh then you see, that it uh
I would say, yes, YES, there it is run down, if you,
if you go to the shopping centre in De Bijlmer, and
you come, you go down the stairs, then you're met
by the dirty uh uh stench of urine, that is terrible.
Iter: Do you ever go there?
Itee: I was there yesterday. When I, I sometimes go there,
yes, and YES, then uh then you have to accept it, uh, if you
want to accept it and can't do anything against it,
then you must build these houses uh, well, uh in neighborhoods, where this can be tolerated. I think it
shouldn't be tolerated at all. If you would, if they
use those staircases like urinals, and that happens!,
just as it happens in the corridors at the Central
Station, the strangest things happen there too, they
happen there too. Why it has to happen there, I don't
know, and uh uh uh and I don't say that uh uh there is
no NAME-tag, I don't know who does it, there
is no name attached to it, I don't say these are Surinamese, or Turks, I don't know that, and it doesn't matter.

This fragment is topically connected to the previous fragment by the thematic concept of urban decay or pauperization, and is triggered by the use of the concept in the last line of the first fragment, mentioning the general consequence of letting minority groups live in the garden city where our respondent lives. Yet, he does not merely change topic under the heading of this more general topic of urban decay. He starts to describe the situation in another part of the town: *de Bijlmer*, a vast postwar project of large apartment houses, well-known in Amsterdam for its high proportion of minority citizens. This common knowledge is presupposed. The man does not need to make explicit that he is making a comparison with a neighborhood in town where there *are* many foreigners, but of course the comparison is relevant only if this presupposed part is mutually understood. The coherence with the previous

fragment is signaled by the clause *then you must build these houses in neighborhoods where this can be tolerated.* In other words, the fragment about concrete experiences of urban decay, *viz.* about dirty smells, is indeed supportive of the previous and therefore higher-level topic: 'I don't want them here'. At the same time, this argumentative support for the urban decay topic introduces the *implicit* topic 'they are dirty'. Only if this topic is part of the thematic structure, the comparison and the argument hold: I do not want minorities here, because they are dirty. Yet, although this topic is clearly implied by the local moves of the interviewee, lines 17 and 18 start a routine strategy of denial of such negative attributions, using a stereotypical expression in Dutch (*d'r staat geen naam bij*) to conceal explicit accusations. We will come back to this kind of local strategies in chapter 7.

This informal analysis shows several things. First, topics in interviews are usually introduced and maintained by the interviewer, as we had assumed earlier. Second, given such a topic, the interviewee may adapt this topic to his or her special interests or opinions. In our case, for instance, the economic backgrounds of migrant labor. Third, a topic involving an explicit opinion may be introduced as a direct answer to a question, but will in general require argumentative elaboration. A simple "No, I wouldn't like to have them here" is clearly inadequate. However, the topic 'This part of town is not built for that' is hardly a good argument. Nor is the supporting topic 'One would not build industry in a garden city either'. So, the speaker must try again, focusing on the possible negative consequences (decay), and finds a 'convincing' case in the comparison with a 'notorious' other neighborhood of Amsterdam. In other words, one topic requires argumentation and hence higher-level propositions (the town decays), and these again need to be supported by a particular example. This example, then, provides the next topic. Fourth, the relevance of that next topic should however be signaled, e.g. by referring back to the keyphrase of the previous fragment (*then you must build these houses...*).

What conclusions may be drawn from the preliminary analysis of the topical structure of this fragment about the underlying cognitive representations and the strategies of interaction in talk? First, the topic 'I do no like minority groups in this neighborhood' suggests a high-level proposition both in the group attitude schema and in the situation model of this interviewee. Thus, the model of the neighborhood features an all-white group of citizens, expensive houses, and a garden-like layout. Inferences drawn from the minority group model, e.g. 'dirty', 'poor', and 'cause urban decay', conflict with

this model. The topic introduced to support the argument in favor of the plausibility of the model about the interviewee's own neighborhood involves the proposition 'That other neighborhood is dirty', which is part of the model of a minority neighborhood elsewhere in Amsterdam. In other words, the topics of discourse may express rather high-level propositions of situation models, and organize the kind of stereotypical information people use about their neighborhood or about specific minority groups. Second, the relations between the two topics are established by the speaker to show the unacceptability of the model proposed by the interviewer as a 'thought experiment': imagine a model of your neighborhood but then with minority groups as participants. That is, the two models are thought to be incompatible, and the positive nature of the interviewee's own neighborhood is contrasted with the negative features of the other neighborhood. Here we witness the important social 'differentiation' involved in prejudiced attitudes and models, *viz.* favorable evaluation of the ingroup (and its location) vs. unfavorable evaluation of the outgroup and its location. In this way, the topic signals what is most important or relevant to the speaker. And it does not only organize lower-level, detailed opinions, but it also *defines the situation*: minority members should be kept out of our neighborhood.

The introduction of a new subtopic, *viz.* about the other part of Amsterdam, also has strategic functions for the conversational interaction. A direct negative answer to the hypothetical question of the interviewer could appear to be a signal of intolerance or discrimination. Therefore, the speaker first introduces the local topic of the incompatibility of building factories in a garden city, a topical proposition with which most interlocutors would probably agree. As a further argument, a comparison is made with the other neighborhood in order to demonstrate the negative consequences of having minority groups in a rich neighborhood. Showing negative consequences to a hypothetical question, here, implies both a negative answer and a supporting reason for this negation. Here we witness the dominant combined interactional strategy of placing minority groups in a negative light and at the same time the positive presentation of the self as a 'reasonable' citizen. Urban decay is attributed to minorities only indirectly. The refusal is articulated at the higher level of 'incompatibility' of rich and nice living, on the one hand, and poor and dirty living, on the other hand (*that's impossible*). The persuasive intent of the speaker seems to be to show to the interviewer that the imagined model of an ethnically integrated neighborhood is 'impossible', because inconsistent with higher-level values of economic responsibility and

the preservation of beautiful suburbs.

4.4. *Topic sequences*

Topics usually do not come alone. They are introduced 'on-line' by the speech participants, and thus form topical sequences. In the previous section, we have briefly described how a speaker may introduce new topics under the control of a previous topic or a higher-level (often implicit) topic. We should now address, more in particular, the question of how talk (interviews) is topically constructed by such processes of sequencing.

A first, obvious aspect of topical sequencing in interviews is of course the topical coherence between *question* and *answers*. That is, we find a kind of 'adjacency pair', but then at a more global level of analysis (not necessarily distributed over the local turns of subsequent speakers). An example (note that we do not reproduce the transcript itself here, but give an expression of the macrostructural topic of a sequence) from interview B1 is:

(4) Iter: There are many nationalities in town.
Itee: There are too many of them in this neighborhood.
The character of the neighborhood changes.

The interviewer introduces the topic 'foreigners in town' through an indirect and probably 'positive' question (many nationalitities), and the interviewee asks for clarification about the topic and the question: "Whether I find that positive?" Then, he starts his answer with the usual strategy of positive opinion display (*I don't find that negative, but...*), introducing his answer and his side of the topic: 'There are too many here'. Next, we see that within this coherent question-answer sequence, the interviewee continues his contribution with another topic ('The character of the neighborhood changes'), which denotes a subjectively perceived negative consequence of the first topic ('too many here') and at the same time a functional *explanation* of the previous macro-opinion. Conversationally, such an explanatory topic is not only an elaboration, an addition of details, but also part of a strategy of making opinions, given as answers to questions, more plausible, as we had also seen in the previous example (3). In other words, relations in topical sequences may be of several kinds, e.g. coherent 'seconds' in adjacency pairs, functioning as answers to questions; referring to consequences of previously mentioned events (or opinions about events); providing explanations for previous opinions, and making opinions or answers conversationally more plausible.

Similarly, the same interviewee, when asked whether he has any contacts with minorities, answers that he has no such contacts, but at the same time volunteers several topics that may be interpreted as reasons for not having such contacts: 'I have many friends' and 'These people are not very accessible'. The latter topic is again followed by another explanatory topic: 'They want to be on their own'. Hence, the question-answer format is routinely expanded with reasons, causes, consequences, or details that function as explanations for events or opinions about such events. Topics obviously play an important role in argumentative structure, to which we will turn in more detail later (chapter 6).

In this way, an answer to a question may expand into a story about personal experiences. It is mentioned by the interviewer that immigrant workers have their families come over to Holland, a topic picked up by the interviewee ("I have had some experience with that") in order to talk about large families in another part of town (semicontact) in which he lived. Again, this topic is introduced with several positive moves (nice children, I do not mind these large families, old people who live there do, etc.) followed again by a negative consequence and conclusion, identical to the one in our previous example (3): 'But the neighborhood is pauperizing because of all these poor, jobless people'. We see that the sequencing of topics is determined both by the dialogical nature of the interview (question-answer pairs) and by the strategies for the presentation and formulation of opinions. People will often start with a positive topic which then developes into a negative one, often mentioning negative consequences (depersonalized, i.e. made independent of personal interest: I do not mind, but this will cause decay for the town).

Sometimes, the sequencing seems to show organizational principles of underlying cognitive group schemata. Talking about Surinamese, the same interviewee volunteers the following sequence:

(5) (a) Surinamese live here too.
(b) But there are differences among them.
(c) Creoles are less active than Hindustans.
(d) They come here (to Holland) because of the social services.
(e) They do not adapt themselves.
(f) Look at the rubbish in De Bijlmer.
(g) They easily get an apartment.

This list is short for the stereotypical group schema in the Netherlands about Surinamese. Some of the topics directly come from situation models, *viz.* about one's own neighborhood and about the Bijlmer (the neighborhood

we have already encountered in the previous example (3)). The other topics, however, are general statements about Surinamese as a group, differentiations between subgroups and their properties, an opinion about the reason for their presence, and two major complaints: they do not adapt themselves, and they get apartments more easily (than we do). The latter two topics are the most frequently expressed prejudice themes of the interviews in contact areas (see below for a list of prejudice topics). We see that, once a topic has been introduced either by the interviewer or by the interviewee, the latter may develop this topic according to the on-line retrieval of high-level group-schema information. Probably more detailed information or opinions about Surinamese are represented in the interviewee, but the level or degree of availability will codetermine their on-line expression in the conversation.

We see that questions also have a more immediate cognitive function. They function as retrieval cues for relevant information. That is, they need not be answered directly, but in the interview they suggest a topic of discourse, as retrieved by the interviewee after some question. For instance, in interviews B1 and B2, mention of 'their different habits' prompts concrete model information about 'sheepheads lying beside the trash can'.

Topic sequences, just as proposition sequences at the local level, appear to be coherently organized by conditional or functional relationships (van Dijk 1977). Mentioning causes, reasons, or consequences in their 'natural' order is a form of conditional coherence. Functional coherence is established not via relations between denoted facts (cause-consequence), but through relations between propositions or speech acts themselves. For instance, an Explanation, an Example, an Illustration are categories of propositional functions — defined in relation to previous propositions, as we have seen above for e.g. explanatory topics in interviewee turns. The Example relation often appears when people, after some general opinion, volunteer a concrete story. A rather typical functional relation, which at the same time has self-presentational strategic functions, is Comparison:

(6) (B2) (a) They must respect the rules.
(b) We also have to do that when we are abroad.

The 'adaptation' topic, which is dominant in our interviews, is often persuasively presented to the interviewer via such Comparisons: they have to behave as we would/should in another/their country. This Comparison may then be followed again by a Generalization:

(6) (B2) (c) One has to respect the habits of the country.

We will analyze the strategic uses of such semantic relations in more detail for the local level in chapter 7. For instance, the stereotypical Contrast relation between topics ('I have nothing against them, but...') at the same time functions as a move of apparent denial of prejudice. Topically, Contrast relationships between topics are frequent in our data and their cognitive function may serve to signal differences, conflicts, or oppositions between the ingroup and the outgroup, or between 'positive' norms of tolerance and 'negative' experiences as represented in situation models about events in the neighborhood. Finally, the Specification relation holds when a sequence of detailed topics follows a more general topic. Thus, B6 (a teacher) tells about minority children in his class and also mentions problems in general, followed by an example in which he specifies the difficulties Islamic girls have when participating in coed gym lessons.

Summarizing this section, we have found that (a) topics are usually introduced by the interviewer, (b) such introductions serve as retrieval cues for relevant topics in the memory (schema or models) of the interviewee, (c) an introduced topic may function as a question to which the direct answer but also the simple 'continuation' by the hearer may be heard as a coherent 'second' in an adjacency pair typical for interview talk, (d) topics may denote conditionally related facts, (e) there are several functional relations between topics (Generalization, Specification, Example, Illustration, Comparison, Contrast, etc.), (f) topic sequences and their relations may express the organization of underlying cognitive models or schemata about minority groups, and (g) sequencing may function as a conversational strategy, e.g. of positive self-presentation or acceptable complaining.

4.5. *Topic change*

One important relation between topics in sequences is the *change* of topic. Theoretically, this means that a next topic cannot directly be related semantically to the previous topic, although at a higher level topical coherence may remain intact (the topic may still be about minorities). Since interviewers have control over topic continuity and change, they are the regular initiators of topic change. As soon as they think they have 'heard enough' about a topic, a next topic may be addressed. They will thus typically change from the 'neighborhood' topics, to 'work', 'school', 'social benefits', or 'culture'. These changes may be preprogrammed if the interviewer wants to talk about minorities in different 'situations', but they may also come up spontaneously, on-line, during the talk. More interesting from our point of view are

topic changes by interviewees. Strictly speaking, the rules of interviewing do not allow such changes, since the interviewer asks the questions, and the answers of the interviewee should by definition remain within the topic introduced by a question.

Yet, we have already met some examples in which the interviewee introduces new subtopics as part of an argumentation, such as Comparisons with other neighborhoods, or higher-level topics about economical consequences of immigration. Topic changes, therefore, are mostly strategic. They are consciously or less consciously geared towards the realization of the overall strategies of the interviewee, e.g. making some (negative) opinion plausible or making a good impression. Yet, there are also other reasons for topic change. When B2 is asked a rather specific question about minority children at school, this (old) man probably has no specific beliefs or opinions about the topic, but simply repeats the stereotypical saying *'s lands wijs, 's lands eer* (approx.: 'When in Rome, do as the Romans do'), probably implying that also at school children should adapt to our school system (and language). Immediately after that move, however, he changes the topic to another generality: 'You have to be careful with these people', followed by an illustration, in a narrative, about a fight.

Similarly, a topic change may occur when the interviewee does not (want to) answer a question directly, but starts with another topic — which later may lead to a delayed answer to the question, as in the following sequence of topics derived from the dialogue:

(7) (B3) Iter: Did you ever have an unpleasant experience?
Itee: I have nothing against foreigners.
But their attitude, their aggression is scaring.
We are no longer free here. You have to be careful.

The question would in principle elicit an answer based on personal experiences. Instead of this model-based information, though, B3 volunteers more general schema-based opinions which are more or less coherent at the higher level of 'safety' or 'aggression' concepts (following the usual apparent denial strategy).

Whereas in (7) the topic change is merely one of 'level', that is, a specific question is answered only in general terms, the introduction of a new topic may also be less coherent, as in:

(8) (B5) (a) It is nice, so many different people here.
(b) But, there are limits to that.
(c) There are many Dutch people who have no job.
(d) Criminality also occurs among Dutch people.

The stereotypical apparent denial strategy turns from a positive evaluation (based on the tolerance norm) to a negative evaluation of the presence of minority groups, which is motivated by the unemployment of Dutch people: the usual 'negative consequence' move in explanatory functional relations between topics. The 'criminality' topic, however, does not seem obvious in that case, however. It may be triggered by the mental 'review' of negative consequences of the presence of minority groups. But then, the prejudiced proposition about their assumed criminality is constructed in an indirect denial, a move showing understanding or tolerance (apparent refuting of prejudice). In other words, topic changes may signal cognitive associations based on 'proximity' in minority models or schemata, but at the same time they may have a conversational, strategic nature. Avoiding negative or difficult answers, preparing a delicate opinion, making relevant comparisons, supplying 'other' evidence for a previous opinion are examples of such strategic functions of topic changes in conversation.

4.6. *Contents*

Apart from the structural properties of topic sequences, a study of prejudice in discourse should of course be interested also in the actual 'contents' of the topics people talk about. Parts of these contents reflect the ethnic prejudices of speakers in particular and of Dutch majority group members in general. Prominence and frequency of occurrence of such themes may in addition suggest how such prejudiced beliefs are organized in memory. For the first set of (38) interviews, we have analyzed the topics that directly pertain to minority groups. Such an 'overall' analysis is of course far from formal or explicit: macropropositions have not been derived 'algorithmically' by applying macrorules. Rather, we have 'summarized' passages, more or less subjectively, by a proposition that 'covers' a fragment of the interview. In order to give an idea of the generality of the topics/prejudices involved, we also give some quantitative data. This is necessary because the qualitative data, in principle, might be illustrated for a few interviews only and do not show how widespread specific opinions are. Since many of the topics are discussed following the specific introductions of the interviewers about various 'areas' such as work, education, government policy, neighborhood, and so on, we will mention the topics according to their organization in these categories. Maybe, models and schemata have similar categories of organization (see the previous chapter). The data for this section were collected by Nico Hergaarden.

(a) *Official policies*

In this category we find topics that express beliefs about the historical backgrounds of immigration, migrant labor, and the official policies about these issues by the government, as well as the policies about the actual ethnic situation in the Netherlands. The majority of the respondents are critical of the government on these policy issues: 'They do too much for the foreigners'. Some frequently formulated topics are (approximate frequencies of occurrence indicated):

(T1) They (the 'guest workers') have been invited to come and work here in Holland. (10x)
(T2) They should be sent back. (5x)
(T3) Immigration policies should be stricter. (5x)

(b) *Education*

This category involves various topics, such as specific education policies for children of immigrants, second language learning programs, or minorities in the educational system in general:

(T4) Education should be exclusively Dutch (in Dutch). (11x)
(T5) They should have lessons about their own culture. (5x)
(T5) They should *not* have special lessons about their own culture. (4x)
(T6) The presence of minority children causes problems at school. (10x)
(7) There are cultural differences between the children. (7x)

(c) *Rights and duties*

Against the general background of social norms in the Netherlands, the presence of minorities is often associated with their rights, but more often with their duties towards the Dutch (majority) society:

(T8) They have (should have) the same social rights. (13x)
(T9) They abuse our social security system. (10x)
(T10) They have (make use) of various social benefits. (9x)
(T11) They have various rights (to live here, have education, to have a house, etc.). (20x)

(d) *Work and (un)employment*

The beliefs of Dutch people about the work of minority group members is rather stereotypical. Immigrant workers do the 'dirty jobs', but about the details of this work (where, what, how) not much is known:

(T12) They do the kind of work Dutch people do not (want to) do. (6x)
(T13) They do all sorts of cleaning jobs. (7x)
(T14) They work in factories. (5x)
(T15) They work (hard). (20x)
(T16) They have unpleasant (monotonous, heavy, dirty) jobs. (18x)
(T17) They want to work but have no jobs. (5x)
(T18) They do not want to work. (11x)
(T19) Dutch people do not want to work (either). (8x)

(e) *Contacts and information sources*

Regular interview questions are about possible contacts with minority members. Such contacts, but also other sources of information, are used to form beliefs and opinions about minorities:

(T20) You read about it in the newspaper. (15x)
(T21) I have seen (that) on TV. (9x)
(T22) I have heard (that) on the radio. (2x)
(T23) I have seen (that) myself. (30x)
(T24) I know them from my work. (12x)
(T25) I had contacts with them in the shop/on the market. (9x)
(T26) I have heard about them/that from others. (37x)
(T27) I know about that from a relative. (19x)
(T28) I have/want no contact with them. (50x)

(f) *Social problems*

In the various domains mentioned above, people interpret the presence of minorities often in terms of general or more specific social problems, such as unsafety, criminality, drugs, etc. The interviewees do not always connect such problems explicitly with minority groups, but the context or subtle cues show that this is at least indirectly the case.

(T29) I feel unsafe (do not dare to go out anymore). (29x)
(T30) They make me feel unsafe. (6x)
(T31) They are involved in crime. (15x)
(T32) They are involved in (other) negative acts. (9x)
(T33) They take our houses. (13x)
(T34) Amsterdam is getting dirtier/is pauperizing. (24x)
(T35) They make Amsterdam dirtier/cause pauperizing. (11x)

From this list of most frequently discussed topics, we may first conclude that

they are predominantly negative, expressing underlying stereotypes or prejudices. Second, a number of rather general norms or values of tolerance are supported by a large part (at least half) of the respondents, e.g. about education, own culture, social rights, and so on. Third, however, in concrete situations these rights may well be disputed or thought to be 'overused', as in the case of housing and the social benefits. Fourth, information about minorities is drawn both from the media and from personal contacts and hearsay. Fifth, a very general topic is that of social distance or avoidance, ranging from 'I do not want them here', via the 'neutral' phrase 'I have no contacts with them', to the indifferent-tolerant phrase 'I don't care about them (as long as they do not bother me)'. Common to many topics is the overall evaluation 'They should adapt themselves to our norms, values, or rules' (an opinion explicitly shared by 17 of 38 respondents and probably by more implicitly). Also, there are a number of topics/opinions that occur rather often, independently of the various categories mentioned above:

(T36) They have to adapt to our (Dutch) norms and rules. (17 resp.)
(T37) They have different lifestyles/habits/traditions. (12 resp.)
(T38) They think Holland is a social paradise. (10 resp.)
(T39) You have good ones and bad ones among them. (9 resp.)
(T40) *Other* people do not like them. (8 resp.)
(T41) They treat their women differently (worse). (8 resp.)
(T42) They have too many children. (6 resp.)

Again, these additional topics show the preoccupation of Dutch majority citizens with the supposed deviance from Dutch norms, values, habits, rules, or lifestyles. On the one hand, a general and formal norm of tolerance ('OK, if they do not bother me') is formulated, but in practice many of the 'differences' are resented.

4.7. *Prejudiced topics*

The previous section enumerates some frequently occurring topics of discourse in our interviews. Most of these pertain to minorities or to a multi-ethnic society. They are the contents of models and group schemata. These contain information of several kinds, involving correct or incorrect beliefs, opinions, emotions, and concrete personal experiences. However, since our study specifically deals with prejudice, some further remarks are in order about the prejudiced topics in our data. Although it is theoretically nor practically very easy to distinguish between mere 'beliefs' about minorities

and negative stereotypical opinions, we use the traditional notion of prejudice as a criterion for selecting some prejudiced topics for further attention. For this analysis we have also used the data from the second group of interviews held in one of the contact neighborhoods of Amsterdam and specifically held to elicit personal stories about minorities (40 interviews). The list of more specific, prejudiced topics include e.g. the following:

(P1) They are dirty/cause dirtiness.
(P2) They do not integrate or adapt themselves here.
(P3) The town/neighborhood has changed (negatively) due to them.
(P4) They are aggressive.
(P5) They have a different 'mentality'.
(P6) They do not respect women.
(P7) They have (too) many children.
(P8) They abuse/profit from our social services.
(P9) They get (our) houses (get houses more often than we).
(P10) They are threatening, criminal.

These are the most frequent opinions people formulate about minorities. They may indeed be called negative stereotypes, shared by many people in the Netherlands. Others include e.g. 'They are noisy', 'They do not respect (our) property', 'They are more emotional', 'Their children bother us', 'They threaten our prosperity', and so on. On the whole, these prejudiced topics cluster in different overall prejudice categories, such as:

(PC1) THEY ARE DIFFERENT (CULTURE, MENTALITY).
(PC2) THEY DO NOT ADAPT THEMSELVES.
(PC3) THEY ARE INVOLVED IN NEGATIVE ACTS (NUISANCE, CRIME).
(PC4) THEY THREATEN OUR (SOCIAL, ECONOMIC) INTERESTS.

Both in their general opinions and in more concrete stories about events, the respondents stress instances of these general categories of prejudice. PC1 and PC2 both define the overall ingroup-outgroup distinction, difference, and contrast: they are not only different in many respects, but also do they not accept our way of living, our norms, and our values in many domains. PC3 stands for a long list of prejudices about the everyday behavior of minority members, involving the usual neighborly conflicts (noise, smells, fights) but also more generally the involvement of minorities in crime, mostly violence and stealing. In fact, PC3 is a specification of PC1 and PC2, since it

also implies deviation from our norms, values, and laws. Finally, PC4 also involves a 'threat', this time not of our way of living or of our safety, but of our interests as 'original' Dutch citizens. Hence, the key concepts organizing the prejudices about 'foreigners' in the Netherlands seem to be DIFFERENCE, DEVIANCE, and THREAT, a triplet with increasing strength of negative evaluation and emotional involvement of the people. At a still higher level of abstraction, these notions all seem to convey the negative value of INFRACTION: foreigners are (unwanted) intruders of our country, town, or neighborhood, they do not respect our way of living or our good neighborly contacts, they break our daily habits, norms, and laws, and are a threat to our rights, benefits, privileges. From these reformulations we clearly see the social functions of prejudice emerging as they have been discussed in the previous Chapter. Minorities are categorized primarily by their different appearance, their different socioeconomic status (also a class prejudice), their different culture, their different (negative) acts, and their different 'mentality'. All these categories are frequently discussed and illustrated in general opinions or everyday stories. Their abstraction, clustering, and frequency suggest at the same time the prominence or salience of certain topics/beliefs, according to the hypotheses that prejudices primarily involve opinions about the social, economic, and cultural interests of ingroups.

It should be stressed, however, that of course not all prejudices can be captured in such interviews. Many of them only show up in interactions with minorities (Essed 1984). For instance, a general feeling of 'superiority' only occurs implicitly in our data. And the same holds for the various types of discrimination, mentioned in the previous chapter, that such prejudices may help to sustain, rationalize, or make acceptable.

4.8. *An experimental test*

Ethnic attitudes are not privately held beliefs, but socially shared cognitions of groups. Our data indeed suggest that many of the negative topics are expressed by a majority of the respondents. In order to show that ethnic prejudice is not only shared by large parts of the majority group, but is also known as such throughout the society at large, Sprangers (1983) conducted an experiment in which typical prejudice items are generated and evaluated by experimental subjects (psychology students). In the generation task, students had to write down both negative and positive opinions that they thought would characterize prejudiced or tolerant Dutch people. She found, first, that subjects in general are able to mention more negative than positive

opinions held about minority groups (10 vs. 7 on average). Second, it appeared that the negative opinions generated are a rather precise reflection of the opinions we had collected in the field work. The experimentally generated (attributed) prejudices (EP's) of the 35 students contain e.g. the following items (the formulations are paraphrases of actual expressions):

(EP1) Houses deteriorate. (6x)
(EP2) Neighborhoods deteriorate. (5x)
(EP3) They take our houses. (5x)
(EP4) They are a nuisance for their neighbors. (8x)
(EP5) They cause the economic recession. (5x)
(EP6) They cause unemployment. (13x)
(EP7) They abuse our social services. (28x)
(EP8) They steal. (13x)
(EP9) They are involved in drug use/dealing. (13x)
(EP10) They are lazy. (27x)
(EP11) They are stupid. (17x)
(EP12) They are dirty. (21x)
(EP13) They are aggressive/criminal. (10x)
(EP14) They are sexually perverted. (15x)
(EP15) They do not adapt themselves. (20x)
(EP16) The cultural differences are too big. (20x)

When we compare this (partial) list with the topics we have found in the interviews, we observe much overlap. Yet, there are also differences. For instance, our interviews do not show that people frequently have negative opinions about the personal characteristics of minority group members (stupid, lazy). Yet, we have also noticed that such opinions are socially very delicate and directly in conflict with norms and values. Essed (1984) has shown, in her study about the experiences of racism by minority members, that indeed the opinions about the stupidity or laziness of minority members are often attributed to majority members on the basis of their actual behavior. In other words, the experimental subjects correctly construe the typical prejudiced Dutch majority group member. In fact, students also had to evaluate a number of opinions that were isolated from our interviews for their 'typicality' of a negative attitude. Those topics that score high in our interviews are also judged to be the most typical by the students (except again the laziness trait). Also these opinions are thought to be the most 'relevant' for the prejudiced persons.

4.9. *Stereotypes about stereotypes: Topoi*

The notion of 'topic' derives from Greek *topos*, meaning 'place' or 'location', which we also know from expressions such as *common place* or *lieu commun*, referring to stereotypical statements or formulations. Thus, people not only have ethnic stereotypes but also linguistic or textual stereotypes, such as fixed expressions, locutions, or proverbs. When people talk about minorities, they will often also use such stereotyped expressions, which of course are a strategic way of handling the difficult task of opinion selection and formulation in discursive interaction. Their stereotypical nature, so to speak, provides interactional 'safety', due to the commonsense and, hence, shared nature of the underlying opinions or 'wisdoms'. In the humanities, fixed themes or topics, e.g. in the historical development of art and literature, have been called *topoi* (Curtius 1948). In our data we also found such stereotypically formulated topics, e.g.:

(TO1) Now it is different from how it was in the old days.
(TO2) They are also people (human beings).
(TO3) Each country has its own habits.
(TO4) We have to accept that situation.
(TO5) I don't care, if they do not bother me.
(TO6) I cannot judge about that (I don't know).
(TO7) They are different.
(TO8) I have nothing against them.
(TO9) There are good ones and bad ones among them.
(TO10) One may not generalize.

Some of these topoi are real universals, it seems, such as the one about the 'good old times'. Others are topoi of prejudiced speech and also function as characteristic moves in negative portrayal strategies, e.g. TO2 (shared humanity), TO3 (cultural differentiation), TO4 (resignation), TO5 (indifference), TO6 (ignorance), TO8 (positive attitude), TO9 (distinction), and TO10 (tolerance). We see that most topoi express, as such, a positive norm or value. They are used, therefore, as part of the self-presentation strategy that is aimed at conveying a positive social image of the speaker (who knows what the norms and values are). At the same time, these topoi are the preparation moves for negative opinions about minorities. In discourse, they are typically followed by *but*. This means that their role is predominantly local, and not global like the 'summarizing' topics we have studied above. They are stereotypes of semantic representation and of formulation at the

same time, and do not dominate whole parts of conversations, although sometimes they may extend across several sentences in one turn (like the 'good old days' topos). Their relationship with the topical structures of discourse however warrants a brief mention of such topoi in this chapter. In chapters 7 and 8, we will return to the stylistic, rhetorical, and (local) semantic dimensions of such moves.

4.10. *Some survey data about ethnic attitudes*

This study advocates a qualitative approach to prejudice, *viz.* through a systematic analysis of discourse about minorities. Survey data about a socially prominent but delicate topic are, in our opinion, too superficial, researcher-biased, incomplete, and especially not subtle and context-bound enough. Yet, they are of course not worthless and practically the only way to get a first, very rough impression about the diffusion of opinions throughout the population.

Also in the Netherlands, there have been some recent surveys that investigate opinions about minority groups (see van Praag 1983, for a review of these surveys). The majority of these surveys contain the usual social distance questions that measure the dependent variables of ethnic attitudes and use the traditional independent variables such as age, gender, profession, income, political attitude, marital status, region, or percentage of minorities in the neighborhood (or amount of contact). The overall attitude about both Surinamese and Turks, for instance, is found (in 1982) to be 2/3 neutral or positive, and 1/3 negative. A negative attitude is slightly higher for (a) those who have little or no contact, (b) older people, and (c) people with lower education (and hence lower social status) (see also Bagley *et al.* 1979, and Bagley and Verma 1979, for comparison with English data). The overall average on a 7-point social distance scale is 3.74 for Surinamese and 4.08 for Turks (approachingg 4.50 for older people and people without contact, and 3.00 for people with a university degree or those with frequent contacts). About 10% of the Dutch people think that sending foreigners back to their home countries is morally justified, 18% that minorities abuse our social services, and about 40% to 50% perceive competition in housing and employment (with variations depending on neighborhood, age, income, and political affiliation). In general, no gender differences are found in this research, whereas the political left scores generally lower on various prejudice items. The vast majority of the population (78%) would find it better if we had less foreigners in the country, but then again only 5% to 10% would object to

having them living in their streets, whereas about one-third of the respondents would send unemployed foreigners back to their own countries. Half of the respondents agree with the opinion that foreigners should 'adapt themselves', and a third would be in favor of the discriminatory rule that Dutch people should be favored in employment (more than a third think that foreigners cause unemployment and inflation). That many of these opinions directly relate to immigration during the seventies can be read from comparisons between surveys from the sixties and the eighties. In 1966, 85% of the people had no objection to having a racially different neighbor. Fifteen years later, this percentage had dropped to 46%. If we take acceptance as family member as the best indicator of ethnic tolerance, however, these various results get a different perspective: only 8% of the population would have no objection against minority members in their family (as expressed in a survey; we ignore what their *actual* acceptance would be, of course). In other words, the prejudice picture, as it emerges from survey research, is not flattering for the Dutch majority. Tolerance, indeed, appears to be a myth.

Although the various surveys sometimes yield different results, depending on the techniques or methods of research, the sample of respondents chosen, the time of the survey, or the kind of questions asked, they convey converging impressions of ethnic attitudes in the Netherlands. On the fringes, we find about 10% of people who seem to be tolerant in all respects, and the same amount of people that may be called racist in all respects (these would send back all immigrants, and would, for instance, vote for the extremist right wing party *Centrumpartij*, which now has 1 seat — out of 150 — in parliament, but recently obtained nearly 10% in local elections in a newly built town near Amsterdam). Then, we would have about 25% of the people who are either more or less negative or more or less positive, and a remaining 30% scoring in the middle. This means that, roughly speaking, two-thirds of the population has negative opinions about minorities, at least in some respect (if we evaluate their opinions instead of direct scores).

In order to interpret these overall results from survey research, we have compared these numbers with some of the results of our own interview data. Of the first group of 38 interviews conducted in different neighborhoods of Amsterdam, we have (intuitively) matched the expressed opinions (from a topic list) with a five-point scale, running from very negative (−3), via rather negative (−2) and somewhat negative (−1), to neutral (0) and positive (1). No further distinctions in the positive part of the scale were made, since there were no detectable differences in that respect. The rating on the nega-

tive scale was determined by the frequency and the strength of negative opinions. The results are in agreement with the survey data: 63% negative (18% very negative), 29% neutral, and 8% positive. There was no difference due to gender, but the (overrepresented) elderly were predominantly negative. Since no usual methodological precautions were made for the manipulation of quantitative data, these statistical data are of course only impressionistic, but their convergence with results from survey research indicates that these percentages seem to be approximately accurate. Note that our scoring pertains to overall impressions from interviews. That is, the opinions are treated in a context-free way, as in survey research. This only gives a very rough picture of the attitude contents and structures of the people. Sometimes, negative opinions are embedded in a rather positive attitudinal framework of thought and talk, and, conversely, a rather negative framework may often also feature 'positive' opinions, especially those in agreement with general norms. It is the whole framing, the contextualization, and the detailed formulation that counts and that can be analyzed as an indication of 'real' underlying attitudes. And even then, these 'real' attitudes are those of an interview situation and are not necessarily instantiated in the same way as in 'real' interethnic situations. This also suggests that an overall topical analysis merely provides part of the prejudice picture emerging in discourse. Such a topical analysis only marks the summarizing outline, the prominent features of prejudiced attitudes (as expressed). The fine details should therefore be retrieved through other dimensions of discourse analysis. The results of this chapter, however, provide the general contents of the kinds of overall prejudices involved and the background for the analysis of the following chapters.

4.11. *Racist discourse: How do majorities talk to minorities?*

This study is only concerned with the way people speak *about* ethnic minority groups. In this way we get to know something about the expression and the diffusion of ethnic prejudice among the majority. It is, however, vitally important to know how people talk *to* the ethnic minority group members themselves. At that point, the expression of ethnic prejudice actually becomes a form of verbal discrimination in social interaction. Of course, it is not easy to obtain nonobtrusive measures of that kind of conversation in general, and of racist talk in particular. Also, it is not so much the conversation itself which is important in that case. Rather, the experiences of the minority group member are decisive: his or her interpretation and evaluation

of the talk, the speaker, and the whole interactional situation are involved in the assignment of prejudiced beliefs to majority group members on the basis of what was said. This kind of research can be conducted reliably only by minority researchers. To date, we only have detailed interview data about experienced everyday forms of racism from a study by Essed (1984) about black Surinamese women in the Netherlands (and a comparison with Afro-American women in California). This approach systematically links behavioral or contextual indicators of the situation with attributed cognitions of majority group members. For our discussion, it is most important to note from this research that a large part of the reported racism or discrimination was verbal. People in many ways signal (often subtly and implicitly) that they have negative opinions about minority members (Surinamese women), in several situations (school, public transportation, street or store, work, etc.).

Many social encounters with minority women involve discriminatory acts of the white majority members, and these acts may be accompanied or executed (para)verbally. Refusals to rent rooms or houses may be expressed for instance as *Sorry, we have already rented the apartment*, or more blatantly as *You people don't think you're still in the bush, do you*? in cases of perceived cultural differences in living style. In other situations, the women experience accusations of theft, laziness, or dishonesty, are addressed impolitely or patronizingly, or are made sexual propositions in situations where white women would not be harassed. Unjustified criticism, expressing too low an evaluation, or verbal discouragement occur in educational contexts. Calling them names is regular in public situations (street, public transportation, stores). These various negative or aggressive speech acts are expressions of superiority feelings of majority members, of social distance and higher self-assigned status, and of straightforward antipathy or hate towards black women. Hence they signal both the social relationships and the underlying ethnic attitudes involved in interethnic situations, and at the same time indicate that the economic, social, cultural, intellectual, or moral (beliefs or reality of) dominance should be maintained. It is at this point that we can see most clearly how the links between ethnic prejudice and its social functions, as we have discussed them in the previous chapter, are established. If we want to study the role of ethnic attitudes in actual interactions and situations, that is, in discriminatory behavior, we need more of this research about the actual experiences, interpretations, and evaluations of minority members themselves. They are the real experts on our prejudices.

5. STORIES ABOUT MINORITIES

5.1. *Stories, storytelling, and minorities*

Storytelling is an important part of our everyday life. We tell stories in conversations in order to communicate our 'interesting' personal experiences or to persuade others of the relevant social implications of the actions or events in which we have been involved. We hear or read children's stories when we are young, and read fiction when we grow up. With few discourse genres we are more familiar than with these various types of narrative. In our culture, therefore, we have acquired detailed implicit knowledge about the typical contents and rules of stories and about the appropriate occasions in which they may be told. A theory of narrative has the aim to make this cultural knowledge explicit. It formulates the structural categories and the rules of stories, and the strategies for appropriate and effective storytelling in social contexts.

Stories are primarily about people. First about ourselves, or about people we know, and about the actions or events in which we have participated in the past. They are answers to the question *What happened?* Yet, they are not about just *any* event or action. Most everyday or routine actions or events are hardly worth telling about to others: our listeners would already know what had happened. Hence, they must be about events that are at least somewhat less common, less predictable, less expected, or less trivial, both for the storyteller and for the recipient. That is, they must be relatively 'interesting'. Weird, funny, dangerous, deviant, or new events are the preferred referents for stories, and the interest derives from what we *did* in such a situation. Such events are often a 'complication' in the routine accomplishment of our daily tasks, and our listeners may want to know how we 'solved' such a predicament or reacted to such happenings. The typical characteristics of the episodes we are entitled to tell stories about in our culture have received their conventional representations within the story structure itself. For instance, we may expect a Complication and a Resolution category in many stories, as was also found by Labov and Waletzky (1967) when they asked people to tell about an episode in their lives in which they "were afraid to

die". Surely, a threat to our lives may constitute the most tellable episode of our personal experience: mostly our stories in everyday life will be about more mundane 'threats' to our goals or values.

If stories are about people, and especially about those actions and events that complicate or threaten our daily tasks, we can imagine that one type of preferred participant in stories will be those people we consider as threats to our fundamental goals and values. In the previous chapters we have seen that ethnic minority groups fit this description precisely. Therefore, we may expect that people will readily engage in storytelling about 'foreigners'. Stories are preferably about negative events. And foreigners are stereotypically the actors in such 'negative' episodes: they are the ones who we perceive as acting weirdly, strangely, dangerously, deviantly, or incomprehensibly. In a multiethnic society they are the stereotypical villains of prejudiced storytelling or the clowns of racist jokes (Dundes 1973; Wilson 1979; Sherzer 1984).

Yet, stories about minorities are not just told to communicate our personal experiences or to catch the listener's attention with the details of an interesting episode. They are also told as a form of subjective social information processing, to communicate what we 'know' about (new) minority groups or immigrants in our society and how we react to their actions. They formulate norms and values by which these 'deviant' actions are measured and evaluated, and thus provide the ingroup with basic common knowledge about the outgroup as well as precepts for adequate (re)action. They embody our prejudiced attitudes that underlie these evaluations and reactions and, at the same time, are told to share these attitudes with others.

Distinct from argumentation, statements, or other generalized formulations about foreigners or our attitudes towards them, stories are about *situated* episodes. They are about episodes that occurred at a particular time, a particular place, and with particular participants, especially the storyteller him/herself. Those situations which we have observed or participated in are represented in our memory, *viz.* as a situation model (see chapter 3). A story is a partial expression of such a situation model, adapted in such a way of course that the resulting narrative is communicatively and socially appropriate. Stories about minorities are about situations in which minorities participate as actors, but they express our subjective model of such situations. These models, we have seen, are frequently biased, and so are the stories based on them. An analysis of stories about minorities, hence, may show how we construct negative models about foreigners.

5.2. *Narrative structures*

Few genres of discourse, we have argued, are as familiar as stories. The same holds for the study of narrative. Few genres have been analyzed or theorized about as frequently as the narrative ones. First the aesthetically more 'interesting' ones, such as drama and novels, then the 'popular genres', such as folktales and myths, and finally, with the advent of the sociological interest in our everyday life, also the mundane stories in conversations. Neither the history nor the details of these theories, from Aristotle's analysis of drama to the structural analyses of the past fifty years, can of course be gone into here. We can only mention some highlights, and draw some conclusions about the relevant categories or principles for the analysis of stories about minorities.

If we disregard for a moment the earlier work in literary studies about novels or short stories, one source of current narrative analysis may be found in the work of Propp (1928) on the Russian folktale. He established an invariant 'morphology' of thematical categories ('functions') in which the recurrent elements of many different tales could be inserted. Just as in our modern James Bond stories, a hero would receive the task of solving a problem (recuperating a princess abducted by a dragon), be challenged in various difficult trials, slay the enemy, come back victoriously, and receive a reward. Important for our discussion is that in this work and the many structural analyses of narrative in semiotics, ethnography, or literary scholarship it inspired 40 years later, a first abstract definition of narrative structures was given. Stories are built up with fixed categories and rules for their appropriate ordering. In many popular stories, these categories may have a semantic nature: they are invariant themes, with fixed participants as heroes and villains. The same holds for our stories about minorities. I, we, the Dutch people are the heroes or the victims, and the outgroup members are the villains. Even the events and the actions involved may be drawn from a limited repertory. Minorities cause us trouble of various kinds: they make noise, cause dirt in the street, take our jobs or houses, or are engaged in crime. Minority stories are becoming a specific genre of the folklore of ingroup prejudice. They are as stereotypical as the prejudices on which they are based.

Beside this stereotypical nature of the thematic inventory of preferred participants and episodes, a structural analysis may yield a more abstract description of narrative categories and rules holding also for other stories in our culture, both those in everyday conversations as well as those of popular

culture, TV-dramas or crime stories. We have mentioned Labov's work on stories about personal experiences as a case in point (Labov and Waletzky 1967; Labov 1972, 1982). Oral stories of this kind can be segmented into episodes that have different functions, such as Summary, Setting (or Orientation), Complication, Resolution, and Coda. The Summary introduces and announces the story by presenting its 'interesting' event. In conversation, such a category will typically serve to gain the floor and to capture the interest of our listeners. The Setting will feature the time, location, circumstances, and the major participants of the events. The Complication involves the central 'disrupting' events, and the Resolution the actions undertaken to solve the predicament caused by this disruption. The Evaluation, which may be expressed at various points during the narrative, expresses the opinion of the storyteller about the events or the emotions caused by them. The Coda ties the related past events to the actual pragmatic context of the storytelling event, by drawing conclusions, expressing intentions about future action, or making recommendations to the recipients. In our analysis of stories about minorities, we will try to specify such narrative categories in some more detail.

Narrative categories like the ones mentioned above also require explicit connection with the discourse, the actual story, through which they are expressed. That is, they must be tied to the linguistic dimension of the story-discourse. In our own work we have proposed to analyze narrative structures as 'global' organizational schemata of discourse, namely as *superstructures* (van Dijk 1972, 1976, 1980). Superstructures are the abstract overall 'form' of discourse, consisting of a hierarchical set of genre-specific categories. Beside narrative superstructures, we may also have argumentative superstructures (see next chapter) or schemata of sermons and scientific publications. The 'contents' that fit into the terminal categories of such a superstructural form-schema should of course also be 'global', *viz.* semantic macropropositions or topics. After all, the Setting or the Complication of a story will seldom consist of only one word or sentence. If a macroproposition 'resumes' the meanings of a sequence of sentences (a textual 'episode'; van Dijk 1982b) into a higher-level meaning, the schematic categories of the superstructure assign *functions* to these macropropositions, e.g. the function of a Setting or of a Complication to a story segment.

The similarity with a (functional) grammar is obvious: we have formation rules that define 'well-formed' stories on the basis of their constituent formal categories. Also, we may have transformations of such canonical narrative structures, for instance when we start a story with the Complication. Such

'story grammars' not only received interest in the literary or semiotic approaches to narrative, but were also used by psychologists to reconstruct the processes and representations of story understanding in memory (Rumelhart 1975; Kintsch and van Dijk 1975; van Dijk and Kintsch 1978; Mandler 1978; Mandler and Johnson 1977). Similarly, in Artificial Intelligence, research about stories or narrative structures were simulated in terms of their underlying actions structures, such as the respective steps in the realization or the frustration of goals. Although these story grammar and action-theoretical approaches are often presented as conflicting theories of story understanding (Black and Wilensky 1979), they should rather be considered as complimentary accounts of 'underlying' narrative structures (van Dijk (ed.) 1980; van Dijk and Kintsch 1983).

Whereas many of the structural approaches in various disciplines account for simple 'fixed' stories, such as myths, folktales, children's stories, or popular fiction (crime stories, TV-dramas), we have stressed in the beginning of this chapter that our mundane forms of narrative appear as regular parts of everyday conversation. The last decade has therefore witnessed increasing interest for the properties of this kind of conversational storytelling (Jefferson 1978; Polanyi 1983; Quasthoff 1980a; Ehlich 1980). Spontaneous storytelling is an interactional accomplishment between speaker and hearer. A storyteller in conversation cannot simply start telling an interesting personal experience. There must be an appropriate occasion for doing so during the conversation. Only when, for instance, some 'accident' is mentioned during the conversation may the storyteller try to get the floor and propose to tell a story about some accident he or she once had. Such a proposal has a strategic nature. For instance, an interesting, feature (such as the Complication) might briefly be hinted at first, so as to interest the recipient. Once granted permission to tell the story (*What happened?*), the storyteller may start with the proper story, e.g. the Setting. At the same time, the hearer may ask questions, demand clarification, express evaluations or emotions, or show that the story is rather uninteresting or told inadequately. Also, many important features of a Setting or a Complication may be 'forgotten' during the on-line production of the story, and such details might have to be attended to later during the story. Transitions between the respective narrative categories may have to be signaled, both by grammatical or by paraverbal or nonverbal means. Specific categories, such as the Complication or the Evaluation, are made more prominent by expressive devices so as to enhance their effectiveness. In other words, a conversational story is an on-line, interactional accomplish-

ment, featuring several strategies for the occasioning, the presentation (proposal), the introduction, the development, the organization, and the closing of the account of personal experiences. A storyteller must especially see to it that the story have a 'point' (Polanyi 1979) and remain relevant and interesting.

5.3. *Schemata of stories about minorities*

The properties of stories briefly outlined above should now be specified in more detail for the stories people tell about ethnic minorities in society. Some of the overall functions of such stories have already been summarized above. People tell about their personal experiences with minority members, express their evaluations about the actions of minority members in such stories, and at the same time provide other ingroup members with a social 'data base' of subjectively interpreted but socially relevant 'facts' about the outgroup. That is, they convey models of ethnic situations, which may again be adopted (and adapted) by other social members to update their models and to draw general conclusions about minority members.

In this section, we analyze the overall, schematic organization of stories about minorities. In the next chapters we will then attend to the more local details of storytelling in talk. As our data base, we use 133 stories told during fifty different interviews. Part of these interviews were specifically conducted to elicit stories about minorities in a contact neighborhoods of Amsterdam, *viz.* by asking people explicitly about their personal experiences with minority members, rather than, say, to ask their opinions about 'foreigners' or the general ethnic situation in the Netherlands. Yet, it appeared that people will also readily engage in storytelling when they are not specifically asked about personal experiences. As soon as they express a more general opinion (whether asked about it or not), they may volunteer a story by way of 'proof', illustration, or example to corroborate the general opinion. Indeed, stories about minorities are often argumentatively occasioned (cf. chapter 6).

In our stories, we have found more or less the same categories — but with some interesting modifications — as the categories of narrative discussed by Labov (1972). We will discuss each of these categories and give a few examples of their manifestation in talk (due to space limitations, however, we cannot give many full stories as examples).

5.3.1. *The categories of narrative*

(a) *Occasioning*

We have noticed that stories are not told in talk without specific constraints upon their 'occasioning': they should be introduced only at relevant places. For instance, as functional components in an argumentation, or as an illustration of a more general point, they require appropriate 'placing' at some specific point during the conversation. Such a strategy of placement is often marked with specific expressions, such as *take for example*, *that reminds me* (see also Schank 1982), or *I happen to have experienced that*. The category of 'occasioning', therefore, is not so much a narrative category, but a conversational category in which a transition is accomplished between a topic of talk or a general statement in such a topic, on the one hand, and a more specific or particular level of description, *viz.* of relevant personal experiences. The occasioning, then, links the ongoing topic of discourse with an embedded story. Some examples:

(9) (C6) (About living among foreigners in de Bijlmer)
Itee: Yes, it is not pleasant to live there. And it so happens that my daughter's brother in law, he has left there. He bought a house in G. out of sheer misery ...

(10) (D3) (Nuisance from neighbors)
Iter: Can you tell me about those experiences?
Itee: Yes, uh, what can I tell you. They probably don't know how to use a tap ...

(11) (D1) (Surinamese come to live here to get rich)
Itee: Well, like that Surinamese lady uh well she came to live in that apartment ...

In (9) a topic is provisionally summarized by an evaluative statement, but that evaluation needs to be backed up with a concrete example, which is introduced with a phrase such as *it so happens*. In (11) the transition is made with a particle *well* (*nou* in Dutch), and the expression *like that* marks the relevance of the following example. Sometimes, occasioning may be elicited by the interviewer, e.g. by asking about concrete personal experiences, which is followed by a question of the strategic 'recollection' type, as in expressions such as *What shall I say*. The occasioning is finally also the location where a speaker announces that he or she has a story to tell about the actual topic, as in:

(12) (RA2) Since you are talking about that, it is a funny thing, well then I will tell you something funny ...

Here the occasioning is expressed by a metacommunicative expression about the actual topic, followed by an evaluation (funny) that also triggers the

(funny) story. We will come back to that story below.

(b) *Summary*

The next category — either a part of the occasioning or an independent category — may be called Summary. It presents the important point — often a fragment of the Complication or an anticipated Evaluation of the story. Much like titles of written stories or headlines in the news, summaries express part of the macrostructure of a text. In conversational storytelling, Summaries not only function as topic-introducers, but at the same time as interest-arousers:

(13) (D2) Iter: And, uh can you tell me about that?
Itee: Well, yes, the other day I nearly got beaten up uh one Saturday morning by one of them.
Iter: Yes!?
Itee: Yes.
Iter: How did it happen?

(14) (D4) Iter: Do you know any foreigners personally?
Itee: No, not personally. YES, that Surinamese woman who used to live downstairs, she was, for the rest she was a nice woman, and he was also kind of nice. But, well, to let yourself be beaten up, and uhh
Iter: But why did that happen?

(15) (RA2) (continuing example 12)
Itee: You know, slaughtering those sheep, that's also one of those sad things ...

In these three examples, the story is introduced with the most interesting event, such as 'getting a beating', 'to be beaten up', and 'slaughtering sheep'. These propositions will define the Complication category of the story, but as such they are sufficient as a brief hint about the interestingness or the deviancy of the situation talked about. And indeed, the interviewer on two occasions reacts appropriately by a stimulative question of disbelief or a question about the details (*How did it happen*? *Why did it happen*?), which signals to the storyteller that he/she may go on telling the story. Cognitively, the summary also functions as an expression of the macroproposition that defines the monitoring (sub)topic of the next segment of the conversation, that is, of the announced story, so that the hearer already knows more or less what to expect. In other words, Summaries have both an important cognitive and a conversational or interactional function in the organization, the planning, and the monitoring of the next part of the talk.

(c) *Setting*

The Setting, for us, is the first major category of the story itself, the Occasioning and the Summary being an introduction to the story. The Setting contains the specification of time, place, and participants of the events told about. Thus, in (9) we saw that participants may be mentioned directly after the Occasioning (my daughter's brother in law), and in (11) we are immediately introduced to "that Surinamese lady". In (13), the interviewee first identifies a vague time for the episode ("the other day"), then mentions part of the Summary, and then — after a hesitation marker — specifies the time ("one Saturday morning"). In (14) not only two Surinamese neighbors are introduced in the Setting, but also an overall evaluation of them. Typical for stories about minorities (and for outgroups in general), it seems, is the extensive use of direct pronominalization, that is, of using pronouns without previous identification by antecedents. *They* may denote foreigners in general, or specific individual foreigners now being talked about. Such a move of vague identification may be understood as part of a strategy of distancing, and at the same time as an expression of the cognitive categorization of outgroups in terms of 'them' vs. 'us'. Sometimes, elements of the Setting are mentioned later in the story, *viz.* when further details about time, location, or participants are needed. In practice, then, an initial Setting will only feature minimal information about the 'scene' and the actors.

(d) *Orientation*

The Orientation category, closely linked with the Setting, provides further special circumstances, e.g. a description of the current events or actions of the participants. Such an orientation is necessary as the 'background' for the interesting events mentioned in the Complication. Therefore, it typically features the routine activities of the protagonist, and may also already embody 'possible problems', so that specific expectations are generated in the recipient. Some examples:

(16) (B4) I was sitting on a terrace. Then one of the guys comes along whom I know from the city.
(17) (C6) When they were having their lunch break, ...
(18) (D2) We had to get up Monday morning at seven.
(19) (E1) (In the supermarket) That women bought bread.
(20) (E1) My mother had her laundry hanging outside.

Indeed, such descriptions involve the mundane situations or activities of everyday life: having lunch, getting up, shopping, doing one's laundry, and

so on. In stories about minorities such quasi-trivial backgrounds to the story have a specific function. They signal that the disrupting events, mentioned in the Complication, are indeed breaches of our daily routines. The complicating negative actions of minorities are not exceptional, but are themselves a regular part of everyday life, not exceptional events. Yet, at the same time, the normality of the state of affairs described in the Orientation may contrast with the deviant behavior mentioned later in the story, thereby highlighting the prominence or *Prägnanz* (cf. van der Wurff 1984) of those deviant actions.

(e) *Complication*

The core of a story is its Complication category. Here we find a description of the 'interesting' event, such as deviant, weird, strange, criminal, or otherwise unexpected or abnormal actions of minorities in our stories. More than the other categories, therefore, the Complication expresses the social conflict experienced by majority group members, the infraction by the outgroup of our accepted norms and values, our habits or routine activities, and our expectations. That is, most Complications have a negative bias, and they are therefore the appropriate location for the negatively biased description of the properties and actions of minority members. The seriousnes of the Complication largely supports the interestingness of the story as a whole, and hence its conversational narratability. In our minority stories, Complications are characteristically filled by accounts of theft, aggression, menace, holdups, dirty or noisy behavior, and in general those activities that are a 'nuisance' for the storyteller or the ingroup. However, not all such 'complicating' events are equally interesting. They are often those small annoying things neighbors have to cope with. In that case, the narratability of a negative experience must be enhanced by a series of rhetorical or other conversational strategies, such as exaggerations, repetitions, and evaluative expressions. An example of a Complication (in fact, a double, embedded Complication) can be found in:

(21) (B5) (Woman who worked in a home for battered wives)
In that home where I worked they (Surinamese women) were for example not allowed to speak their own language, you know, they absolutely, absolutely had to speak Dutch. Well, I think that, I think that's inSANE, I think, when I meet Dutch people abroad then I'm going to speak Dutch and I'm not going to speak Italian or English or what ever, because I mean these people aren't allowed to speak their own LANguage. (pause). I was supposed to forbid it, but I didn't do it.

This Complication in a story from a relatively tolerant woman (tolerant because she actively defends the rights of minorities) shows more in general the social conflicts involved in interethnic relations. The origin of the Complication is the disrupting event of forbidding people to speak their own language. In this case it is the norm of tolerance that serves as a basis for the (negative) evaluation of that action of her colleagues. Yet, the breach of a norm by ingroup members against outgroup members, when told about by an ingroup member, evidently needs some backing up (others might find the use of Dutch in Holland to be a form of respect or politeness), and she therefore uses a comparison by way of argument. We have seen before that comparisons often occur in our data, especially comparisons with a situation of Dutch people abroad. Here, it is used in favor of the minority group, though: we wouldn't speak another language to Dutch people abroad either. In many other cases, comparisons are used against minority members, for instance when it is stated that Dutch people abroad also (should) adapt themselves (a well-known myth). At the same time, though, the argument, together with the stressed evaluation (*inSANE*), functions as an emphasis on the ridiculous and therefore interesting (tellable) nature of the action of her colleagues. Although there are several other stories in which majority members intervene in favor of minority members (in discriminatory situations), most stories feature a Complication in which minorities are portrayed negatively:

(22) (D2) (About Surinamese neighbors)
Well, look, if we have to get up Monday morning
at seven o'clock in order to get to work, and they're
still partying on Sunday morning at five,
then that is not what you call nice, is
it. And that was not just once, not twice, that
happened all the time. And when you would go up-
stairs and uh go ask politely if they could
be more quiet, then you might get a knife in your back.

Strictly speaking, this is not a story fragment since it contains generalized statements about repeated events, so it is not a description of a specifically situated event. Later in the interview, however, more specific details follow which, after all, make it some kind of *generalized story*. Here the routine activity of getting up early is frustrated by late parties of black neighbors. This Complication, however, needs some semantic and rhetorical support. Semantically, we find the usual contrast between the positive behavior of the ingroup (*we* get up early and go to work) and the having-a-party behavior

of the neighbors, implying that *they* probably do *not* go to work (the argument hinges on the temporal indication; however, does the woman mean Sunday morning or early Monday morning — that is, late Sunday night?). Second, the interviewee gives a negative evaluation, but formulated in the form of an understatement and a litotes (*not exactly nice* meaning 'extremely unpleasant'). Third, having a party may be a normal and hence acceptable form of behavior, and therefore the woman has to make sure to stress that (a) the time was wrong (too late at night), but also that (b) this was no exception (which should and could be tolerated) but a frequent event. This both enhances the negative qualification of the nuisance and at the same time presents the woman as possibly tolerant ('I would have tolerated that if it were only occasionally'). This self-presentation strategy also appears in the use of *politely* in the next sentence: the second Complication ('getting a knife in one's back') is not caused by our impoliteness or our intolerant behavior against our neighbors.

(f) *Resolution*

Complicating events in stories are usually followed by a narrative segment that may be identified as the Resolution of the problem or predicament of the Complication. People react to a problem, both mentally and through action, and such actions are intended to restore the normal course of events, the original state of affairs, or the wanted realization of one's goals or values. In popular stories, we may here expect the valiant fight of a hero, usually resulting in a victory. In stories about minorities, however, this is seldom the case. There are some examples of successful problem solving, of some form of mundane heroism, but more often than not there is no solution to the problems mentioned in the Complication. And that is precisely how the ingroup storyteller sees the social conflict: minorities cause problems, but we cannot do anything against that. Instead of a heroic success story, we then have a complaint or accusation story. The major thrust is not to portray ourselves as positive heroes, but rather to present the others as negative villains. A Resolution category may therefore often be lacking. And if action is undertaken, as in example (22), it may be abortive: a polite request is met by violence. The members of the ingroup become victims of the presence and the behavior of the outgroup. Against the normal, polite, understanding, and tolerant acts of people like us, *their* acts violate all the norms:

(23) (E1) (In the Supermarket, a Surinamese woman brings back a loaf of bread she has just bought)

> She goes out of the store and comes back and says I don't want that bread. Then the manager said, very DECENTLY, madam we do not exCHANGE bread. No, you do not exchange bread in Holland, do we? Well, then that woman made a TERRIBLE scene and, you know, the manager tried to explain her that we do not exchange bread here, in a very decent way, but the woman started to SHOUT like do not touch me ...

Again, it is the ingroup actor, the supermarket manager, that reacts according to the rules of politeness to the 'deviant' behavior of the black woman: he is patient and politely explains our norms for exchanging items in stores. And it is the black woman who is portrayed as not only breaking these norms, but also as an unreasonable and aggressive person. In this example, the interviewee also makes an appeal to the norms of interviewer ("you do not exchange bread in Holland, do we") so as to explicitly underline the norm involved as it was violated by the Surinamese woman. Obviously, the representation of the situation may be biased in the first place, because the specific attention to the bread-exchange incident might not have occurred for a white woman (and the same may hold for the reaction of the manager). Moreover, it is not told whether the bread was prepacked or not (it is highly unlikely that Surinamese woman would bring back an unpacked — touched — bread, given the strict rules of hygiene in tropical Surinam). For our discussion it is not only this possibly incomplete or negatively biased model of the situation that is expressed in the story, but especially also the strategies followed in the negative portrayal of the actions of minorities (contrast in the respect for the norms, emphasis by intonation, repetition, the use of very positive evaluations for the ingroup member involved, and so on). In this way the small incidents of everyday life may be reconstructed as real dramas, with clearly identified participant roles and highly negative events. This strategic process of accentuation is well-known from the psychological literature about prejudice and intergroup perception (Allport 1954; Tajfel 1981). And although such an accentuated differentiation between ingroup and outgroup members may already exist in the prejudiced group schema or in the concrete models of situations, it has, at the same time, an important conversational and persuasive function. It makes the negative portrayal of the outgroup more memorable, more credible, and therefore more effective.

(g) *Explication*

Stories about minority members often feature one or more narrative moves which might be called an Explication. Such moves may be part of the

Complication or of the Evaluation (see below), but their frequent occurrence seems to suggest that they have a more specific status as a separate category. In the Explication, we may expect general propositions, in the present tense, often using generics. They are used in order to express some general rule, norm, framework, background, or other explanatory information against which the (negative) action of outgroup members is placed. Explications typically occur in interviews with people who do tell something negative about minorities, but try to understand or even to excuse such behavior. A standard procedure is the reference to cultural differences:

(24) (E2) They are different, jumpier.
(25) (F1) That's the mentality of people. Not only the Turks, but also the Dutch, but...
(26) (F3) They don't know the time.
(27) (G1) They stand up for each other, otherwise they cannot maintain themselves.
(28) (G7) Normal Dutch people, they don't do that.

Some of these explanatory moves imply, of course, an evaluation of the events, but the difference with a 'real' narrative Evaluation is that these general explanations need not reflect a personal evaluation of the events (or an emotional reaction). Rather, actions are placed within an attributive framework in which the difference of mentality or norms is seen as a possible cause for the (negative) act. (see e.g. Kelley 1983).

(h) *Evaluation*

The Evaluation in stories is not so much a separate structural unit as an independent dimension of storytelling in which the speaker can express the opinions or emotions about the events or actions told about. Typical evaluation expressions are *I didn't like that*, *I was afraid*, or *That was a shock for me*. Yet, the evaluation may also surface in stylistically marked lexical items, in intonation and nonverbal activity, and so on. We saw that the woman in example (22) uses an understatement in the evaluation of the loud parties of her neighbors, and the woman in the supermarket uses special intonation to mark the DECENT behavior of the manager. Sometimes people become highly emotional when they have to relive the situations they tell about, and the evaluative nature of such passages is then apparent at all levels, as in (29) about Turks:

(29) (G7) at the Haarlemmerdijk (a street in Amsterdam), they walk, all filth and dirt, only on that market. Well, then I can only say, HOW, howhow is it possible, don't you think, it's somehow INSANE, isn't it...

Except for the emotional intonation of this passage, this (highly prejudiced) man can only see the foreigners in terms of filth and dirt; at the same time, he expresses an appeal to the interviewer, stresses the rhetorical question, and uses the strong negatively biased word *insane*. Most of our data, however, do not display this kind of highly emotionally involved negative evaluation. People get angry once in a while but seem to control their evaluation, e.g. by using understatements, litotes, or other ways to seemingly underplay the seriousness of the situation as they see it. (Dutch rhetoric, much like British, often prefers understatement to exaggeration or emotional language: emotional rhetoric is seen as less credible). Since the Resolution category in stories about minorities is hardly developed, and the negative evaluations of outgroup members play such a fundamental role in prejudiced discourse, one could advance the hypothesis that in this case the Evaluation takes over (part of) the role of the Resolution. We cannot *do* anything against the negative behavior, but we do have a mental reaction, namely a negative evaluation. And indeed, (negative) evaluations occur throughout our stories.

(i) *Conclusion*

Finally, stories often have a terminal category, a Coda or a Conclusion, in which the *relevance* of the story for the storytelling situation is made clear. Conclusions may be drawn from past experiences to guide the actual or future actions of the storyteller or of the hearer. The more particular evaluation about action or participants in the story may here be generalized to the typical actions of such participants in general. In other words, the Conclusion is what we may call a kind of moral. Particularly in stories about minorities, such a moral is of course indispensable. People do not only tell such stories for fun, but especially because they are supposed to have an actual, social moral: an evaluation of the minority group told about, an illustration of a general statement made about such groups, and suggestions about the appropriate actions to undertake with (or against) minority persons in given situations. Whereas the other categories are expressed by sentences (verbs) in the various tenses of the past (or the historical present), such Conclusions are therefore marked by a 'generic' present tense or by future tenses. Often the Conclusion repeats the statements that have triggered the story. Thus, the narrative becomes 'circular' with respect to its embedding in the conversation. Since stories typically occur as a form of illustration of 'proof' in an argument, this final category may at the same time coincide with the Conclusion category of the argumentation structure in which it is embedded (see next chapter). A few examples, from our interviews, of such Conclusion expressions:

(30) (AC2) Oh no, I uh still dare to go out Monday nights.
(31) (AC3) It just depends how you handle them.
(32) (KW5) Now he does not come anymore.
(33) (PD1) So those blokes I don't like.

5.3.2. *The hierarchical structure of the narrative schema*

The various categories of narrative briefly introduced above do not simply define subsequent segments of the story, but form a hierarchical schema (see Figure 2, p. 99). That is, some of the categories can be taken together again at a higher level of analysis. For instance, the Occasioning and the Summary may, taken together, be a Preparation category for the story itself. They are so to speak not part of the narrative structure itself, but part of the storytelling event. The narrative structure consists of one or more Episodes (which makes this higher-level category recursive) and maybe the Conclusion, which may also be taken as part of the Storytelling event, rather than as a part of the narrative structure. Episodes consist of a Scene (or Situation), on the one hand, and an Experience (in that Situation), on the other. The experience consists, in turn, of some Event(s) — dominating the Complication and the Resolution — and the Interpretation of these events (Explication and/or Evaluation). We thus obtain an abstract, idealized, and 'canonical' structure for narrative. We have seen that transformations and local reordering are of course possible.

5.3.3. *Some quantitative evidence*

The superstructural categories of stories do not occur in each story. Sometimes they are implicit and sometimes they are just optional, and therefore need not always appear in a concrete story. We assume that a *kernel story* in general consists of a Setting, a Complication, and a Resolution in which the Evaluation may be more or less implicit, e.g. expressed by evaluative style. Yet, at the same time, we have seen that stories about minorities have a specific status in this respect. The predicament told about does not always have a solution, so that no 'heroic' or 'lucky' Resolution may follow the Complication. Instead, we expect that, in that case, the important Evaluation will take over as an explicitly occuring category in which the point is formulated, *viz.* the 'motivated' negative opinion about minority groups and their presence.

To test this hypothesis we have counted the occurrences of the respective categories in the 133 stories (see Table 1). We see, indeed, that the Setting and the Complication occur in practically all stories. Resolutions occur

Inter-views	Number of story-tellers	Number of stories	Occa-sioning	Sum-mary	Setting	Orien-tation	Compli-cation	Reso-lution	Evalu-ation	Expli-cation	Conclu-sion	Stories/ Teller	Number of stories/story
Group I	20	50	22(44%)	6(12%)	50(100%)	21(42%)	50(100%)	24(48%)	33(66%)	13(26%)	17(34%)	2½	4,7
Group II	30	83	22(27%)	9(11%)	81(98%)	45(54%)	81(98%)	48(58%)	49(59%)	20(24%)	27(32%)	2¾	4,6
TOTAL	50	133	44 (33%)	15 (11.3%)	131 (98.5%)	66 (49.6%)	131 (98.5%)	72 (54.1%)	82 (61.6%)	33 (24.8%)	44 (33.0%)	2⅔	4,7

Table 1: Narrative categories and their frequencies in stories about minorities.
(Stories in interviews of Group II were explicitly elicited)

only in about half of the stories, but Evaluations in more than 60% of the stories. Summaries do not seem relevant very often, whereas the Occasioning and Conclusion categories occur in one third of the stories. The storytellers tell an average of $2^2/3$ stories during the interviews, and each story has nearly five narrative categories. These figures provide partial support for our hypothesis that stories about minorities are often indeed without a Resolution.

5.3.4. *An example*

Having reviewed some of the structural components of stories about minorities and having given some fragmentary examples, it is appropriate to give an example of a complete story. In this way, we can see what categories are actually used, how they are ordered, or what other characteristics such stories may have. We have selected a rather stereotypical story, involving the well-known topic of 'sheep slaughtering'. This topic has acquired its own role in the structure of prejudice, and people seem to tell about it even when they have never personally experienced such events (in fact, illegal slaughtering is rather exceptional, since most people from Turkey or Morocco have their sheep slaughtered in the slaughterhouse). The interview from which this story is taken is held with a couple, husband and wife, but it is the man who is the main storyteller, the woman providing support (see Quasthoff 1980b, for this kind of storytelling by two storytellers). In the right margin we have indicated the narrative categories that, according to our analysis, may be assigned to the respective segments of the story. Of course, other interpretations are possible, because the categories are still rather hypothetical and not completely formal or explicit. Also, some story segments may have more than one narrative function. Two small digressions have been omitted in the transcripts (e.g. after line 8, further information about the pretty daughter). Again, the translation shows serious defects; the colloquial Dutch expressions are difficult to reproduce in equivalent English (e.g. the particle *nou*, here translated with *well*).

(34) (RA2)

	Man:	Since you are talking about that,	OCCASIONING
		it is a funny thing, well then I'll tell	
		you something funny.	
		You know that sheep slaughtering	SUMMARY
5		it's one of those sad things	EVALUATION
		...	
		Well then, allright, and there live around the	SETTING

		corner, there lived a family, a Turk, and they always had a prétty daughter	
		...	
		But one day, that lady who lives downstairs	ORIENTATION
10		comes over to me and says "Do you know where G. is?" And G., that was my mate, he was the building supervisor [of a house across the road]. I said "Well, he is in the shed." "Well," she says, "I've gotta talk to him for a minute." I say,	
15		"OK, come with me," and we go over there together. I say: "G. eh," I say, "The neighbor, got to talk to you." And he says: "Well, what is it."	
		And then she says: "It stinks in the staircase."	COMPLICATION
		I say: "Well, let's go have a look."	RESOLUTION
20		"And the drain is clogged too, of the sink." (imitates voice of neighbor)	COMPLICATION
		Well, also look at that	RESOLUTION
		But by then we'd already seen a sheep skin stashed away, hanging on the balcony	COMPLICATION
25	Iter:	Oh Gee!	EVALUATION
	Man:	You understand, they had slaughtered a sheep secretly in the shower	COMPLICATION
	Woman:	Yes, 't was Ramadan	EXPLICATION
	Man:	You see, Ramadan	
30		And everything that they couldn't get rid of, of that animal, they had stuffed down that little pipe, you know	COMPLICATION
	Iter:	Of the drain	
	Man:	Of the drain	
35	Woman:	And that is the only story	CONCLUSION
	Man:	That whole thing was clogged	COMPLICATION
		Opened up the thing. Police were there.	RESOLUTION
		Look, who would DO a thing like that!	EVALUATION
	Iter:	What, who, did those people ask the police	RESOLUTION
40		to interfere at, or what, what happened?	
	Man:	Yes, the police came	
	Woman:	You are not alLOWED to slaughter sheep at home, don't you KNOW that!	EVALUATION
	Man:	And what it also means is, who is going to pay	EVALUATION
45		for it	
	Woman:	'f course!	
	Iter:	Yes	
	Man:	Because, you can't do anything against that	EVALUATION/ CONCLUSION
	Woman:	Well, that's the only contact, that we once	CONCLUSION

50	Man:	And the funniest thing was, that was, so to speak not ... Who would do a thing like that You wouldn't slaughter a chicken in your room, would you, and	EVALUATION
	Iter:	No, they do it a lot in the slaugherhouse now	EXPLICATION
55	Man:	But that is the only thing.	CONCLUSION

In this story, we first observe that indeed most of the categories we have introduced above seem to occur. Second, these categories need not occur continuously in spontaneous talk, but may also be expressed in discontinuous fragments. Storytellers may 'recycle' categories such as Complications and Resolutions. In line 18 we find the interesting disrupting event, *viz.* an inexplicable smell in the staircase. Then follows the first 'installment' of the Resolution, *viz.* the actions of the men who are going to help the neighbor. But additional Complicating material is added, in direct imitative quotes, about the problem encountered. The next major element of the Complication is the 'discovery' of the sheepskin hanging 'secretly' on the balcony. This of course is the narrative core of the story: the surprising and strange part of the event. The interviewer reacts (in line 25), as required, with an exclamatory Evaluation to mark that special function and the interestingness of the event. From the information about the sheepskin, the hearer can already infer what happened, so that the next move of the man is only a confirmation of that inference: they had indeed slaughtered a sheep (in the shower). The woman explains why: it was Ramadan, an explanation taken over or confirmed by her husband, who continues with specifics about the cause of the smell: they had put the remnants into the drainpipe. These various details add to the overall category of the Complication (taken together in Figure 2 as one slot).

Notice that a further analysis of the event or of the action might, for instance, yield possible subcategories such as Goal, Cause, Reason, Act, Result, or Consequence, as is also proposed in various story grammars or in AI-work on narrative mentioned above. Yet, we do not consider these to be proper narrative categories, but rather categories of a more general, semantic theory of event and action, underlying a narrative theory.

Interestingly, the woman here wants to stop the story and concludes that this was the only story (experience) they had with foreigners, thereby answering the interview question of the interviewer. Her husband, however, has more to say and continues with further details (some repetitive) about the Complication and the Resolution, e.g. the interesting fact that the police was involved. This is, of course, strategically relevant, because the presence

Figure 2. Narrative schema of story (34)



of the police makes the event more serious and therefore more tellable. Also, the Evaluation category had not yet been attended to: not only the experience itself is worth telling. We also need an opinion and a possible moral based on that. The Evaluation here, after the global one in line 5, is formulated in terms of a rhetorical exclamation (with appropriate emphasis on DO). Typically, the interviewer wants more information about the role of the police, information which is however not provided, only the same phrase is repeated. The woman appears to have a different interpretation of the question of the interviewer. She formulates the norm (the law), and assumes that the interviewer doesn't know that norm (which is also a reproach). This might imply the fear that the interviewer might not find the event serious enough to call the police, which would make the story less interesting. Then, further evaluative moves are made and the Conclusion is being prepared; the Evaluation in 48 seems to function, at the same time, as a more general Conclusion: we can't do anything against this sort of thing. That is, at the level of the story events, there *is* a Resolution, *viz.* the discovery of the cause of the bad smell and the actions of the neighbors and the police, but at a higher level, there is *no* Resolution: the problems we have with these foreigners can't be solved. In 49 the woman tries to conclude the story again, this time by mentioning the notion of 'any contact' that has led to the story, but again the man continues with the Evaluation, addressing the interviewer again with a hypothetical comparison (*You wouldn't slaughter a chicken in your room, would you*), a move not fully accepted by the interviewer, who answers negatively but also adds that the slaughtering of sheep is now often taking place in the slaughterhouse. She thereby takes some distance from the stereotypically prejudiced nature of this kind of 'neighbor nuisance' stories (indeed, Dutch people often used to slaughter chickens at home too!). Finally, the man then also terminates his story by the same token, namely that this was their only (negative) experience with foreigners in the neighborhood. The Conclusion here is therefore not some kind of moral, but only a minimal closure referring to the occasioning of the story. The more substantial Conclusion and Moral seems to be expressed in line 48: "You can't do anything against that". Similarly, also the Evaluations imply a moral conclusion, *viz.* 'you don't do such things here in Holland'. Indeed, the repeated Evaluations in such stories seem to be the real point. They show why the story is relevant in the interview. They express the ingroup member's attitude towards the 'deviant' behavior of the outgroup members.

5.4. *Story topics*

Narrative schemata are the formal framework for the organization of the stories. For our discussion about prejudice, however, it is not only important *how* people tell stories about minorities, but also *what* they tell. In the previous Chapter we have analyzed some of these topics as they occur in the various interviews, but here it is particularly interesting to have a closer look at the kinds of topics people select for storytelling. After all, as we have suggested, stories should be about personal experiences or, in general, about interesting events or actions. Prejudiced stories in particular, therefore, will globally be about personal experiences of storytellers (or their acquaintances) with negatively interpreted actions of minority group members. Since the Complication category is the specific location for such 'negative' actions, we have classified all actions of such categories that are predicated of minority group members. In Table 2 we have listed the abbreviated topics that function as Complications in the stories.

Table 2: Topics in the Complications of stories about minorities

1. Aggression, violence, menacing behavior, and fights (27)
2. Holdups, thefts, and muggings (13)
3. 'Abnormal' behavior (due to cultural differences) (9)
4. Nuisance, bothering, harassment (9)
5. Being dirty, unhygienic behavior (7)
6. Noise, loud music (7)
7. Avoidance of contact (6)
8. Leaks and similar neighbor conflicts (3)
9. They ruin their apartments (2)
10. Home slaughtering (2)
11. Dependent behavior of women (2)
12. Abuse of social benefits (1)
13. They dance differently (1)
14. They do not want to work (1)
15. They are favored in housing (1)
16. They take our jobs (1)
17. They do not adapt (1)
18. They are stupid/backward (1)

By far, the topics of aggression, violence, threats, or plain everyday fights lead the list, with 27 stories out of 133 (of which, of course, not all are negative about minority groups). These various topics can again be grouped together in three major topic classes (accounting for 57.5% of the stories):

(a) AGGRESION, CRIME (40 stories, 30%)
(b) BOTHER, NUISANCE (26 stories, 20%)
(c) DEVIANT BEHAVIOR (10 stories, 7.5%)

The other stories are about topics that do not fall within these dominant topic classes, e.g. the role and behavior of foreign women (standard: 'they are not allowed to go out', said about islamitic women), the abuse of social services, or competition in employment. Most interesting about this finding is that, as soon as people volunteer stories about personal experiences, they predominantly focus on the everyday small problems and conflicts between neighbors, such as bother from noise, smells, etc. The generally held prejudices about job competition, positive discrimination in housing, abuses of the social services, and so on, *do not appear in stories at all*, or only occasionally. This may mean, first, that people simply do not have such experiences and that — indeed — these are negative stereotypes that cannot be backed up with stories. Second, such prejudices have a more general, socioeconomic nature. They cannot simply be illustrated by direct observation, at least not in everyday situations (one would have to be at the city bureau for housing to 'observe' such events, as we find in one of our stories). Third, the events in that case are, as such, not interesting enough, so that they do not constitute material for tellable stories. Indeed, people express prejudices of the general socioeconomic kind preferably in general statements and argumentations. Stories are about the differences of culture, the 'deviance' of the outgroup members, the nuisance, the dangers, the threats, and all other everyday infractions of the norms and values of the ingroup members within the neighborhood. In other words, stories are expressions of personally experienced (but negatively construed) models, whereas general statements and argumentations are rather based, it seems, on group schemata. Of course, stories may be used to function as supportive arguments within argumentation.

Topics are defined in terms of semantic macropropositions, and therefore they do not only feature predicates denoting events and actions, but also Participants, who have the role of actors in these actions. In Table 3 we have listed the actors from the ingroup that figure in the stories. As expected. most stories are indeed about *personal* experiences: the storyteller figures in 98 of the 133 stories. Yet, we also see that this is not always an active role but may also be a passive or observer role. This suggests that storytellers often depict their role as victims in stories about minorities, or as witnesses

Table 3: *Ingroup participants in stories about minorities*

1.	I/STORYTELLER	98
	a. Agent/Co-agent	37
	b. Patient/Experiencer	36
	c. Observer	25
2.	FAMILY MEMBER(S)	12
	a. Agent/Co-agent	5
	b. Patient/Experiencer	6
	c. Observer	1
3.	ACQUAINTANCES (friends, neighbors, colleagues, etc).	14
	a. Agent/Co-agent	6
	b. Patient/Experiencer	8
	c. Observer	0
4.	STRANGERS	9
	a. Agent/Co-agent	1
	b. Patient/Experiencer	7
	c. Observer	1
5.	INSTITUTIONS/AUTHORITIES	6

NOTE. In some stories several ingroup members are (major) participants, whereas in other stories there are no explicit (major) ingroup participants but only minority group participants.

of the negative events told in a Complication. Sometimes the members of the ingroup have several roles, in which case they have also been counted (and in other stories they do not have an explicit role at all: such stories are directly about minority members).

In Table 4 we find the occurrence of the different outgroup members in the stories, but counted only in the central Complication category in which they figure as negative actors. We see that most stories are indeed about the most prominent outgroups, *viz.* immigrant workers (Turks and Moroccans) and Surinamese. In some cases the origin of the actor remains unclear or implicit. These figures show that storytelling reflects more or less the general predominance of specific outgroups in the salient prejudices of the ingroup members during a particular period. Although there are many more groups of 'foreigners' in Amsterdam, only a few groups are selected for specific

Table 4: Minority groups in negative Complications of stories.

1.	Minority groups/foreigners (general)		6
2.	Immigrant workers		60
	a. General	19	
	b. Turks	18	
	c. Moroccans	23	
3.	Surinamese/blacks		51
4.	Other minority groups		5
5.	Unclear (not specified)		12
			133

storytelling and prejudiced informal communication. Narrative salience, it seems, is a valid indicator of the social and the cognitive salience of outgroups.

6. ARGUMENTATION

6.1. *Conversational argumentation*

One of the major goals of interviews about ethnic minorities is the elicitation of opinions. Especially when socially relevant but delicate opinions are involved, however, people are expected to provide *reasons* for such opinions. That is, they will engage in argumentative sequences that make such opinions (more) plausible, reasonable, defensible, or acceptable. And indeed, argumentations abound in talk about minorities. In this chapter we analyze some of these argumentative structures. The overall contents, the topics, of such argumentations have already been discussed in chapter 4, so that we know what kind of opinions people have and want to make plausible. Similarly, in order to argue for an opinion, people will often try to present a concrete example or illustration, and the stories we have analyzed in the previous chapter are regular parts of such illustrations, especially in contact areas where people have personal experiences with ethnic minority group members. In this chapter, then, we focus on the argumentative structures themselves and on the argumentative moves people make in the defense of an opinion or position. During such argumentations, speakers also make use of specific semantic, rhetorical, or conversational strategies that may make the argument more effective. These *local* strategies of argumentation will be discussed in the following chapters. Thus, here we are only concerned with the global, overall analysis of argumentation, that is, with argumentative schemata or superstructures. Such argumentative schemata may be compared with the narrative schemata we have analyzed in the previous chapter.

This means that an argumentative structure can be analyzed in terms of a number of conventional categories. Well-known, for instance, are the categories of Premise and Conclusion, as we know them also from the classical, dialectical analysis of syllogisms (Kennedy 1963, among many other publications in logic and rhetoric). Then, we may distinguish between different kinds of Premise, such as particular statements of fact, general laws or rules, or assumptions about the relevance of such premises for the conclusion (see e.g. Toulmin 1958). Most work on argumentation, however, is not descriptive, but normative. It shows how valid argumentations should be

built up, and what kinds of fallacies should be avoided (Kahane 1971; Crawshay-Williams 1957; Fearnside and Holther 1959).

When we want to understand how people actually argue in natural discourse, and especially in informal everyday talk, the formal or abstract models of normative argumentation theories are only of limited relevance. It goes without saying, first, that people will seldom defend a position or opinion which follows logically from their arguments. Nor, in fact, will they argue in such a way that the conclusion is valid according to weaker criteria of derivation and validity. Rather, we assume, people will try to make their opinions conversationally *plausible*. The general criterion of plausibility is part of the socially based principle of 'reasonableness' that underlies conversation and interaction. This principle explains *why* people feel obliged to provide reasons for their actions and their (expressed) opinions. In talk and interviews, they do so not only because others will ask for such reasons, but since they know that the speech partner will expect such explanations they will also spontaneously provide arguments for an opinion or some action (Schiffrin 1984).

Conversational argumentation does not have the more or less strict organizational principles that may be expected in other types of discourse, such as in written argumentations in general, and in scientific argumentations in particular. Spontaneous arguments may not simply be 'wrong' arguments or fallacies, but they may become irrelevant altogether or 'wander off' into different topics of discussion. Yet, despite this kind of relative freedom in informal argumentation, there certainly *are* constraints also in spontaneous talk, and these constraints may be monitored by the speech partner, as may be witnessed by the many *why*-questions or *but*-objections that challenge ongoing arguments.

The general outline of the kind of informal argumentations we find in our data is as follows: a particular or general opinion is formulated first, followed by one or more arguments that each or jointly are assumed to make the opinion (more) plausible; these arguments may themselves need further subarguments; finally, some kind of conclusion, repeating or paraphrasing the initial opinion, is formulated as a closing category. However, during the argumentation, one argument may become relatively important in its own right, e.g. by questions or comments of the interviewer, and may then become a major opinion that again needs further argumentation, after which the initial opinion is no longer sustained. This is, however, only a rough outline of the overall organization of informal argumentations in talk. It cannot be

our aim to develop a theory of informal argumentation in conversation (see e.g. Schiffrin 1984, for details). Rather, we focus on the substantive dimensions of argumentations for opinions about ethnic minorities or ethnic situations. From the analysis of some examples, we may then try to derive some more general conclusions about the way such arguments are carried out.

6.2. *Arguments about ethnic opinions*

The argumentations in our interview data may be of different degrees of complexity. Consider, for instance, the following argument:

(35) (D2) Itee: I have lived here for 13 years
and I am glad that I have left.
Iter: Why?
Itee: Well, because in those 13 years the
neighborhood here has terribly declined
with all those foreigners.

The opinion 'I am glad that I have left' is defended with the single argument that is given after the *why*-question of the interviewer: 'decline with (read: "because of") the foreigners'. Implicit in the argument, of course, is the more general implication 'If the (a) neighborhood declines, I (will) leave', but such an implication may remain implicit because it follows directly from the stated argument together with the initial statement/opinion. The single argument suggests that foreigners are the cause of the decline of the neighborhood, and such an assumption will usually ask for further arguments or provoke questions of the interviewer, especially when such an attribution of causation of negative circumstances to ethnic minority groups might be heard as a form of discrimination. This woman, however, does not feel the need for further adstruction of her main argument and only later will she tell about some negative personal experiences. Similarly, when the interviewer later asks whether she would have objected when one of her sons would have come home with a Surinamese girl friend, she answers positively and her only argument is 'Because I have only experienced trouble with that', again without further details or examples. A question from the interviewer asking for a story about (such) personal experiences is responded to by a short narrative about a small conflict in the launderette where she works, but that story is not relevant for the argumentative defense of her rejection of cross-ethnic contacts of her sons. In other words, we notice that sometimes *any* negative experience may be used as an argument that would be relevant to the defense of opinions about quite different topics. We have concluded

earlier that this is a central cognitive strategy of prejudiced thinking, *viz.* 'negative transfer' (see chapter 2). We now see that argumentation analysis can make such underlying thought processes explicit.

Often, however, argumentation is more complex than in this simple example. An opinion or action may be defended by a long sequence of arguments, which in turn may become statements that are in need of their own argumentation. Let us examine some of these more complex argumentation structures, because they reveal much about the underlying cognitive organization and strategies of prejudice, as well as about the social processes of the presentation of opinions and arguments in communicative interaction. Instead of the full text of the transcript, we only give the steps of the argumentation.

First, an argumentation given by B1, a man of 32 years old, a systems analyst, living in a well-known contact neighborhood in the old center of Amsterdam (another part of that interview will be analyzed in chapter 9, where we consider the actual conversational structure). The man mentions that he lives right among ethnic minority groups, and the interviewer then asks whether he has any contacts with them. His answer is defended as follows:

(36) (B1) I do not have many contacts.
- A1. Because I have a circle of close friends.
  - A1.1. I have known them for 15 years already.
- A2. I have been away from this neighborhood for some time.
  - A2.1. I have lived elsewhere.
- A3. I don't need contacts with Turks or Moroccans.
- A4. Moreover, one has difficult access to them.
  - A4.1. I don't know why.
  - A4.2. EXAMPLE. (No contact in a Turkish coffeehouse)
    - A4.2.1. It is open from 6 to 6 in the morning.
    - A4.2.2. I only see Turks there.
    - A4.2.3. I went there once.
    - A4.2.4. Nobody sought contact with me.
      - A4.2.4.1. Because of their language.
        - A4.2.4.1.1. They speak Dutch with difficulty.
      - A4.2.4.2. Because of their culture.
  - A4.3. They feel better in their own environment.
    - A4.3.1. I can imagine that.
    - A4.3.2. They are here to work hard.
    - A4.3.3. They need their own community.
      - A4.3.3.1. They attach much value to that.

The interviewee first proposes a series of arguments that have prevented him from having contacts with 'foreigners'. In A3 he openly admits that he hardly feels any need to establish such contacts. However, such arguments may be heard as insufficient reasons, as a lack of initiative, and maybe even as discriminatory. Therefore another argument is necessary, which is stated in A4, by which the lack of contact is attributed to the foreigners themselves. *That* argument (rather than the personal ones) is supported in detail. The argumentative move *I don't know why* is a standard starter for spontaneous reasoning, and indicates uncertainty about the assumed arguments. It is also a move in a strategy of avoidance. However, he then mentions an example by way of argument, *viz.* his negative experience during a visit to the Turkish coffeehouse, which after some specifications yields the wanted conclusion: They did not try to get into contact with me (formulated in a rhetorically 'indignant' style: *Don't think they would...*). So, that argument directly supports the 'difficulty of access' argument at a higher level. In his argumentative strategy, however, some explanation may be relevant about the behavior of the Turks (after all, it should be made clear that the lack of contact in the coffeehouse is *not* due to the man himself), and he comes up with language and culture barriers. In addition, argument A 4.3. is even stronger, because it is not limited to a single experience, but draws more general conclusions about the preferences or the foreigners: they work hard and need their own community very much (a special value of their culture), which, together, support the argument about the difficulty of access. If we leave aside many details about the contents and the structure of this argumentation, we see that an opinion, action, or state of affairs of the speaker/interviewee is supported first in terms of *external circumstances* (friends, absence), then briefly by *personal preferences* (needs), but most importantly by the *attribution* of a (negatively interpreted situation) to the minority groups themselves. This attribution is supported by a concrete personal experience, but also and more strongly by generalizations about properties of their culture. Thus, the question of why *he* did not have contacts is 'defused' and redefined as an answer to and explanation of the question of why *they* do not want contacts with us. But these arguments are formulated in *positive* terms, which seems to suggest that the speaker does not at all resent that they do not want contacts, a situation which happens to be perfectly consistent with his own personal preferences. The interesting feature of this argumentative strategy is that the speaker is able to redefine a possibly negative situation that may be attributed to himself in terms of a positive situation attributed to foreign-

ers. Thereby he does not only defend himself against a negative evaluation by the interviewer, but he even establishes a possibly positive image because he makes positive assertions about the behavior and the culture of foreigners. We see that a major position in this way is not only made plausible (Why don't I have contacts?), but is also gradually replaced by another position which may be defended in a strategically much more advantageous way. Such an argument shows, as we have assumed above, both what kind of opinions the speaker has about minorities but also how these opinions can be organized and expressed by way of a strategically positive self-presentation.

Assumptions about what minorities themselves want or what would be 'good for them' are often used to dissimulate the speakers' own preferences. A next example is from an interview with a 50-year-old woman, living in a new (suburban) contact neighborhood (de Bijlmer). During the interview the woman repeatedly shows that she does not want her daughter to have contacts with Surinamese neighbors or students in her class ('because they are different'). She agrees that it is 'positive' to help minority groups, but she prefers to help them 'in their own country', e.g. with money from the development budget. Her major statement, thus, is that they (the Surinamese) should stay in (or go back to) their own country:

(37) (E2) S. "Let them stay in their own country."
A1. They find it (too) cold here.
A2. They don't like it here.
C1. There is no work there. (Counterargument of Iter)
A3. It is a beautiful country.
A4. So much grows there.
A5. There is a rich culture there.
A6. It is a pity that that country is going to pieces.
A7. There they have their own family.
A7.1. I also love my family a lot.
A7.2. They are very much attached to each other.
A7.3. Their family ties are very tight.
A8. They can get financial help.
A8.1. I wouldn't have a grudge against that.
A8.2. but not HERE.

The argumentative structure is fairly simple here. The woman just lists a series of arguments that each or together would be sufficient reasons for Surinamese to stay in their country. Notice that hardly any personal preferences or interests of the woman herself are mentioned. Her strategy is one of empathy (they feel cold, etc.), an enumeration of positive features of

'that' country (features one could doubt she knows about at all, so she just makes them up), socioeconomic reasons, *viz.* the interests of the country of Surinam, and then again the stereotypical family bonds attributed to minority groups (as in our previous example). Here too, the woman makes a move that is intended to convey her positive evaluation of such tight family relationships, namely by asserting the quasi-irrelevant love for her own family. Finally, the decisive problem (money) would also be solved, *viz.* by 'our own' help — which she would readily agree with (if it is not HERE, as she intonates her conclusive statement of this argumentation).

Relevant for our discussion is that arguments in favor of majority speakers, such as the return of minorities to their own country, are reformulated in terms of what the minorities themselves would prefer, what ethical reasons they (should) have, and what personal and cultural ties they have with their country. Again, it is as if she is not speaking against minorities but in favor of them, though maybe in a rather maternalistic manner ('I tell you what would be good for them').

Just as in the previous argumentation, many propositions are left implicit that would make the argument 'sound' in the normative sense. For instance, she assumes (correctly, as common knowledge, which may be omitted in argumentations of course) that in Surinam they would not feel cold, but also that feeling cold would be a good reason for not being in another country. The counterargument of the interviewer about the lack of work in Surinam is not taken up and rejected by arguments. To make A6 stick, she implies that the presence of the Surinamese here has led to the present decline of Surinam. And finally, it is important to repeat that most of her arguments are not simply statements of facts, but unsupported assumptions or stereotypically shared consensus beliefs about the Surinamese people. The rest of the interview clearly shows that she couldn't care less about the real interests of Surinamese people. She even proposes the (in the Netherlands rather exceptional) idea to have segregated schools for Dutch and 'foreign' children.

Finally, we present the argumentation of the director of the firm whose rejection of a minority settlement in his garden city suburb of Amsterdam we have already met in the example at the end of chapter 1 and in the topic analysis in chapter 3:

(38) (I2) I would find that WRONG (to have them here).
A1. (CC1) Not because they wouldn't have the right.
A2. If you would build cheap apartment houses here, the value of the houses would go down.

A2.1. That is economically irresponsible.
A2.2. COMPARISON. No industry in garden cities either.
A2.2.1. People have built their houses here.
A2.2.1.1. Because it was a garden city.

Iter: And if the city would take such a decision?

A3. It is impossible.
A3.1. This neighborhood would pauperize.
A3.2. EXAMPLE/COMPARISON De Bijlmer pauperizes.
A3.2.1. Staircases stink there.
A3.2.1.1. STORY.

This argument is somewhat more complex. First, an obvious counterargument is offered: of course they have the right to live here (read: my rejection is not racist). But then the major argument follows: the values of the houses would go down. Again, this personal interest, however, is too close to a prejudiced attitude, so it should be formulated in more general and abstract terms, e.g. those of economic rules, or norms and values. A comparison with the (obvious) example of the absence of industry in garden cities may not be quite to the point, but it vaguely shows that certain settlements cannot be tolerated in a rich garden suburb. After the intervention of the interviewer mentioning a possible city policy of 'spreading' people in various neighborhoods of the city, his first argument is simply 'It is impossible'. Again, a personal dislike is formulated in terms of a social or economic impossibility. Then, as a further support, the consequences are mentioned: the neighborhood would decline, an argument which is further supported with the well-known example of the situation in (the new) de Bijlmer suburb, an argument which, in turn, is strengthened with a story about his recent visit there.

Concluding, we have found first that arguments are often counterarguments against anticipated objections. Second, arguments that would link personal beliefs or opinions to a possible suspicion by the interviewer about the prejudices of the speaker are avoided. Rather, arguments take an abstract, more general or 'it is better for all of us if' nature. Economic 'necessities' are always strong points in the argumentation. Third, negative consequences are not directly connected to the minority groups, but rather to this more general, abstract situation ('building cheap apartment houses'). Fourth, the speaker may strategically resort to comparison arguments that are less delicate or controversial, or comparisons with similar situations about which some consensus seems to exist.

These few examples have only shown some of the argumentative strategies people use when presenting their prejudiced opinions. The tactical

defense is first one of evasion: avoid direct answers or try to change the topic. Second, try to attribute possibly prejudiced (negative) opinions about oneself to a — positively presented — characteristic of minority groups. Third, try to abstract from personal preferences and interests by claiming more general social and economic goals and values of society. Fourth, formulate your own preferences in terms of preferences of minority groups. Fifth, mention negative consequences, but leave the causal connection with minority groups implicit. And finally, present personal or stereotypical assumptions about minorities as facts, and take the prevalent norms and values of our society as a commonsense (and consensus) basis for the inferences underlying the argumentation.

These are only a few principles we have encountered. Here again, much further work is necessary. Indeed, argumentation reveals many of the underlying principles of prejudice organization because it forces people to verbalize (or presuppose) relations between various opinions. At the same time, it shows *which* opinions people think need defense, which 'excuses' must be made, and which arguments are better avoided during interaction so as to avoid suspicions of racism. We have not attempted to show, as is usual in argumentative analyses, where the argumentation is 'wrong' or 'invalid'. Most informal arguments are invalid, and especially in our case, argumentation is mostly far from adequate. Important, however, is its conversational effectiveness, and it seems that the kind of quasi-arguments we have encountered are just very effective for many people.

7. SEMANTIC STRATEGIES

7.1. *The notion of 'strategy'*

In this chapter we start what we call the 'local' analysis of discourse about minorities. Whereas the next chapters focus on the surface expressions and formulations of opinions, we are here concerned with so-called semantic strategies. Just as the many other strategies we discuss in this book, these semantic strategies are also part of the overall strategies of adequate self-expression, positive self-presentation, and effective persuasion. Semantic strategies are defined in terms of semantic moves that realize the goals of such strategies. An example of such a move is when the speaker 'corrects' a previous proposition, or when a speaker formulates first a positive opinion in order to be able to formulate a negative opinion later. The stereotypical example of this last move is: *I have nothing against foreigners, but...* Our interviews as well as spontaneous conversations abound with strategies, and we will see that they are crucial in the effective formulation of ethnic opinions (cf. van Dijk 1983c).

The notion of a 'strategy' is often made use of in a rather vague way. Our concept of strategy is derived from the cognitive approach presented in van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) (see also chapters 2 and 3 above). A strategy is a property of a 'plan', that is, a (cognitive) representation of an action sequence that will be executed. It is that property of a plan that guarantees that the action sequence is carried out effectively and optimally, given the (known or assumed) circumstances of the action context. In other words, a strategy is a partial plan about the *way* a goal can or should be reached. A strategy is different from a rule, which applies to given structures or information and will always yield a specified result. Strategies have to cope with incomplete information, with vague information, with information about parts of the text or context, and with available knowledge and beliefs from memory or the representation of the actual communicative situation. They operate on-line. That is, they apply to all available information at given stages during the process of production or comprehension (or in the execution of actions), and do so by making hypothetical assumptions about the struc-

ture, the meaning, or the function of the current clause, sentence, paragraph in discourse processing (or similar units in action processing). Each functionally relevant step of a strategy, that is, each step that is assumed to contribute to the overall goal of the strategy, is called a *move*. Moves may relate backwards to previous moves (as in 'corrections') or they may relate forwards, as in the preparation of the next moves (of the same speaker or of a previous or next speaker). In discourse comprehension, strategies may involve the effective comprehension of a sentence or part of a text, as well as the use of knowledge and beliefs that are relevant in this understanding process (effective search and retrieval of schemata or situation models, etc.; see chapter 2, for details). In discourse production, such as the participation in spontaneous talk or interviews, such hypothetical on-line processing is essential. At each point, the speaker must take into account what has just been said (and its possible semantic and social implications), as well as what will be or may be said next, also by a next speaker. This local planning based on complex expectations derived from world knowledge, models, and beliefs about the hearer and the context, therefore, is not rule-governed (at least not only) but strategic, and each move shows the traces of this cognitive and social process of effective talk (Gumperz 1982).

Obviously, semantic strategies do not come alone. They are part of the realization of global strategies, such as those of topic production and understanding (i.e. of macrostructures), of narration, and of argumentation, as we have seen in the previous chapters. At the same time though, semantic strategies are closely related to rhetorical, pragmatic, stylistic, and conversational strategies for the adequate expression and formulation of propositions and their underlying cognitive representations. Thus, the strategy of a 'repetition' is both semantic and rhetorical, and may even be strictly a phenomenon of conversational formulation. Similarly, a 'conclusion' may be a move that is argumentative, pragmatic, semantic (based on implication), and rhetorical. Despite these obvious difficulties in making precise distinctions, and despite the possibility that one unit of discourse may have several functions at the same time, it is appropriate to make theoretical distinctions between such different moves/functions (see Sinclair and Coulthard 1975; Coulthard 1977; Coulthard and Montgomery 1981; and especially Kreckel 1981, for an extensive categorization of moves).

7.2. *Semantic strategies in talk about minorities*

We have seen above that semantic strategies have as their primary goal

the effective expression of semantic macrostructures (themes) and cognitive situation models, and the inducement of wanted semantic representations and corresponding models in the hearer. Secondly, they have an interactional and social goal, *viz.* to manage the inferences of hearers about the personal or social characteristics of the speaker. These two different sets of goals may sometimes conflict: a direct or 'honest' expression of the beliefs or the opinions from the speaker's situation model may lead to a negative social evaluation of the speaker by the hearer. This means that speakers will heavily monitor their semantic expressions by the more fundamental social goals, e.g. by various cognitive transformations. They may leave out certain information, add information that is not part of the model, or apply various forms of recombination or permutation. In more informal terms: speakers will often be obliged to dissimulate their 'real' beliefs or opinions, or express what they assume is expected or wanted by the interviewer. Obviously, we have no direct way to assess these transformations or interactional adaptations. We only have what people actually say, and only from specific signals might we infer the underlying cognitive operations. Before we can start to speculate about such inferences later in this book, we will therefore have to take the contributions to the talk more or less 'literally', and limit semantic analysis to what is actually expressed.

Theoretically, semantic analysis is constrained also by the terms of the discourse semantics we have at our disposal. This means, first, that we are dealing with propositions, relations between propositions, or components of propositions. Second, we must try to describe strategic moves in such terms. Yet, moves are properties of (inter)action, and semantic theory has not been developed for such an interactional analysis, but rather for a more abstract or 'structural' account of meaning, mostly for isolated sentences. If we want to account for the dynamic aspect of meaning as some kind of 'semantic act', probably other notions should be introduced. Thus, the semantic move that could be called 'generalization' might well be defined in terms of semantic implication or entailment between subsequently expressed propositions of sentences or turns. But a move such as 'correction' cannot straightforwardly be defined in well-known semantic terms such as implication, synonymy, antinomy, or presupposition. Rather, such a move would involve something like 'delete proposition p_i from the semantic representation (or the situation model) and substitute for it proposition p_j now being expressed.' Instead of a 'static' relation, it seems as if we have something like a semantic transformation (substitution) as well as a procedural instruction. Hence, at least part

of the strategic semantics is dynamic or procedural.

Before we continue this theoretical analysis of semantic strategies, a brief example needs to be given. The following interview fragment comes from a conversation with a 30-year-old woman:

(39) (KW-1)

1 Iter: Do you also have contacts with foreigners in this neighborhood?

Itee: Well, No, uhm, it is very difficult, umm, she is just about to say hello to me, our

5 neighbor

Iter: Oh, is she Surinamese or

Itee: No, not, I think she is Turkish or Moroccan. But I sometimes talk with the children. I think she is mostly inside the house. They

10 are not allowed to go out alone.

In her answer to the initial question of the Iter, this woman not only provides the negative information (*No*) between two hesitation markers (*well* and *umm*), but also starts a new move intended to *explain* the lack of contact. This is done, first, by predicating a property (*difficult*) of the concept of 'contact' and, second, by an illustrative *example*: her neighbor barely greets her. We are dealing with a semantic move of *explanation* as soon as speakers express causes or reasons of events or actions in which they have been involved. This move is strategic in our sense, because a simple negative answer might lead to the possible inference that the lack of contact is due to the speaker herself, and that may be a negative property, given the general norms of initiative-taking in social contacts. Hence, her explanation needs two component moves: first, a general reason for lack of contact, *viz.* difficulty, and, second, an *attribution* of the responsibility to the minority neighbor.

In her second turn, line 6, the woman first routinely *corrects* an implication of the Iter's previous question, but then continues her answer to the first question about her contacts with foreigners. This move is started with the contrastive *but*, and thus can be interpreted as part of a more *positive* type of information about such contacts and at the same time as a *specification* of her contacts. After that positive answer to the first question, she continues with her explanation of the lack of contact on the part of the foreign neighbor: she is always inside. And that particular fact needs a more *general explanation* or warrant, *viz.* in terms of a general statement about the norms of the foreign group (they are not allowed to go out).

From this short example, of which we ignore a host of other conversational properties for the moment, we may conclude that speakers make use of various semantic moves in order to relate the propositions in a coherent sequence: corrections, explanations, specifications, positive transformation (turning a negative proposition into a positive one), giving examples or illustrations, and generalizations. The overall strategic function of the respective propositions and the functional relations is to attribute the negative state of affairs (no contacts between neighbors) to the foreign woman, and more in general to the norms of the foreign group as a whole, while at the same time presenting a positive action on her part (contact with the children). In this example we see that indeed the semantic strategy is geared towards the avoidance of negative inferences by the hearer about the social role of the speaker.

The second example comes from an interview with a 62-year-old woman who reluctantly accepted to talk about her experiences with foreigners. Her macrostrategy is to assert that she has no contacts with foreigners at all, so that she cannot tell about her experiences. This general strategy of what could be called *topic avoidance* by claiming *ignorance* is very common in the interviews. A fragment of the interview runs as follows (her husband sometimes joins the conversation):

(40) (RA-2)

Iter: Yes, what kind of, kind of experiences you have with ... foreigners ...

Woman: We don't have any contacts with foreigners, here not at all.

Man: (coming from the back) Well, I am a man, but then I find it really terrible, that is frankly my opinion, I am a healthy guy, I'm standing on my own feet (?), but it's a big scandal when you see young Turkish woman walking around here ... 18 years old with a 50 year old guy.

Woman: Yeeees

Man: with three, four, five children, which you and I pays for and then I say, they've gotta do something about it.

Although the English translation is only a distant approximation (the Dutch version has various grammatical 'errors', such as *I pays* in line 13, and the mixture of two expressions in lines 7 and 8, namely *standing with ones own feet on the ground* and *standing in the middle of life*), the passage shows rather well the strategies used in such kinds of 'opinion-talk'. As was men-

tioned above, the woman in line 3 repeats her avoidance moves by *denying* contacts with foreigners. At the end of her turn, she repeats the negation (same words in Dutch: *helemaal niet* 'not at all') which can be interpreted as a move of *emphasizing* an earlier assertion. Then, her husband joins the conversation, starting with the typical Dutch particle *nou* (approximately *well* in English but with many other meanings), which may signal the starting of a new turn, but also, semantically, the first segment of an contrast pair with the approximate meaning here: '*although* I am a man, I *yet* find it...' The assertion about his manhood is of course not arbitrary but part of a strategy to back up his opinion: 'although as a man I may be expected to take sides with other (here: Turkish) men when relations with younger women are concerned, I still find it...' The negative evaluation in that case becomes more credible, and the concession (*I am a man*) then becomes rather an *apparent concession*. This concession is followed by another move in lines 6 and 7 about his frankness, which again delays the object of the judgment (*terrible*). This move, although occurring regularly in the interviews, may not always have a clear function. First, it may imply that the situation is such that the speaker is *entitled* to such a frank opinion, and in that case it is both an excuse and a justification for expressing oneself in this negative way about others or for mixing in with the private affairs of others. Second, it may imply more generally that the speaker is frank and does not conceal his 'real opinions'. Third, the move may more specifically 'look back' at the qualification just used (*really terrible*) and *confirm* the choice of the evaluative predicate. Then two other moves follow, one about being a healthy guy, and the other about 'standing firmly on the ground/in life'. The first of these seems to *repeat* and *specify* the *I am a man* move and thus emphasizes the weight of the negative evaluation: 'healthy men like me could in principle understand these other men, but...' And similarly with the second move: 'I know about life, and I am realistic, but...' These various moves are made to sustain the negative judgment of the speaker by eliminating possible doubts about his credibility or honesty: the negative judgment might be heard as a case of jealousy or envy about having such a young woman. In line 8, then, the negative judgment may be *repeated* and even *emphasized* (*a big scandal*), and then finally the core of the semantic moves may follow, *viz.* the object or reason for the negative judgement. This final move of his turn, phrased in a circumstantial clause, uses a semantic opposition (young women vs. old guys) with an additional rhetorical function, namely a *contrast* that is further specified with the possibly exaggerated guesses about the ages of the

relevant outgroup members. His wife joins him in line 11 with a positive *agreement*, using a phonetic signal, *viz.* lengthening the vowel of *Yes*. The man continues by slightly changing the topic: after the 'difference of age' topic for foreign couples, he can easily slip to the 'they have many children' topic. The move is rhetorically performed by a numerical climax (3, 4, 5) and is followed by a standard move in this kind of talk: 'we have to pay for this', which can be interpreted as functioning as a *negative consequence* for the WE-group. The negative consequence, following reference to a number of properties assigned to foreign families, is not enough, however; what is needed is a kind of evaluative *conclusion*, a pragmatic moral: 'we should do something about that'. This moral is preceded by the performative move *then I say*, which again functions as an indication of the (personal) opinion being formulated. We may call this the *perspective establishment* move, by which a speaker signals that some opinion is his/her opinion or that he/she sees the situation from his/her point of view. Notice, finally, that in the stereotypical move *which you and I pay for*, we not only find a negative consequence function but also an interactional *appeal* function: the interviewer, both as representative of other (white, Dutch) people and as 'belonging to the same, our, group', is referred to as involved in the negative consequences and therefore appealed to, *viz.* in order to agree with the judgment.

Again, our analysis is still fairly informal and far from complete. Further moves, relations between, and functions of moves might be discerned in this kind of, rather typical, example of prejudiced talk. We have provisionally found that speakers will do such things, semantically, as repeating or emphasizing what has been said before, making apparent concessions, invoking credibility despite appearances of possibly biased judgement, establishing semantic oppositions, e.g. to achieve rhetorical contrast, and especially making positive self-assessments as preparations and excuses for negative judgments about others. Finally, we also saw that there may be a more specific conversational strategy of postponing important propositions, thereby creating both 'suspense' and providing enough warrants for an opinion. These few examples have given us the flavor of the kind of strategies involved in talk about minorities. We also found, rather informally and intuitively as yet, that speakers make moves — as parts of more complex strategic steps — that can be interpreted as e.g. 'explanations', 'giving examples', 'specifications', 'corrections', 'generalizations', 'denials', 'emphasizing', 'avoiding', 'concessions' (or apparent concessions), 'repetitions', 'establishing contrasts', 'stating negative consequences (for the WE-group)', or 'specifying

perspectives'. Clearly, these are just examples, and the expressions used to name these semantic moves are no more than lexical approximations of what is 'going on'. In order to make these intuitive terms more explicit, further theoretical clarification is in order. Is it possible, for instance, to find common underlying principles organizing these strategies? Also, should these strategic moves all be called semantic, or do they also involve pragmatic or other dimensions of description? And, finally, *what* semantic description can be given so that the strategies can be specified in unambiguous terms?

Although the analysis given above suggests a number of important semantic strategies, we need to inspect more data to obtain a more complete list of such moves. Therefore we have analyzed the first group of (38) interviews at this local semantic level and have found further moves that people have recourse to when strategically expressing, defending, or preparing their opinions, e.g. 'presupposition', 'implication', 'suggestion', 'mitigation' (or 'understatement'), 'exaggeration' (or 'overstatement'), 'vagueness', 'indirectness', 'displacement', 'blaming the other', 'ignorance', 'distance', '(apparent) contradiction', and so on. (see van Dijk 1982a, for details). It was also observed there that moves may have several of these functions at the same time.

One of the first theoretical observations that should be made is that most of the moves are strictly *relational*, in the sense that they can be defined only relative to other moves in the sequence. In that respect they contribute to the local *coherence* of the discourse. Thus, a 'correction' can be defined only with respect to what has been said before, which is also true of a 'mitigation': something is claimed in less negative terms than it was in a previous move; the speaker 'tones down' a previous move. Other moves do not have a relational function, but can be categorized in their own right, though often implicitly relative to expectations, a norm, or properties of the communicative context. Thus, an 'exaggeration' can be identified as a move in which something is claimed or a judgment is made which is obviously 'more', e.g. 'more negative', than was planned by the speaker or expected by the hearer, or which is 'more' with respect to the implicit norms and values holding in the communicative context for judging events or actions of others, such as 'foreigners'. Some strategic moves may appear both as relational and as autonomous. Thus, for instance, 'displacement' is a move in which a previously expressed negative opinion of one's own is 'displaced' (attributed) to others, e.g. other members of the WE-group, as in *I don't mind so much, but others in this neighborhood get really mad about these things*. In this case

the displacement move follows a typical avoidance or denial move, in which a speaker denies negative evaluations of the THEY-group. Obviously, such a displacement may also occur alone, that is, without the explicit previous denial of the speaker of his/her own feelings. In both cases though, like for the other moves, the ultimate functions of the moves should be established not only locally, with respect to preceding and following moves, but also with respect to the goals of the conversation/interview as a whole. Thus, 'mitigation' both tones down, locally, a previous move and, globally, aims at the establishment of a positive impression of tolerance and understanding.

The theoretical criterion we would like to apply in the decision whether a move is semantic or not is that a semantic move should be definable in terms of semantic relations between propositions or between the referents of propositions, that is, 'facts' in some possible world. In other words, the specification may be either intensional or extensional, or both. Pragmatic moves, on the other hand, should be definable in terms of relations between speech acts, whereas rhetorical moves may again be based on both semantic and pragmatic (and surface structural) information, *viz.* by applying a specific transformation to this information. Thus a *repetition*, as we have in the examples analyzed above, is a semantic move if its underlying proposition(s) are equivalent to those in a close previous move, where equivalence is defined as usual, *viz.* as mutual entailment. Strictly speaking, according to pragmatic conditions on appropriate assertions, the repetition of the same proposition in the same local context would be 'superfluous': the hearer already 'knows *p*'. Therefore, semantic and pragmatic repetition also function as a rhetorical move, *viz.* in terms of an *addition* (of the 'same') operation that also defines phonological rhyme or syntactic parallelism. Such a rhetorical move would be functional with respect to the overall goal of being (more) effective, e.g. by making sure that the right 'message' is conveyed. In other words, the semantic and pragmatic move hardly contributes anything 'new' to the discourse representation or the situational model of the hearer — according to the cognitive model sketched above — but its rhetorical function may attribute extra 'weight' or 'relevance' to the repeated proposition or assertion. This extra memory 'tag' will be helpful in retrieval, and hence makes the proposition/assertion more effective. From this brief theoretical analysis of the move of 'repetition' — for which further cognitive processing will not be discussed here — we see that moves may be defined at several levels of analysis.

Similarly, we may try to define other moves. An *explanation*, for exam-

ple, can be defined in terms of postponed reasons or causes of a fact denoted by an earlier proposition, as in: *I have no contacts with them. They do not* speak our language. In the previous chapter we have found that such explanatory moves are the standard functional units in argumentative strategies. We mention them here as well because of the semantic nature of such relationships. Explanatory moves are always separate (mostly assertive) speech acts, usually expressed by an independent sentence. Of course such moves may be *recursive*: several assertions may be made, functioning individually or together as an explanatory move.

Example and *specification* moves can semantically be defined in terms of one-sided entailment: q is a specification of p if q entails p, and an example would similarly be definable in terms of an instantiation relation specifying a member of the set denoted by a previous proposition. *Generalization* is defined the other way around: the generalizing move is itself entailed by its previous move, or it defines the superset of which a previous move specifies a member. Although this is not yet quite impeccable from a logical point of view, and although further constraints are necessary (not *any* generalization is acceptable, but only 'relevant' ones), these theoretical definitions will do for the moment.

Other moves are semantically somewhat more complicated. A *correction*, for example, is of course not *any* other proposition added as a *substitution* for a previous proposition. Often the correction is merely lexical: a better predicate is chosen to represent the intended state of affairs referred to. Or, interactionally, the hearer corrects a wrong presupposition of the speaker/iter by, for instance, referring to the intended, but at first misidentified, discourse referent. In other words, correction usually pertains to members of the same class of individuals, or to their properties or relations. Thus, if we find the following statement in an interview: "They do not work. Well, that is to say, they mess around with cars and sell them" (B1, 144), the correction is from paid, regular occupation to irregular, private occupation. That is, common to both terms is the implicated proposition about their occupation, featuring the same discourse referent and predicates of the same class.

Emphasizing and its converse (*mitigation*), functioning often at the same time as rhetorical hyperboles and understatements, respectively, may be defined along similar lines. In fact, they are corrections of a specific kind whereby often the same fact is referred to, but only in stronger terms (or weaker terms). This move may affect the quantifiers (saying *all* instead of

many, *always* instead of *often*) or the choice of a more positive or more negative evaluative predicate, such as *a big scandal* after saying *it is terrible* in our example about the young Turkish girls that marry with old Turkish men.

Although, formally speaking, some of these relations may be defined in terms of entailment, it is essentially our world knowledge and the system of our norms and values that will specify whether one proposition can be interpreted as a stronger or weaker representation of some state of affairs. The same holds for the definition of *contrast*. Formally, we may try to capture part of the semantic relation in terms of antonyms or in terms of the implication of a negated proposition (p is an antonym of q, if p entails $\sim q$ and q entails $\sim p$). But again, what is interpreted as a contrast may need specific culturally variable beliefs, opinions, or emotions. *Young girl* and *old man* are certainly contrasts, both along the dimension of gender and along that of age, but the contrast is relevant only within a proposition in which these two terms are connected by the predicate *to marry* (or *are seen together*), which is conflicting with the norms of a given culture. Hence, the semantic opposition should be evaluated relative to a set of beliefs, opinions, or norms. In fact, this important condition holds for *all* our semantic analyses: we are not talking here about abstract, universal semantics, but about socioculturally variable and hence cognitively variable and relative semantics. This means that the moves of the interviewee will be interpreted relative to the beliefs, opinions, norms, or values of the (dominant) WE-group, which he/she usually expects the interviewer to share. The move of what might be called *establishing a perspective* is precisely the initial or 'reminding' way to constitute this basis for the interpretation of what is said, or to guarantee that the same basis is shared with the interviewer. In other words, here we find a *metasemantic* move, that is, a move that guarantees or defines the (correct) interpretation basis for other moves (typically: *That is how I see it*). Such meta-moves may at the same time function as a form of *relativization* and hence as a form of *mitigation* if they follow a more absolute statement.

Presupposition, *implication*, and *suggestion* are moves defined in terms of unexpressed but entailed propositions, in which entailment is again relative to scripts, group schemata, or other social beliefs. Thus, instead of saying *They abuse our social services*, a speaker may presuppose the underlying proposition of this sentence to be known to the speaker or to be shared by the WE-group by directly stating *I don't understand why they are abusing our social services*. Or, with an implication, people may say *We have to pay*

for it (e.g. for their having many children), which implies that they do not pay for it themselves. And finally, an expression like *They always have the nicest clothes* suggests the implication *They have money* or even *They have obtained that money/those clothes by illegal means*. We see that the implicational relations between the explicitly stated and the implicit propositions might be increasingly weak, depending on the amount and strength of the underlying common beliefs and opinions about the social world.

Here we touch upon the large class of moves which does not only contain moves such as those of *implicitness*, but also those of *vagueness* and *indirectness*. Vagueness could be defined in terms of referential adequacy together with a pragmatic maxim that we should say no more and no less than relevant for the situation. If a speaker wants to represent the (intended) fact 'He stole my bike', vagueness may become a necessary move in order to avoid outright accusations (against a minority group). This may be done by adding modalities like *probably*, *maybe*, or *I think that...*, by choosing a more general term, such as *he took my bike*, or by specifying normal conditions or consequences such as *I have seen him where my bike was...* or *I have seen that he had my bike*. For the hearer the probable inference about theft remains the same in that case. Similarly, indirectness, e.g. of the whole speech act, may be strategically necessary if the 'direct' speech act would be too impolite, too negative for the discourse referent, or otherwise socially undesirable. Instead of an accusation, the speaker may then resort to the kind of indirect accusation performed by the assertion of possible conditions of the accusation as in the theft example just mentioned.

A *denial* also requires both a semantic and a pragmatic definition. On the one hand, a denial will semantically often be a negation of some proposition, but pragmatically it is the assertion that some presupposed proposition, or a previous assertion, is false or inappropriate, respectively. Self-denial may in that case be the negation of propositions implied by previous moves, whereas other-denial negates propositions implied by moves of the other speaker (here of the interviewer, for example). Typical denials in our data are moves such as *I have nothing against them*, which precede or follow moves in which negative evaluations are made about foreigners. Therefore, such denials should also be heard as a kind of correction or a warning, *viz.* that the hearer should not draw the wrong inferences.

Finally, we often find *concessions* as moves in our conversational data. These may be of different types. For instance, before or after negative evaluations, a speaker will typically assert that minorities also have 'good qualities'.

Similarly, an actual right may be denied (such as sharing in the benefits of social housing) when a more general right is conceded (such as *They have the right to be here*). Also, concessions will typically be made about possibly negative properties of some members of the WE-group before or after assertions about the same negative properties of the THEY-group: *They ruin our park here. Of course, also some of the Dutch children do this.*

Since denials, concessions, contradictions, and similar moves may often be incongruous with the overall meanings or intentions of the speaker, it often makes sense to add the term *apparent*. This qualification is necessary in order to explain the local and global coherence of the discourse and to specify the (relative) semantics for each move. In other words, we thereby want to convey that the move is strategical only relative to the goal of 'making a good impression', rather than to the goal of 'being sincere and honest'. Thus, semantically, propositions of such moves may be false, and pragmatically, the speech acts would violate the sincerity condition. Yet, such an analysis is too simple. Ethnic attitudes often have this seemingly contradictory nature. Despite the requirements of positive self-presentation, people are not simply lying. Rather, they may interpret or evaluate social reality from different points of view or on the basis of different models, general opinions, values, or norms.

This brief characterization of the semantic properties of strategic moves has shown first that both meaning and referential relations between propositions may be involved. Second, the interpretation is relative to the beliefs, scripts, schemata, or norms of the ingroup. Third, moves may be backward or forward. Fourth, moves may be used to signal unexpressed propositions. Fifth, moves may at the same time be pragmatic and rhetorical. Sixth, some moves seem to directly manage the interview interaction, e.g. meta-moves about one's own expressions or moves of avoiding to speak about a certain topic. In general, we may conclude that strategic moves are often used to manage (un)wanted semantic or social inferences. Wanted are the inferences that are positive for the speaker, unwanted those that may lead to a negative impression. The inverse holds for the presentation of the outgroup.

Although the moves discussed above may occur in all kinds of interviews or conversations, some of them seem to be more specific for prejudiced talk and for the specific strategies they help to realize. Thus, we find moves of *dissimulation* (implicitness, indirectness, vagueness, presupposition, avoidance), *defense* (excuse, justification, explanation, displacement), *accusation* (accusation, blaming, comparison, norm explication, and in general all nega-

tive predications), and those of *positive self-presentation* (admission, concession, agreement, acceptance, self-assessment, norm respect, empathy). Depending on the choices or combinations of such moves or move classes, different *styles* of talk about minorities may be discerned. Thus, less prejudiced people rather seem to opt for the 'positive' moves and avoid accusation moves when speaking about minorities.

Finally, it should be repeated that, although an analysis of moves tries to assess the semantics of talk and also the interactional strategies performed by them, part of the definitions and certainly most of the functions require a characterization in cognitive terms. The management of semantic or conversational inferences is part of the interpretation of what is said, how it is said, and of who is speaking. Such interpretations are based on shared rules and schemata, and often only appear on the 'surface' of talk by way of subtle indications, such as intonation, particles, connectives, hesitations, repairs, and so on. This is also the reason why a semantic analysis should be embedded into a wider framework of description. At this point, it is however already obvious that talk itself is merely the tip of the iceberg of the ongoing interaction and its cognitive and social dimensions. The huge inferential network involved remains below the surface.

Moves have been characterized in relative terms, *viz.* in terms of semantic relations between propositions and with regard to overall strategies. Yet, we have also briefly seen that moves occur in longer and more complex *sequences*. People may first avoid a direct answer by providing a sequence of positive self-assessment moves, and will only then volunteer the requested answer. In order to provide examples or instantiations, they will typically recur to a narrative sequence, or they will build up an argumentative sequence in which such stories may again be embedded. Although we haven't done so explicitly in the previous chapters, it is important to stress that whole sequences may form what could be called *macro-moves*. Telling a story, as a whole, may function as the macro-move of 'illustration' for a more general point (Polanyi 1979), and an argumentation may be an explanation or a preparation of a more general (often negative) conclusion. A macro-move, thus, is a move that has a function relative to other (macro-)moves, but that itself consists of a coherent sequence of (micro-)moves (for details, see van Dijk 1980).

7.3. *Some cognitive implications*

Many of the conversational strategies discussed above appear to require

a characterization in partly cognitive terms, rather than in terms of an abstract semantics. Indeed, action and interaction and hence also strategic organization require planning and monitoring, interpretations and inferences, of previous or current moves, or expectations or anticipations of next moves. In this final section, we would like to draw some further conclusions about the possible cognitive implications of such conversational strategies for the strategic uses of ethnic information and opinions.

From the direct expressions of beliefs or opinions in the interviews, we may of course tentatively infer that such expressions do indeed reflect the 'contents' of models or more general group schemata about minorities. More interesting, perhaps, is the formulation of hypotheses about the *processes* involved in the manipulation of ethnic beliefs and opinions. Prejudice is not only defined by its 'contents', but also by a way or style of thinking or evaluating, that is, by the *strategies* of social information processing about ethnic groups (see chapter 2).

One well-known operation involved is that of *(over)generalization*. People describe aspects of a single experience, that is, a particular model, but in order to enhance the validity and the cognitive usefulness of ethnic evaluations, they will tend to generalize from such a model to the more general group schema. Properties of individual participants or events are then taken as properties of all members of the group or of all ethnic situations. The converse may also happen. General properties assigned to the group or to a prototypical representative of the group are *particularized* for a single individual or unique event. We have found the strategic expression of such cognitive strategies in conversations in moves such as generalization and illustration. Note, however, that this only holds for negative properties. Typical for prejudiced thinking is that generalization or illustration do not hold for positive properties of ethnic minorities. These will typically be seen as exceptions or due to special circumstances (Pettigrew 1979).

Next, we may find operations of *extension* or transposition, in which negative experiences in one cognitive domain are extended to those in other domains. A negative evaluation of cultural habits, for instance, may extend to such domains as hygiene or behavior in general. In conversation this mutual 'triggering' of negative ethnic information is displayed in otherwise unwarranted topic changes. In fact, such extensions are a specific example of what could be called 'negative spreading'. If some negative detail in a model or a schema has been represented, the whole model or schema may be 'affected', both top-down and bottom-up. And finally, cognitive coher-

ence is obtained by linking negative models or schemata through *attribution*. That is, negative properties of the neighborhood are attributed to minority group presence and actions, even if plausible other explanations would lie at hand. The overall strategy of these cognitive operations and their conversational expression in the functional organization of moves is obviously to effectively build new, or rather reactivate old, models of ethnically relevant situations, and to link these with negative outgroup schemata. In interaction, then, the strategy is more specifically geared towards inducing a similar model or schema in the interviewer, or at least to making one's own models or schemata plausible or defensible social cognitions.

Beside these strategies leading to the construction of negative outgroup models and schemata, ingroup members need, of course, a complimentary strategy that aims at the construction of a positive self-image. In the analysis of the conversational strategies we have seen that the dominant moves employed in that case pertain to the avoidance of negative inferences about evaluative expressions: correction, mitigation, concession, and so on. In fact, these moves seem to express the operations that are to block precisely the negative operations described above: do not generalize, take this positive example, do not extend to my opinion about minorities in general, etc. Then, both in negative descriptions of outgroups and in positive self-presentation, argumentative sequences are given that make evaluations plausible and socially acceptable.

We may now finally try to characterize hypothetically some of the conversational strategies described in the earlier sections of this paper in terms of possible cognitive strategies within the framework and against the background of the general principles of the organization of group prejudices sketched above.

(a) *Generalization*. Move used to show that the (negative) information just given or about to be given, e.g. in a story, is not just 'incidental' or 'exceptional', so that a possible general opinion is warranted. Marks transition from model to schema.
Typical expression forms: *It is always like that, You see that all the time, This happens constantly*.

(b) *Example*. The converse: a move used to show that the general opinion is not just 'invented', but is based on concrete facts (experiences). Typical expressions: *Take for example, Last week, for instance, Take this guy next door. He...*

(c) *Correction*: A formulation or rhetorical strategy (often lexical). Monitoring one's own production leads to the assumption that the formula-

tion is either referentially 'wrong', or may lead to unwanted interpretation and evaluation by the hearer about underlying implications or associations. Part of a general semantic adequacy or of a positive self-presentation strategy.

(d) *Emphasizing*. A formulation strategy geared towards a better or more effective attention monitoring of the hearer ('drawing attention'), towards a better structural organization of relevant information (e.g. of negative predicates), or for highlighting subjective macro-information.
Typical expressions: *It is terrible that, a scandal that...*

(e) *(Apparent)Concessions*. Move which allows conditional generalization even if counterexamples can be mentioned, or which may display real or imagined tolerance and understanding as part of a positive self-presentation strategy.
Typical expression: *There also good ones among them, We may not generalize, but..., Also Dutch people can be like that* (which is also a Comparison).

(f) *Repetition*. A formulation move with similar functions as the move of emphasizing: drawing attention, structuring information, highlighting subjective evaluations, major topics, etc.

(g) *Contrast*. Move with several cognitive functions. Rhetorical: drawing attention to the members of the contrast relation (information structuring). Semantic: highlighting positive and negative evaluations of persons and their actions or properties, ofen by opposing WE- and THEY-groups.
Typical examples: ***We** had to work hard for many years, and **they** get welfare and do nothing*, ***We** have to wait for years to get a new apartment, and **they** get one directly when they come*, and all situations where conflicts of interest are perceived.

(h) *Mitigation*. Move that generally serves a self-presentation strategy, showing understanding and tolerance (or apparently, 'taking back' an evaluation or generalization that cannot be backed up). Intended to block negative inferences.

(i) *Displacement*. Essentially a move for positive self-presentation.
Typical example: *I don't mind so much, but the other people in the street, they get angry about that.*

(j) *Avoiding*. In fact, this is a set of different moves within a more general avoidance strategy. Cognitively, conversational or topical avoidance moves may indicate (i) no or insufficient relevant EM-information in the model, (ii) only irrelevant, unreportable information can be retrieved from the model, or (iii) only negative experiences and hence negative opinions can be retrieved and these are blocked by a general criterion of not speaking negatively about other people, other groups.

Typical expressions: *I don't know*, *I have no contacts with them*, *I don't care what they do or not*, *I have no time*...

(k) *Presupposition*, *implication*, *suggestion*, *indirectness*. Semantic and pragmatic moves allowing the speaker to avoid the formulation of specific propositions, e.g. those of negative observations or opinions, or to draw upon general, shared knowledge or opinions for which the speaker is not responsible.

Some typical indicators: usual presupposition markers (e.g. pronouns, definite articles, *that*-clauses to certain verbs, specific particles and adverbs, such as *even*, *also*, etc.), the use of second person pronouns for distant or general reference (*you see it all the time*), vague terms (*things like that*), incomplete sentence or stories, and so on.

These few examples show that it is in principle possible to attempt a reformulation of specific interactional and conversational moves and goals in talk about minorities in terms of their 'underlying' cognitive functions and strategies. We saw that some of the moves have merely an *instrumental* function: they draw attention (that is: bring specific information into working memory), structure information, point to macro-topics, etc. That is, they contribute to a better organization of the information, and hence to better retrieval chances of specific information in memory. Most rhetorical moves have this function. Other moves allow us to see how the speaker indeed 'moves' from episodic model information to more general semantic information about minority groups: they are typically used to back up, justify, or explain assertions (either by generalization or by exemplification). A third set of moves should be seen as contributing to the realization of self-presentation goals of speakers: there will be a possible monitoring control such as 'whatever I say, the hearer must not think negatively of me'. Mitigation, avoidance moves, and the various moves of implicitness or indirectness belong to this set.

Of course, this cognitive description is not only speculative, but also still very rough. Precise processing steps should be spelled out, the relevant information specified, and representations of the beliefs, opinions, or attitudes involved should be layed out. Yet, we believe that in this first stage of observation and theory formation, these approximations will do. We have found that the conversational strategies are very often interactional displays of cognitive strategies that are geared towards the effective *management of inferences*, that is, negative inferences (by the hearer) about minorities and positive inferences about the speaker and his/her attitudes.

8. STYLE AND RHETORIC

8.1. *Strategies of adequate and effective formulation*

Whereas the previous chapters have focused on the local and global meanings or contents of talk about minorities, as well as on their organization in stories and arguments, this chapter and the next one need to pay attention to the actual *expressions* of such 'underlying' structures. In this chapter, the adequate and effective strategies of formulation, that is style and rhetoric, will be attended to. Both topics would need booklength treatments, since the stylistic and rhetorical presentation of opinions about minorities is of course crucial in effective communication. An analysis of a few examples, however, will have to do to provide the flavor of the ways people speak about minorities. Future work needs to be done to fill in the many details.

By *style* we understand the textual result of personally and socially determined variations in language use for the expression of more or less the same meaning or reference (see Sandell 1977, for a survey of the many definitions, approaches, and confusions in the domain of stylistics). Variations in the process of formulation involve different pronunciation, sentential syntax, and lexicalization. Relevant is what impinges on that process, *viz.* information about the actual or permanent state of the speaker (anger, frustration, aggression, etc.), his or her social roles (age, gender, status, position, function, etc.), and the various structural properties of the social context (type of interaction or situation, environment, norms, group relations, and so on) (Scherer and Giles 1979). Thus, style is the linguistic trace of the context in a text. More or less independently of content, style allows the hearer to infer properties of the personal or social characteristics of talk. In our case, for instance, stylistic variations allow the hearer to infer evaluation and affect involved in opinions and attitudes about minorities, about the social roles of the speaker, about the definition by the speaker of the ethnic relations involved, or about the actual strategies performed during the interview. These stylistic options are partly fixed for the kind of interaction involved, *viz.* a semiformal interview situation with an (mostly unknown) researcher. Politeness formulae, such as the use of the V-form *U* in Dutch (vs. the more

familiar *je*), is one of the results of those situational constraints. We assume that style, therefore, can be evaluated according to its *adequacy* with respect to the complex contexts it indicates, or with respect to the rules that govern linguistic choice and variations for specific discourse genres and social situations (Brown and Levinson 1979).

Rhetoric on the other hand is concerned with conditions of *effectiveness*. It consists of a set of specific features at all levels of discourse analysis, from expression to meanings, that are aimed at the enhancement of the understanding and acceptance of the discourse by the recipient. Traditional rhetorical analysis, thus, focuses on special operations, so-called 'figures of speech', of which the best known are, for instance, alliteration, rhyme, and parallelism in surface structures, and metaphor, comparison, metonymy, and irony in meanings (Lausberg 1960; Corbett 1971; Plett 1979).

This means that also rhetorical structures of discourse are context-oriented. Yet, whereas style could be called the result of the interpretation by the speaker of the relevant context and hence is rather *speaker-oriented*, rhetoric is the result of the more specific attention for the hearer and is thus *hearer-oriented*. In other words, style is expressive, and rhetoric persuasive; style has to do with formulation, and rhetoric with strategies. Of course, at many points, style and rhetoric interact. Inadequate style simply is not very effective in most contexts.

8.2. *Some stylistic properties of talk about minorities*

Stylistic properties of discourse, we have seen, indicate both personal and social parameters of the communication context. More or less spontaneous talk during interviewing is first of all subject to the interactional constraints of the communicative situation that influence stylistic formulation. Interviewers are students and the interviewees are participating as citizens of Amsterdam, but also as parties that have agreed to participate in the semiformal occasion of talk defined as 'interview'. As we have suggested above, this means that the *forms of address* are also more or less formal. Also depending on the age of the interviewee, this involves the use of the polite personal pronoun *U*, both by the interviewer and the interviewee. In some cases, the increasingly prevailing form *je* is used, especially when interviewees are younger or of the same age as the interviewer. The interviewer is categorized as a representative of the institution 'university', and the nature of the interview itself is determined both by this institutional context and by the informality of a more or less spontaneous talk at the home of the inter-

viewees. This, means that, on the one hand, the style exhibits some lexical choices that are typical for the institutional context, such as the use of more or less academic terms, and, on the other hand, the use of colloquial, informal words that only occur in spontaneous everyday talk.

Syntactically, the formulation is subject to the usual constraints of spontaneous speech: incomplete sentences, repairs, hesitation phenomena, interruptions, repetition, etc.:

(41) (B1) among all kinds of nationalities (sighs)
well, uhh, I don't mind it but uh
I I do find it's a shame that it very uh
I am afraid that in this neighborhood it is
getting a bit the upperhand, you know that.

Since the social control on the formulation of opinions about ethnic minorities is rather strong, people take special care to choose the 'right words'. The incidence of repairs, new starts, or hesitations in the interviews is therefore rather high, as we also see in this example, where a sentence using the strong form *very* is broken off and reformulated in the more mitigated form of *getting a little bit the upperhand*. We come back to these conversational features of interview talk in the next chapter.

Another social marker is the social status of the interviewee. Not only the opinions themselves of people of different education and social background are rather different, but also the formulation. Compare, for instance, the expressions of the director speaking in our earlier examples (1), (2), (3), and (38) and those of a market trader, both associating foreigners with dirtiness:

(42) (I2) Yes, what should you think about it? They are
people. And, we have let those people come here.
We never should have done that. Not such big numbers.
Because eh it was to be expected ... that at a
given moment you get a whole lot of foreigners.
And uh it can be expected too, and it probably is
a scientific fact that uh the economic boom won't
always continue, that there is an undulatory motion,
so (incomprehensible) that motion goes down, then,
uh, then you get less employment. This is not something, not something unique to today, it has uh
always been like that and will probably always be
like that. Like everything going up and down.

(43) (G7) Well Amsterdam really has the the because of the foreigners is run down.

Iter: You think so?
Itee: Yes. Because of the foreigners it is really run down.
Because if you say nowadays well uh, then they are
already behind your back they are already with a
knife, right? I have been through it myself on the market and
uh I have seen it myself in the store, so that you
uh uh think that, a black one is coming, 'hally hop',
look out because one of them is coming...
But if they first if they first would just get rid of those
FOREIGNERS
Iter: You think they ought to?
Itee: Right. Then we'll end up with less unemployed, because
a lot of people they would like to. And they don't
get their turn, because you can go look
around, I know one of them here ...

Although the colloquial Dutch, especially in this last example, is practically untranslatable, the approximate English rendering already shows marked differences in style. First, the syntax of the first speaker is more or less complete and grammatical. Second, the lexical items he uses are from a more or less formal register of 'economics', such as *economic boom*, *undulatory motion*, and the use of expressions such as *it probably is a scientific fact.* Further, most sentences are generalizations, abstract descriptions of the ethnic situation. Few colloquial expressions are used. In the passages from the interview with the marketeer, we find a completely different style. First, he talks the local dialect of Dutch (Amsterdamese). Second, he uses *fall back* instead of the more academic term *pauperize* used by many other interviewees to denote the same situation. Third, he starts many sentences that are not completed. Fourth, he preferably illustrates general opinions with concrete descriptions (*they are behind your back with a knife*). Fifth, he uses many colloquial expressions and exclamations (such as the suggestive *hally hop*, probably derived from French *allez hop*).

8.3. *The expression of prejudice*

Within these social constraints of the interview situation and the social dimensions of the participants, we find the stylistic formulation of underlying opinions and attitudes about minorities. In the previous chapters we had already observed that the concepts used in the description of minority members and their actions are often negative. The strategies of negative concept selection, in that case, mutually elicit also negatively associated lexical items. For our discussion here, a few additional elements of style may be mentioned.

First, the *designation* of minority groups. We have noticed before that the term *ethnic minority* is a more or less formal, political, and academic term, hardly used in spoken Dutch. The overall term is *buitenlanders* 'foreigners', which is also used to denote immigrated groups, such as most Surinamese that have the Dutch nationality. By this specific use of the term *foreigner*, people no longer denote 'real' foreigners (abroad, or present as tourists) or immigrant groups from e.g. the surrounding European countries. In other words, the term has become virtually synonymous (in this specific reading) with the term ethnic (minority) group, thereby mostly denoting immigrant 'guest workers', Surinamese, and Antillians.

Next, the various groups are also denoted by their name of origin: Surinamese, Turks, Moroccans. Derogative terms are seldom used in the interview, although there is evidence that (especially among young people) hundreds of such words are in use, especially in contact areas. We find one or two negative terms directly related to negative experiences, such as *thief*, *mugger*, or *crook*. Then, some more general (or generic) 'vague' negative expressions are used, such as *foreign import*, *unruly pack*, *foreign stuff*, and especially *that sort of (kind of) people*. Mention of color is rather infrequent in out interviews. Once or twice we find the terms *colored* or *black*, and in some recent interviews in noncontact areas we sometimes find the expression *Negro*. The general term *Blacks* (instead of Negro) has not yet been generally accepted in the Netherlands (in everyday conversation), except in special (political, academic) situations.

Of interest is the rather systematic use of what we would call *demonstratives of distance*: *those foreigners*, *those Turks*, *such people*, etc. Together with the unspecified 3rd person plural pronoun *zij* 'they', these are the most usual expressions for the designation of minority groups. Here we find one of the most prominent markers of the social distinction between the WE-group and the THEY-group. Indeed, *we* in the interviews almost always denotes white, Dutch majority members, and *they* the minority groups.

Finally, we find examples of what could be called a form of *paternalistic diminutive*, especially for women (*vrouwtje* = little woman), which not only exhibits sexism but also some form of paternalistic empathy with the negatively evaluated position of minority women (especially from Turkey and Morocco).

The expressions for the properties and actions of minority members were discussed (in chapter 5) when we analyzed the negative actions in the Complications of stories. Yet, in general, there seems to be a rather strong

control over the use of (too) strongly negative and evaluative terms, which — we may be sure — would be used in conversations with family members or friends. Instead we find expressions that mark the strategy of mitigation (see previous chapter), such as the very frequent use of *a bit*, *somewhat*, or *somehow*, as well as more formal, academic terms to denote negative events, situations, or consequences. Thus, we encounter terms such as *infiltrate* to denote *there came many foreigners to this neighborhood*, and one popular formal term is '*pauperize*' instead of the less formal *going down* or *decline* (*achteruitgaan*). Stronger terms such as *verkankerd* 'cancered' are mostly mitigated with expressions such as *if I may say so* or *you could say that*. The general tendency, however, is that of lexically expressed conceptual mitigation of strong underlying opinions, such as *that is not very pleasant*, *I resent that*, or *that is rather disturbing*, which probably should be interpreted as parts of the interaction and self-presentation strategies of speakers in interviews.

Many opinions and qualifications that are based on general norms are formulated in terms of those very general norms, *viz.* by the use of proverbs, sayings, or fixed expressions. The many variations of *In Rome, do as the Romans do*, implying that the foreigners should adapt themselves to Dutch norms, rules, habits or customs, are standard.

If in an argument or story, the minority group or group member is represented with rather negative terms, we will often, by way of contrast, find corresponding positive terms for ingroup participants, such as *we asked politely*, *he explained patiently*, or *decent*.

Finally, there is a more or less fixed lexical register in talk about minorities used to denote various kinds of *difference*. Opinions, conclusions of stories, arguments or explanations about actions of minorities are often embedded in expressions such as: *they have different kinds of habits*, *they have a different mentality*, *they have a different way of living*, *their lifestyle is different*, *they have another pattern of living*, *they have quite different beliefs*, and the various specifications of these general expressions of underlying cognitive differentations between WE- and THEY-groups. One woman (E2) formulates the properties of Surinamese (young) men in the neighborhood and at the school of her daughter as *they are quite different, they are jumpier, and clappier* (i.e. they clap their hands more often, also in dancing), or as *more rebellious, noisier*.

Summarizing these few remarks about the style of the interviews, we have first found that there are 'class' differences between the interviewees,

also in the formulation of their opinions. Second, the interview situation itself poses rather strong constraints on the selection of negatively evaluative terms. In general, we find rather weak variants of the full register of negative qualifications, or the use of mitigating terms such as *a bit*, *somewhat*. Third, few downright racist terms were used to designate minority groups. The names of origin dominate, but they are mostly accompanied by distancing demonstratives. Negative situations or consequences are often described with more or less formal, academic (or political) terms, instead of with the usual colloquial expressions. On the whole, therefore, the style expresses the positive self-presentation moves we have also encountered in the previous chapter (mitigation, 'softening').

8.4. *Rhetorical operations*

When people formulate personal opinions about delicate topics in everyday conversation, recourse to rhetorical operations is not only normal but unavoidable. Interviewees are not just expressing their opinions, but they also want to make them plausible, reasonable, and acceptable. Therefore, part of the interaction strategies in interviews of this kind are persuasive. Rhetorical operations precisely have the aim to enhance the persuasiveness of the 'message', e.g. by expressive devices, comparisons or metaphors, and the many forms of exaggeration or mitigation we have also found among the semantic local strategies in the previous chapter. Those rhetorical strategies that have not been discussed there, may briefly be illustrated here. (Quotations are not literal here):

(a) *Contrast*. Contrastive operations are typically used to differentiate between the positive properties of Dutch majority members and the negative ones of minorities, or to mark differences in lifestyles or interests:

(44) (D2) We had to get up early. They were having late parties.
(45) (D2, E2) My husband was working. They were not.
(46) (E2) We have birth control. They have (too) many children.
(47) (C6) A lot of dirt and junk... but he had to deliver a clean apartment (about previous occupants).
(48) (E1) He explained in a decent way. She began to shout.

(b) *Generalization*. Generalization is one of the most forceful means to enhance the effectiveness of concrete exampes. It is the central feature of prejudiced opinions. Examples abound. For instance:

(49) (C6) All foreigners carry a knife.

(50) (C6) if you read the newspaper, it is always a Moroccan or a Turk who has been shooting or stabbing.

(c) *Exaggeration*. Beside the mitigating operations of positive selfpresentation, exaggerations about the negative qualities or actions of minorities also occur frequently, such as *one could have a knife in one's back* or *thirty people in an apartment*. Typically, however, such exaggerations are also used when people want to stress that they do not have a negative opinion about a minority member: *they are neat as a pin* or *some of them are extremely kind* may be used as preparations for negative statements about people, and then function as moves in an apparent concession strategy.

(d) *Litotes (understatement)*. We have encountered this operation several times. It is mostly used to mitigate a highly negative evaluation, as in *that is not exactly nice* or *I don't find that smashing*:

(51) (E5) My neighbor has recently been mugged... and that is not NICE.

(e) *Sincerity*. Persuasiveness also depends on the credibility of the speaker. Hence, claims about sincerity and the truth are repeatedly formulated, especially in 'unbelievable' stories: *I have good contacts. I mean that* (B4), *It is the truth, it is the truth, honestly* (B5), or *You can check for yourself* (E1).

(f) *Repetition*. In spontaneous talk, repetition is a current phenomenon, also as a result of on-line production constraints. Yet, it is also used as a rhetorical operation, as in the next statement about contacts:

(52) (B4) very often, very often, I have very good contacts with them (foreigners), very good contacts; I really mean that.

(g) *Enumeration and climax*. Repetitions may also take place for items of the same kind (enumeration), sometimes in increasing strength, as in the following description of noise from foreign neighbors:

(53) (D2) and that was not once, and that was not twice, that was constantly...
(54) (D2) and filthy, and dirty, and throw junk in the staircase.

(h) *Comparison*. On several occasions we have seen that people use comparison as a means of argumentation. The most pervasive comparison in our data is the one arguing in favor of the adaptation of foreigners to our norms, rules, and habits, *because we also (must) do so in other countries*. Indeed, as F3 explains: "a foreigner is like a guest in our house, who also must adapt to the rules of the house." In contrast, B5 argues that it is ridiculous to expect of Surinamese people that they speak Dutch among each

other (instead of their own language, Sranan Tongo), because "when I meet Dutch people abroad, then I speak Dutch, and I don't speak Italian or English or what do I know."

These are just a few examples from the rich inventory of rhetorical operations used in persuasive strategies of talk about minorities. Some of these seem to exhibit the underlying features of prejudiced opinions and thought (e.g. generalization, exaggeration, contrast, and comparison). Others are especially geared towards the optimal presentation of the self or the accomplishment of an effective story or argument, such as understatements and exaggeration, repetition and enumeration, the display of sincerity and argumentative comparison. Other examples may be given, such as metonymic *monkeying with the doorknob* (instead of breaking in), or ironic *our famous overseas citizens* (instead of Surinamese), which are both part of the general strategy of saying negative things in more or less 'polite' or 'tolerant' terms. These are all local rhetorical operations, especially of formulation (or local semantics). Other rhetorical features, such as those of argumentation and storytelling, as well as the overall organization and strategic accomplishment of talk have been treated separately in the previous chapters. Strategic self-presentation and persuasiveness are not just limited to the well-known figures of speech we have illustrated here: the rhetorical nature of talk about minorities can be found at all levels and dimensions. Few kinds of social discourse are in need of more persuasive strategies than the communication of our opinions about minority groups, because fundamental ingroup norms, values, and experiences are involved. Against the overall norm of tolerance and acceptance, the pervasive but still deviant ethnic prejudices need to be defended and 'sold' eloquently.

9. PRAGMATIC AND CONVERSATIONAL STRATEGIES

9.1. *Speech acts and the structures of opinion interviewing*

In this final chapter we must draw further consequences from the fact that talk about minorities, whether in interviews or in everyday spontaneous conversation, is a form of social action and of communicative interaction. The previous chapters recognized the inherent interactive nature of various strategies of self-presentation or persuasion, but both locally and globally we have focused on the talk of the interviewees, as if this talk were a form of persuasive monologue. Yet, even with the minimal intervention of the interviewer, it is obvious that, at each point, the interviewee is a party in a dialogue. Turns are given or appropriated, sequences of turns are organized into pairs of questions and answers, and even in the semantic strategies discussed in chapter 7, the implicit or expected countermoves of the other party were taken into account. Therefore, we should now see which further properties of talk about minorities should be accounted for in terms of the actions and interactions accomplished in dialogue.

Interaction sequences consist of social actions of respective participants in some social situation. In talk, such actions are, among other things, what are usually called *speech acts* (Searle 1969; Sadock 1974; Gazdar 1979; van Dijk 1981; Leech 1983). Abstract pragmatics, in our view, deals with this illocutionary dimension of utterances. In a broader (and vaguer) conception of pragmatics, practically *all* discourse features analyzed in this book would be 'pragmatic' (while outside of 'grammar'), so we find a narrower and more technical notion more appropriate. Also, we distinguish between the specific, conventionally categorized, illocutionary functions/acts, such as assertions, questions, threats, promises, congratulations, or accusations, and the other social dimensions such speech acts may have in interaction (just like other, nonverbal acts), such as 'attacking', 'defending', 'misleading', 'persuading', 'helping', or 'harassing' other people. That is, these other actions usually have the coagent or the patient as direct object of the action verb (to attack somebody) and may have the illocutionary act as an instrumental 'case' (to attack somebody *by* accusing him), although there are also 'combined' cases

(to congratulate somebody). We have seen in chapter 7 that these interactive roles (e.g. defense) are strategically crucial. Speech acts are *appropriate* (or inappropriate) relative to some pragmatic context, according to a number of specific appropriateness conditions. These conditions are formulated in abstract cognitive terms (knowledge, belief, want, opinion) or in terms of social relations (familiarity, dominance, institutional roles).

Interviews are pragmatically rather simple in that they exhibit standard adjacency pairs of questions and assertions that may be interpreted as 'answers' (that is, answers are *not* speech acts per se: we may answer *by* means of several kinds of speech acts). Often, the answer part may itself consist of a sequence of assertions, in our case often assertions about personal opinions, about ethnic relations, or about ethnic minorities in general. People in interviews seldom make promises, congratulations, accusations, or threats. So, from an illocutionary point of view, talk about minorities is usually of the 'assertive' kind. Yet, some further observations are necessary about the specifics of the typical question-answer pairs in interviews of this kind. (see Labov and Fanshel 1977; Stubbs 1983: chap.6).

The structure of questions in open interviews depends on the degree of participation of the interviewer. Minimally, the interviewer asks a brief informative question, such as *How long have you lived in this neighborhood*?, defining the (sub)topic of conversation. Such a question may be answered directly, after which the answer may trigger further information about the same topic, e.g. about the neighborhood. The interviewer's moves in that case may be minimal responses, such as *yes*, *oh*, *I see*, *hmm*, or *really*?, short repetitions or conclusions of what has just been said: *and you didn't like that* or *so*, *you left*!?, or various forms of encouragement to continue, to provide further details, or to formulate opinions: *what happened then*?, *can you tell me about that*?, or *so*, *what did you do*? That is, we have forward questions that initiate a new topic and ask for information about facts or opinions, but also backward questions, so to speak, which primarily 'react' to what has just been said, ask for clarification about a fact just mentioned, or provide minimal comments, and which only secondarily function as forward moves (as in requests for clarification, encouragement).

Questions may also become more complex and consist of various other speech acts, mostly a sequence of assertions followed by a question (or assertions that function as indirect questions). Such turns of interviewers are, however, globally interpreted as questions, *viz.* as macroquestions (van Dijk 1977, 1980, 1981), as is signaled by the structure of the answer. Such a

complex question structure may, e.g., be the following:

(a) *Reaction to a previous move of the interviewee* (acknowledgement, affirmation, minimal response, evaluation, etc.).
(b) *Meta-coreference to what was mentioned earlier* (e.g., *you have just said that, we were talking about...*).
(c) *Introduction of a new topic* (often a hypothetical situation).
(d) *Motivation or relevance of the topic.*
(e) *Question* (e.g., *What do you think about that*?).

Other structures are possible. One example of such a complex question can be found in the following fragment:

(55)	(B1)	Yes, and then of course you have eh	(Acknowledgement)
		and therefore I mentioned those children	(Coreference/ New Topic)
		that interests me	(Motivation)
		I was a teacher myself	(Support for Motivation)
		already several years ago	(Details Support)
		at that time there were not so many foreign children	(Topic, cont.)
	Itee:	Now there are many	(Comment)
	Iter:	But, but do we have to teach those children their own language, their own history,	(Main question)
		or would would one have to say, they they are in Holland now: the Dutch language and Dutch history?	(Alternative)

The overall strategy of the question is, so to speak, to sketch a real or hypothetical ethnic situation for the interviewee, and then to ask an opinion question about such a situation. In this example, in fact, there is no direct opinion question but a question about the situation (*do we have to teach...*), with respect to which the interviewee is expected to give his opinion. In this example, we also see that longer questions may involve the interviewer more as a direct participant in the conversation: she here volunteers information about her personal background as a motivation for her question. The difference with a real conversation is, however, that the overall aim remains that of asking questions. Also, the interviewer does not give her or his personal opinions, unless explicitly asked by the interviewee. This happens, for instance, in so-called appeal questions of the interviewee, as in *Don't you think so, too*?

The questions themselves are of different types. Direct *wh*-questions

are not predominant. Often, simply mentioning a situation, an event, is sufficient to prompt a further 'comment' by the interviewee. In this respect we seem to have a proper 'topic-comment' adjacency structure in the interviews. Also, we have seen that questions may be backward comments on previous moves of the interviewee, e.g. conclusions, evaluations (*how nice!*), or filling in incomplete sentences. Many questions are of the explanatory kind: *Why*? Sometimes the interviewer is caught in a brief dialogue introducing a story, as in:

(56) (B1) Itee: Did you ever see those heaps of rubbish in de Bijlmer?
Iter: No, eh, tell me about it.
Itee: Are you serious?
Iter: No, no, honestly, no I don't go to de Bijlmer.

The interviewee is both surprised about the social ignorance of the interviewer (presupposing the 'everybody knows that' move) and at the same time enhances the relevance and tellability of his story with such a question of disbelief. At the same time, the interviewer stimulates the interviewee to tell that story by denying this kind of general (prejudiced) belief. In this way, this conversational move of the interviewer is not only a contribution to the negotiation about the relevance of the story but also invites the storyteller to give her *all* the facts — and hence the opinions — about that neighborhood.

At this point we also notice how *answers* are being constructed. A first possible move in an answer sequence is again asking questions, such as requests for clarification about a question or statement of the interviewer, or 'making sure' moves that test provisional understanding (*you mean...*). These questions may or may not be answered by the interviewer: sometimes the interviewee continues directly with the proper answer part. Although there is no standard structure for answering in these open interviews, we often find a general direct answer to the question, followed by support in the form of an example, an illustration, a story, or an argument:

(57) (D4) Iter: What do you think about there being so many foreigners in this neighborhood?
Itee: Well, it has its advantages and its disadvantages. I mean uh we had a Surinamese neighbor on the second floor, and well that woman was absolutely nearly beaten up...
...
Iter: What should the city or the government do about that?

Itee: Not give them preference in housing ...
Iter: Does that happen?
Itee: Yes, I think so, because next door too there lived a Turk...

We see that in the two answer sequences to the respective questions of the interviewer, the interviewee first starts with a general or a more concrete opinion and then continues with a story or with an example that corroborates her opinion. The end of such an answer sequence may again repeat the original generalized opinion, which both functions as a conclusion to the story or to the example and at the same time marks the coherence and the relevance of the answer with respect to the previous question of the interviewer. The speech acts performed during such answer sequences, thus, are mostly assertions, but we may also have initial questions, rhetorical questions, appeals (*don't you think so, too*?), or exclamations (see Goffman 1981: chap.1, for details about different types of answers, replies, or responses).

9.2. *Dialogical structures and strategies*

In the previous section and the previous chapters many strategies of talk about minorities have been discussed: narrative and argumentative strategies, local semantic moves, and the various strategies of stylistic and rhetorical formulation. In these analyses the interactive nature of talk has clearly emerged. Yet, the spontaneous, 'real' forms of spoken dialogue have received little attention, such as turn-taking, repairs, hesitations, false starts, corrections, pauses, and so on. These verbal and nonverbal features of spoken language, however, contain rich indications about the processes of expression and formulation, on the one hand, and about the various interactive strategies, on the other hand. That is, except for turn-taking, they may not be directly rule-governed, but they are not purely accidental or *ad hoc* either. Rather, they may serve specific cognitive and social functions. In this last section we examine some of these properties of unplanned speech, although of course the translation problem is practically unsurmountable: only precise transcriptions of the Dutch dialogues would give us an approximation of what really went on during the interviews. Our analysis of an English version, therefore, is merely illustrative.

First, it should be recalled, however, that the local semantic strategies analyzed in chapter 7 are of course not monological, but inherently functional within dialogical interaction. That is, an apparent concession, a conclusion, or a correction is not only made relative to one's own previous or following

moves, but may also pertain to those of a previous (or next) speaker. The strategic moves that have such an interactive nature are for instance (see also Kreckel 1981):

(a) *Ascertaining*: making sure that a correct interpretation of the previous move has been made.
(b) *Denial*: denying a suggestion, conclusion, or accusation of the previous speaker, e.g. by asserting its negation.
(c) *Appeal*: a forward move intended to obtain acknowledgment from the hearer, to share opinions, or to raise empathy.
(d) *Apparent agreement*: move in which the speaker first seems to agree with the previous speaker, but adds a move that implies partial disagreement (the *Yes, but...* move).
(e) *Apparent admission*: same as with agreement, but now a proposition is first admitted (to be true) and then partially rejected (the *OK, but...* move).
(f) *Correction*: speaker corrects assertions or false assumptions of the previous speaker (e.g. about the opinions of the speaker).
(g) *Illustration*: a general statement of the previous speaker is directly reacted to with a concrete example, illustration, or story (as in: *Yes, take for example...*).
(h) *Ignorance*: a direct avoidance move that is used to express ignorance, or to dissimulate possibly unacceptable beliefs.
(i) *Differentiation*: move that allows the speaker to avoid a direct answer, e.g. by differentiating various aspects, by distinguishing both positive and negative sides, etc. (e.g. *It depends*, and *On the one hand...on the other hand*).

These are just a few of the most common interactive moves we find in our interviews. We have argued before that these moves are part of the overall strategies of persuasion and especially of positive self-presentation. That is, denials usually pertain to negative opinions the interviewer is supposed to have about the interviewee, and the same holds for corrections. Apparent agreements are used to show that the speaker accepts an argument of the previous speaker but does not want to accept all consequences (e.g. some positive evaluation of minority groups). The standard structure, then, seems to become one of 'give and take', in which the interviewee agrees with or accepts some positive point of the interviewer (and thereby shows cooperation and tolerance) but at the same time wants to express his/her own negative

experiences or evaluations. Or conversely, a negative opinion about the interviewee that might be the conclusion of the previous remark of an interviewer may be corrected by a denial, refusal, or restatement of one's tolerant ethnic attitudes.

Besides these semantic and pragmatic interactive moves, spontaneous dialogue also exhibits a number of production and expression features that are interesting for our discussion: false starts, hesitations, corrections, pauses, and so on. Part of these can be explained in terms of underlying cognitive processes of 'verbalization', retrieval difficulties, syntactic interference, or other 'difficulties' of production (Levelt 1983). Others though signal the underlying strategies for the management of delicate opinions, for face keeping, or persuasion (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977; Schegloff 1979; Jefferson 1974; Polanyi 1978; Goffman 1981: chap.5). This happens, for instance, when ethnic group designations or opinion-based concepts are to be selected, inserted into semantic representations, lexicalized, and expressed. We have found, for instance, that in many interviews people hesitate when they have to *name* a specific ethnic group. In fact, naming is often avoided and replaced by (vague or ambiguous) pronouns or descriptions (*those people*). The same holds when some qualification is made about general properties or actions of minority groups. Similarly, at the same locations we may expect relatively many repairs or corrections and 'cognitive search pauses'. We interpret these phenomena again as production results of a sociocognitive strategy of positive self-presentation or self-protection in the expression of socially delicate opinions. That is, a sentence once planned and under execution may be 'called back' by the cognitive Control System that monitors production and expression and their relevance and adequacy with respect to the communicative context. A sentence that would come across as 'too strong' would in that case be reformulated in the usual 'softer' form. Here we find the conversational correlate of the semantic moves of (self)correction—in which a 'better' sentence or proposition follows one that has already been expressed. Here the correction takes place during the production process itself.

Instead of giving many different examples from several interviews, we have chosen one interview in which the interviewee makes frequent use of these various production phenomena and in which it is clear from the contents that he wants to protect a positive self-image of tolerance and understanding. Due to space limitations we select only a fragment of the interview:

(58) (B1) (young, 32 year old man, systems analyst, now living in a contact area of Amsterdam)

Iter: They often say of eh Amsterdam, don't they, they indicate that as a positive point... the fact that there are so many nationalities here... what. what
Itee: Whether I find that positive?
Iter: Yes.
Itee: Well, I happen to live among that
Iter: Among what (laughs)
Itee: (hesitates) among all kinds of nationalities (sighs) well uhh, I don't find it negative, but uhh, I I do find it a pity that it very uh I am afraid that it will get the upperhand in this neighborhood (incomprehensible), you know that
Iter: But what kind of nationalities do you mean?
Itee: Here? (surprised look). Don't we have all kinds of nationalities running around here? Turks, Moroccans, I learn about Egyptians too, Israeli, of course Surinamese. In fact, everything.
Iter: Yes
Itee: uh I... I I think somewhat too many are coming to this neighborhood.
Iter: Hmmyes... [but do you have...
Itee: [not so much because it bothers me, as such, but because the character of the neighborhood is a little but a little bit evaporating and I I I still find it nicer to... yes... well, well, not to deal with people of my own nationality, not so much that, but...uh..well, once in a while I still notice certain... uh yes... very, a lot of things disappear from this neighborhood and instead of that there are coming... empty empty, no those uh those other people; those other people, people of other nationalities.

The interviewer starts the interview with the (planned) 'positive' mention of foreigners in Amsterdam, so as not to introduce negative bias from the outset. Before she can finish her question, the man interrupts with a question about the probable question of the interviewer, an interpretation which is confirmed by her. Then the man starts one of his 'evasion' moves by not directly answering the question but by 'stating the obvious', namely that he lives among *that* (he does not say *them*), which prompts the *among what* question from the interviewer. Now an answer about concrete minority groups is called for, and the man hesitates, then opts for the neutral notion of 'nationalities' and starts to formulate his opinion about these groups. He starts with the typically Dutch particle *nou* 'well' which both introduces many new turns in talk and

may also express hesitation. Then he resorts to the well-known apparent concession move (NOT NEG, BUT) and in fact uses the very concepts that underlie that move (*not negative, but*), again followed by hesitation *uh's*, repetitions of the personal pronoun *I*, and then the provisional negative content following in an apparent concession move (*a pity that*). Yet, the choice of *very* seems to bias the sentence too negatively, and a new sentence is formulated, prefaced with the 'softer' form *I am afraid that...*, and the mitigating expression *to get the upperhand*. Finally, this turn is closed by an appeal to the interviewer to acknowledge her common knowledge about such a situation. The question about the kinds of nationalities is apparently easier to formulate, although the slightly negative expression *running around here* (in Dutch: *lopen hier rond*, meaning 'they are around here') is used. Finally, in line 19 the man must specify *why* he thinks that too many foreigners are coming to live in his neighborhood, and there again we find the full sequence of hesitations, false starts, repairs and corrections. He uses *uh*, repeats the first person pronoun three times, pauses frequently, and uses repeatedly the mitigating term *a bit* (or *somewhat*). In line 22, we again find the apparent denial (the converse of the apparent concession) *not because it bothers me, but...* After further hesitation markers, the sentence in line 25 starting with *I still find it nicer to* (maybe: to live among my own people) is broken off, and after further hesitations its probably intended propositional content is negated, which is perhaps the strongest form of propositional correction. Then, a somewhat 'safer' reason for his negative opinion follows: many things disappear from this neighborhood to be replaced by *those other people*, an expression that is repeated, then repeated ironically (self-commenting), and replaced by the more neutral *people of other nationalities*.

From this brief analysis of an interview fragment we may conclude, first, that there seems to exist an interesting correspondence between the semantic strategies, on the one hand, and the conversational characteristics of talk, on the other hand. Evasion of direct answers and the well-known moves of apparent concessions or denials are also marked in production with hesitations, pauses, false starts, repairs, or reformulations of various kinds. Second, these phenomena seem to be typical when minority groups and their properties are the topic under discussion. This seems to be in keeping with the intuitively plausible hypothesis that socially delicate ideas require extensive monitoring, which results in a search for cognitively and socially optimal expressions. And such a conversational goal involves the phenomena we have described above. Further work, also experimental, is necessary to inves-

tigate whether the awareness or the prominence of social self-monitoring in speech — e.g. when delicate topics are discussed — indeed systematically leads to these production phenomena, such as hesitations, pauses, corrections and so on. And finally, besides these implications for the analysis of the social dimension of talk about minorities, such as the strategies of self-presentation and persuasion, the properties of spontaneous, on-line production may show some of the underlying organization and especially the manipulation of ethnic attitudes in memory. In our example we see that the interviewee formulates a number of opinions explicitly, but others are 'broken off' or 'corrected' during production, which shows how such opinions are activated and used in the production process but also that they are constantly compared to higher-level opinions, and especially to prevailing social norms and values. That is, ethnic prejudices are not simply a 'list' that becomes available during talk and which may be wholly or partly expressed depending on topic, conversational relevance, or interactional strategies. Rather, prejudice should be seen as a set of specific strategies of social (ethnic) information processing, of 'thinking', based on some more or less fixed opinions or attitudes, but flexibly adapted to the various other kinds of social information people possess as well as the information from the actual context. This also explains why people during the same interview seem to express opinions that on the surface seem inconsistent or incoherent. At each position in the interview, other local information may be available or relevant that provides another 'perspective' on the social representations of ethnic groups or ethnic relations. The consequences for spontaneous talk are that one obtains an 'on the one hand' and 'on the other hand' strategy of opinion formulation. The consequence for the relations between ethnic prejudice and overt (discriminatory) interaction is that each ethnic situation may activate different ethnic opinions together with many other social beliefs that together are, the input for action planning and execution. General predictions from underlying prejudices to actual 'behavior' are therefore usually rather unreliable.

This final section however has shown that as far as the relations between prejudice and verbal actions, *viz.* talk about minorities, are concerned, a close analysis of conversational details can, in principle, reveal many of the cognitive and social constraints operating on the expression, presentation, and persuasive uses of ethnic attitudes.

10. CONCLUSIONS

Ethnic prejudice is the root of racism. Without such negative attitudes about minority groups, there would be no ethnic discrimination. Yet, in the same metaphorical terms, the root of prejudice needs the soil of sociocultural and historical conditions that make racism grow and become visible. Hence, without social inequality and oppression, no discrimination would be needed for one group to dominate others, either. And we have seen that the social and economic 'ecology' of discrimination directly determines the depth, the strength, and the size of the ramification of the roots. Finally, plants need cross-fertilization to multiply and diffuse: single plants do not survive; they come in sorts and species. Talk about ethnic minorities, taken as the expression of prejudice and the persuasive interaction for its diffusion in the ingroup, has this important function for the cross-fertilization of racism in the social environment. It provides the seeds from which further discrimination may grow.

So far for the metaphorical reformulation of the major theoretical notions that underlie this study. Fortunately, the laws of nature are not the laws of humanity. The relations between the cognitive contents and organization of ethnic attitudes, on the one hand, and the many forms of discrimination in the social, cultural, historical, and economic contexts, on the other hand, are much more complex. Despite general principles or even universals of cognitive organization and intergroup relations, there is also permanent change in these interdependencies. We have goals, norms, and values, and such shared constraints on action and interaction may have their feedback also in modified cognitive programs. Ethnic prejudice and discrimination, therefore, are not simply the inescapable result of the fundamental principles of the cognitive programs (such as those of generalization, categorization, and the use prototypes and stereotypes). Nor, for that matter, are they the result of the biological hardware that makes the programs work. All depends on the sociocultural functions and aims of the programs, and these can be changed. Although we are again indulging in new, more contemporary metaphors, *viz.* those of computer hardware and software as they are popular

in psychology, the upshot is clear: ethnic prejudice and discrimination are not 'inherent' flaws of the cognitive and social machinery of mankind. Both fundamental research and sociopolitical action may provide insights into, and changes of, the racist nature of our societies. Our analysis of the informal, daily expressions and communication of ethnic prejudice within dominant ingroups has been conducted against this general background. The aim was to show how and what ingroup members say about their ethnically different and dominated fellow citizens.

Yet, a study of talk about minorities itself, whatever its linguistic or discourse-analytic relevance, is not enough. It does indeed yield insights into what people say and how they do so. But there is also a why-question to attend to. This means, first, that we were interested in the links between talk and thought, between discourse properties and the underlying cognitive properties of prejudice. We have found that both the semantic contents and the many types of strategy of conversation allow (complex) inferences about the contents, the organization, and the cognitive strategies involved in prejudiced information processing about minority groups in society. Second, the properties of talk are not fully explained by this relationship with underlying cognitions. People 'adapt' their discourse to the rules and constraints of interaction and communication in social settings. Especially when delicate topics, such as 'foreigners', are concerned, social members will strategically try to realize both the aims of positive self-presentation and those of effective persuasion. Both aims, however, derive from the position of social members within their group. Positive self-presentation is not just a defense mechanism of individuals as persons, but also as respected, accepted, and integrated social members of ingroups. And the same holds for the persuasive nature of prejudiced talk: people do not merely lodge personal complaints or uneasiness about people of other groups, but intend to have their experiences, their evaluations, their opinions, their attitudes, and their actions shared by other members of the ingroup. The properties of talk signal or indicate both these cognitive and these various social functions of prejudice and its expression in discourse.

To arrive at such (very) general conclusions, we conducted more than 100 nondirected interviews, collected in several neighborhoods of Amsterdam, both as the method and as the object of our research. It was expected that informal interviewing about socially delicate topics would yield more valid data than, for instance, survey or experimental methods of the usual kind. This expectation appeared to be realistic. The amount and the richness

of the data are overwhelming. And this book only provides one major cross-section of the cognitive, social, and especially the discourse-analytical account of how and why people talk about minorities and what they say.

The cognitive foundation has been formulated in terms of current theories of social cognition and was inspired by (also our own) earlier work on the psychology of discourse processing. This framework provides a sound basis for memory organization and the processes involved in the representation and the uses of ethnic prejudice. We have assumed, for instance, that prejudice is a specific kind of social attitude about groups and have shown *how* such an attitude is organized in memory. Suggestions from psychology and Artificial Intelligence about the organization of knowledge and beliefs, e.g. in terms of frames or scripts, appeared to be helpful in that respect, though were far from sufficient. We have proposed that prejudice is organized by an (ethnic) attitude schema, built up from a number of basic categories (origin, appearance, socioeconomic, cultural, etc.) that are used to collect and order information (beliefs, opinions) about minority groups. It has been emphasized that these categories are not arbitrary, but depend on the social functions of prejudice and discrimination for the ingroup. Indeed, it has been shown how cognitive ethnic schemata as well as the strategies for their manipulation in information processing are directly interrelated with the features of the social context of a racist society. Prejudice, therefore, is at the same time a shared, group-dependent, social representation. In order to explain the actual uses, the acquisition, the changes, and the expression of prejudice, it has appeared to be necessary to introduce also further notions, such as the concept of a 'situation model'. Such models are the crucial representation in memory of ethnic situations and events, and form the origin and the aim of talk about minorities. They are the basis on which ethnic attitude schemata are construed, and show how the overall negative organization of prejudice can be accomodated to the concrete information from events and interactions in everyday life. We have therefore formulated a number of basic principles for the prejudiced strategies that are the active processes that use information from such models and the more general attitude schemata.

The larger part of this study, then, tries to connect these various cognitive representations and strategies with the discourse characteristics of what people say about minorities. This analysis has followed the more or less well-known tracks of systematic descriptions of text or dialogue. A few chapters have been dedicated to the study of the global, overall organization of talk, e.g. in terms of semantic macrostructures (topics), of narrative struc-

tures, and of argumentation. Other chapters have paid attention to the local features of talk, such as semantic moves, style and rhetoric, speech act sequences, and conversational phenomena. Besides an (unfortunately mostly short and incomplete) description of such discourse structures, we have tried to relate such features with the underlying organization and strategies of prejudice in memory as well as with the two major interactional strategies of talk about minorities, *viz.* those of positive self-presentation and of effective persuasion and communication.

Thus, we have found that if prejudice is stereotypical, this certainly shows in the topical organization and contents of talk about minorities. People volunteer opinions and tell stories about a rather stereotypical list of topic classes, such as crime/aggression, economic competition (housing, work, social benefits), and especially cultural 'deviance'. Topical sequencing, topic changes, and the strategies of initiation and continuity reveal underlying networks of prejudices as well as effective strategies for the presentation and defense of such prejudices in conversation.

Similarly, stories about minorities are also as stereotypical as the prejudices and other beliefs on which they are based. They reveal what situation models people have about 'ethnic events'. This even shows in the structural setup of narrative: stories about minorities often lack a Resolution category. Indeed, they are not stories of heroes but of 'victims': WE (the white Dutch people) cannot do anything against THEM (the foreigners that provide us with all the nuisance we are telling about). Instead, a prevalent Evaluation category provides the important (negative) opinions about the events and actions we are involved in as well as the basis for the negative conclusions or 'moral' such stories lead to. This negative moral defines the ultimate communicative and persuasive functions of storytelling about minorities.

Usually, stories are functional elements of argumentations that are conducted systematically to provide our prejudice opinions with conversational and hence social plausibility, if not respectability. Although, of course, such argumentations are hardly ever valid and abound in fallacies that precisely express the underlying fallacies of thoughts about minorities, they are hardly less effective. Indeed, the strategies of argumentation are mainly geared towards the enhancement of their persuasive effects rather than towards a proof of their solidity or validity. Thus, people are able to redefine their own racist preferences as preferences or goals of minority groups, and are constantly busy showing that their arguments are not racist.

The same holds for the local semantic strategies we have paid attention

to in somewhat more detail. Moves are often directed backwards to check, control, or modify past moves that might have negative implications for our self-esteem, or else they are directed forwards to provide a positive basis for our next negative expressions. The standard formula for that kind of local move has become widely known: *I have nothing against foreigners, but...* Thus, local semantic moves are practically always functional within the interactional strategies of positive self-presentation and effective persuasion, and have as their direct aim the monitoring and the management of (wanted) inferences of the hearer.

This also shows in the surface characteristics of style, rhetoric, and conversational performance. The semantic move of mitigation finds its corresponding rhetorical figures in understatement or litotes as well as in the stylistically relevant lexical choice of 'moderate' expressions, all together indicating (apparent, and indeed 'surfacy') tolerance or reasonableness, but rhetorically conveying implicit messages about 'how bad it really must have been'.

The working of ethnic models and schemata in memory also shows in the production features of spontaneous talk and actual (interview) interaction. Pauses, hesitations, repairs, or corrections, etc., accompany rather systematically the expression of designations for ethnic minorities and their properties and actions. Possibly (too) negative formulations are stopped immediately and rephrased. What we see in the semantic moves shows up here in the actual on-line monitoring of speech. White Dutch majority people do want to say their piece, they want to complain or express their opinions and emotions, but social norms, values, and constraints (upon discriminatory talk) as well as the requirements of interactional strategies of positive self-presentation as tolerant, understanding citizens and as credible 'victims' at the same time require that delicate topics be talked about delicately. Topical sequencing, storytelling, argumentation, semantic moves, style and rhetoric, and the actual production of conversational speech show these conflicting aims at all levels. Therefore, a discourse-analytical approach has provided such important insights into the representation and the strategies of prejudice use, as well as into the interactional strategies of their expression and diffusion in the social context.

Yet, despite these interesting results, most work lies still ahead. The sociocognitive model of prejudice or ethnic attitudes and their uses is hardly more than a sketchy outline. The representational format is still highly informal. More empirical work is necessary to specify its actual (and socially and historically variable) contents and organization. The strategies of the uses

of prejudice in talk but also in actual social situations are as yet barely known. Similarly, our analysis of talk about minorities has — as one would expect me to say in a concluding chapter — hardly scratched the surface. Monographs could be filled with analyses of storytelling, argumentation or semantic moves, or any other topic of this book. Also we need more data about the social environment of talk about minorities. What are the (usual) variations, depending on social situations, or backgrounds (gender, education, etc.) of speakers and their talk? How does less prejudice or different 'kinds' of prejudice — or indeed tolerance — show in discourse?

And even more importantly, what *are* the cognitive and social effects or functions we have been speculating about all through this book? How *are* people influenced by prejudiced talk about minorities, and how do they confirm or change their models and schemata about foreigners? If we want to study discourse as a means of getting answers to the question about the communicative diffusion of ethnic prejudice and the information-processing machinery of racism in society, these are the kinds of questions we will have to attend to in the near future. Since we know practically nothing about the facts or about the theoretical account of the effective spreading of prejudice in society, it is easy to conclude again that indeed most work is still to be done.

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